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ABSTRACT  
African Childhood in Literature and Law 
Between Traditions and Modernism 
By  
Parfait Kouassi Kouacou  
 
Advisor: Francesca Canadé Sautman 
This dissertation traces, in Sub-Saharan Francophone literature and in African regional law, a 
mode of construction of childhood characterized by cultural mixture. It contends that the 
gradually articulated hybrid mode of construction of childhood and children’s experience in 
African literature and law is connected to changing discourses on cultural identity. African 
cultural identity discourses shifted from an earlier affirmation of cultural authenticity, evident in 
early Négritude ideology, to a later claim of cultural mixture. Early African childhood narratives 
asserted cultural authenticity by praising a pristine African world rendered in standard European 
languages, whereas subsequent postcolonial childhood narratives used linguistic and cultural 
hybridity to account for the mosaic of realities in the postcolony. The narratives of cultural 
mixture blossomed under a later form of Négritude that traded the initial cultural authenticity 
discourses for new concepts such as métissage and civilization of the universal. 
Contemporaneously to these postcolonial claims of cultural mixture, local and regional laws in 
Africa gradually embraced legal pluralism. I contend that the conjoined efforts of law and 
literature in utilizing the emblematic imagery of childhood as an ethos of cultural hybridization 
has substantial implications for ongoing global discourses. Not only does it revive questions 
about African cultural identity today, after decades of colonial perception of African as children 
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and lacking civilization, it also unveils an African voice that rejects the received idea that the 
continent is a tabula rasa on which western models can be exported and normalized. I study an 
example of this African voice with the notion of African childhood, which was invented in 
literature as a local counterpart to what has now emerged as global childhood, a childhood also 
imagined in European Romantic literature, then formalized in international law. This study relies 
on cultural, literary and human rights critical theories, and documents the various ways in which 
literature and international law have created a ‘battlefield’ where hegemonic and subaltern 
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HYBRIDITY AND CHILDHOOD IN AFRICAN LITERATURE AND LAW 
1. Childhood and Children’s Rights: A Context 
The literary imagination of childhood long predates the legal concept of children’s rights. 
Amid Enlightenment notions such as freedom and rights for men and women in Europe, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau published Émile, ou de l’éducation (1762). A decade later, Hannah More1 
grew discontented that “[a]mong the real improvements of modern times…it is to be feared that 
filial obedience cannot be included.” More’s great fears were wrought by indications in literature 
that “the next influx of that irradiation which our enlighteners are pouring in upon us, will 
illuminate the world with grave descants on the rights of youth—the rights of children—the 
rights of babies!” (emphasis in original) (100).  
The past two centuries have seen the concretization of More’s worry. The literary 
imagination of childhood has come to be intertwined with legal conceptions of children’s rights. 
The two have come to evolve concomitantly, to inform one another, and to cooperate in 
illuminating each other’s sensibility and legibility.2 Hence, at the onset of the twentieth century, 
children’s rights principles began to be formulated on the grounds that “childhood is entitled to 
special care and assistance.”3 Historians have ascertained that the need for special care and 
assistance for childhood was an influential literary theme spanning the early modern period 
through the nineteenth century in European literature. The pioneering work on the history of 
                                               
1Hannah More (1745-1833) was a British playwright, poet, abolitionist, and philanthropist.  
2In Human Rights, Inc. (2009), Joseph Slaughter formulates this paradigm of cooperation between literature and 
international law. 
3The preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child recalls that, in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the United Nations proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance. 
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childhood is Philippe Ariès’s Centuries of Childhood (1962), first published as L’Enfant et la vie 
familiale sous l’Ancien Régime (1960). Centering on the Late Middle Ages, Ariès used 
representations of childhood to show that in medieval society culture with respect to the child 
and childcare was both narrow and mediocre by modern standards. While this theory has since 
been criticized as too simplistic,4 it laid the foundation for other historians to document the 
changes in the concept of childhood that occurred over time. The opening lines of Lloyd 
DeMause’s 1974 History of Childhood, for instance, state that the history of childhood is a 
nightmare from which we have only recently begun to awaken, quoting in epigraph the words of 
Victorian era poet Elizabeth Barrett Browning (1806-1861):  
Do ye hear the children weeping?  
Oh my brothers . . . 
The Cry of the Children. (DeMause 1) 
The subsequent deployment of notions of children’s innocence and vulnerability in narrative and 
poetry, especially during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,5 fostered what human rights 
theorist Joseph Slaughter terms in his book Human Rights Inc., as the conceptual vocabulary, 
deep narrative grammar, and humanist social vision (4) that now nurture human rights law. As is 
the case for human rights law in general, children’s rights law relied on this literary material to 
imagine and normalize the provisions of the two declarations on the rights of the child, adopted 
by the League of Nations in 1924 and by the United Nations in 1959, and the ensuing UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted in 1989. Reciprocally, international law has 
recently shaped the notion of childhood. The development of children’s rights discourses, for 
instance, has given rise in the age of globalization to a notion of global childhood, a term never 
                                               
4The comprehensive criticism leveled by scholars, especially medievalists such as Pierre Riché and Danièle 
Alexandre-Bidon (L’enfance au moyen âge 1994) is presented in the next chapter.    
5 More insight about these narratives and poetries is provided in the next chapter.		
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really defined but often used to describe the life of the universal child. This universal child has in 
turn risen as a global citizen, in both literature and society (see McCulloch, and also Larsson). 
The cooperative effort between literature and international law, as Slaughter noted, is geared 
towards the realization of such a global citizen. But literary representations in this collaboration 
have implications for human rights narratives. For instance, the notion of “full development of 
the human personality,” according to Slaughter, has implications for the form and politics of the 
literary rendering of human rights narratives. This is the case for the Bildungsroman, which 
Slaughter takes as the example which translates such a quest for human growth. Similar 
implications are found in the formal features of childhood narratives examined in this 
dissertation, in which the hybridized mode of expression appears as social, cultural, and political 
discourses. 
In today’s global society, childhood is imagined, in the words of John Somerville (1982), 
as a carefree, safe, secure, and happy phase of human existence. This global notion of childhood, 
flowing from international law, views children from all corners of the world on the same footing, 
without any differentiation as to race, sex, religion, or social origin. As part of the international 
human rights law framework, children’s rights are inalienable. The institution of childhood as a 
social phenomenon, however, remains subject to literary and cultural speculations. This is not to 
claim that there is no shared basis for grasping the notion of childhood. All societies recognize 
that children are different from adults. Childhood as a phase of immaturity is an inescapable 
biological fact, a universal reality of life. However, recent scholarship based on social 
constructivist theory suggests that the ways in which this immaturity is understood and made 
meaningful is a sociocultural construction (Prout and James 56). As such, any notion of 
childhood is always the product of and connected to a specific sociocultural and historical 
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context. It is not surprising that the notion of global childhood, flowing from children’s rights 
law, conflicts at times with local notions anchored in native cultural traditions. The studies, 
which I survey below, consistently identify such a global notion of childhood as one with its 
roots in Euro-American history and culture, although the construction of the notion is in itself a 
social utopia.6  
This utopic Euro-American notion was introduced into international law at the outset of 
the invention of children’s rights in the early twentieth century and has since achieved global-
standard status. As Judith Ennew noted in 2000, the history of children’s rights began during the 
colonial period and was essentially written by the dominant nations of the North,  following the 
axiom “history is written by the winners.” During the adoption process of the draft of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, scholar Russell Lawrence Barsh 
criticized it as a case of “Eurocentrism in standard-setting.”7 This Eurocentric undertone alone 
has attracted criticism from others across disciplines. Legal scholar Abudallahi An Na’im 
warned in 1994 against the normalization of the values and institutions of the dominant culture. 
Normative universality in human rights, including the rights of the child, he cautioned, “should 
neither be taken for granted nor achieved through the ‘universalization’ of the norms and 
institutions of dominant cultures, whether at the local, regional or international levels” (62). 
Anthropologist Olga Nieuwenhuis contended in 2010 that the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child of 1989 “is not culturally neutral but is grounded in the assumption both of the 
                                               
6In this study, I build on scholarship that refers to this utopian Euro-American notion of childhood as “Western 
childhood.” While I follow this established scholarship in the field and use that same terminology, I do not suggest 
that all Euro-American cultures and childhood are exactly the same. Rather than implying an essentialist-sounding 
Western monolith, my reference to “Western childhood” or “global childhood” is to be understood within the global 
discourses in which the West as a group is compared to other groups in the world. 
7The phrase “a case of Eurocentricism in standard-setting” is part of Barsh’s title, which starts as “The draft 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.” 
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superiority of the childhood model as it has evolved in the North and of the need to impose this 
model on a global scale” (270). Nieuwenhuis further sees this global project as denying the 
possibility of diverse childhood, underscoring a certain moral superiority of Northern ideals 
which provides grounds for the attacks against “other” styles of upbringing as a “lack”—or, as 
popularly described, “outside childhood.”  
An Na’im and Nieuwenhuis contend that there is a tension between multiple cultural 
models of childhood, which the international discourse does not seem to heed. These scholars, in 
identifying this problem, have made it more legible and recognizable. One can now observe that, 
in today’s unified international order, the multiple models of childhood are bound up with the 
dynamics of power relations. This observation, in turn, can elicit inquiries into ways in which 
repressed views on local models of childhood survive, auto-negate, or seek public recognition in 
the international arena. That is what this dissertation attempts to show, by tracing in Sub-Saharan 
Francophone literature and African regional law a mode of construction of childhood 
characterized by hybridization. The local notions of childhood, as this research will show, like 
the societies from which they derive, are not static and uniform. They have evolved with each 
successive wave of encounters between Africans and between Africans and other cultures, and 
they have become heterogenous, hybrid.  
By retracing the construction of childhood in West African Francophone literature and 
African regional law through hybridization as a common strategy of expression, this dissertation 
also extends its inquiry to the social and political discourses that such an observation elicits. 
Specifically, it asks two interrelated questions: What is the significance of the articulations in 
African literature and law of a notion of childhood that take place in-between the local and the 
global? How might we parse this recourse to hybridity as a mode of expression in conjunction 
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with the notion of childhood? I investigate these questions with the assumption that these 
articulations continue a discourse that began during colonization. This discourse consists in 
asserting an African identity that contributes to ongoing global discussions on multiculturalism. 
Therefore, the articulations in literature and law of a changing notion of childhood in Africa, at 
the crossroads of the traditional and the modern, are not a mere assertion of hybrid identity, but 
are paradigmatic of social and political discourses marked with aspirations to contribute the 
African voice to an already fully designed global agenda. One should begin by noting that the 
most influential shift in the notion of childhood into African written discourse that is pertinent to 
this inquiry is the one that occurred as a result of the European colonial mission to civilize. 
In what follows, I provide a brief contextualization of the use of childhood themes in 
literature as a cultural and political discursive instrument in the colonial and postcolonial context 
of Francophone West Africa, the region chosen for this study. The literary portrayal of childhood 
in this context is also characterized by a gradual increase in the use of hybridity which, as I shall 
ultimately suggest, amounts to an expression of multiculturalism. I subsequently discuss the 
relation of this characteristic with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child  
and survey the literature on the study of law and literature, before presenting the corpus of my 
study as well as the theoretical framework through which I seek to engage with my subject. 
 
2. Childhood in Francophone West African Literature 
Childhood as a phase of human development naturally has been a much-traveled theme in 
world literature, and Sub-Saharan Francophone literature, the novel in particular, is no exception. 
As a literature that French Africanist critic Jacques Chevrier characterizes as reflecting the most 
concrete concerns of a group of people and an act of sociability par excellence through which, at 
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a given moment, that group becomes aware of its importance, Sub-Saharan Francophone novels 
have been instrumental in painting an African society persistently in search of its place in the 
globalizing world (“Roman et société” 160). In this context, childhood novels play a prominent 
role in the formation of social and cultural discourses. Before examining the important role of 
this literature in the literary representation of the postcolonial African subject’s identity, I shall 
first delineate the notion of childhood. Unlike the distinction often made in the social sciences 
between childhood and children, in this dissertation, I combine these two ideas to designate 
broadly the experiences of children and their social constructions. Indeed, the discussion of 
childhood is inseparable from the experiences of children to which it should refer. However, 
while this implies that childhood is a period and condition of human existence (as reflected often 
in law), in literature it can be a metaphor for something that is still developing, for heritage or 
hope (Crimp; Moltmann). The literary imagination of children’s experience in this case becomes 
an important factor in the projection and construction of a people’s identity. In the African 
context where people’s identity has been denied and misrepresented, the imaginations of specific 
types of childhood have strong symbolic implications.   
The point of departure of a literary imagination of identity in the Francophone West 
African context can be credited to Senegalese author Ousmane Socé, a lesser-known figure 
among the pioneers of the Négritude movement. His Karim: Roman sénégalais (1935) is not a 
childhood narrative per se, but it is one of the early novels that kicked off the depiction of the 
Sub-Saharan colonial subject as trapped between French-imposed culture and African ancestral 
traditions. Karim’s character embodies the quest of the colonial subject to borrow from the 
colonizer’s culture while remaining attached to his own cultural values. In Socé’s novel, the 
homage to this ancestral tradition is both explicitly asserted and implied by the translation and 
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inclusion of Wolof folklore in the narrative. This strategy of reviving African oral traditions 
became a movement that grew into a considerable excitement about collecting and translating 
oral traditions into books of oral literature.8 Among the first such publications are Ousmane 
Socé’s Contes et légendes d’Afrique noire (1938), Birago Diop’s Les contes d’Amadou Koumba 
(1947), Abdoulaye Sadji and Léopold Sédar Senghor’s Leuk-le-lièvre (1953), and Bernard 
Dadié’s Légendes africaines (1954). These writers set out to publicize the rich and beautiful 
cultural heritage that they felt black Africans ought to share with the world. The approach was 
both political and cultural, as would be forcefully asserted during the First International 
Conference of Negro Writers held at the Sorbonne in Paris, September 19-22, 1956. Speaking of 
the role of the black African writers, an editorial in Présence Africaine,  the “cultural journal of 
the Negro World,” reads:  
[W]e, for our part, have two primordial tasks: (1) to bring before the world audience the 
expression of our original cultures, so far as they interpret the present life of our peoples 
and our personality; (2) to reflect back to our own peoples the image of their aspirations, 
their experience and their joys, illuminated by the experiences, joys and hopes of the world. 
(“Modern Culture and Our Destiny” 6) 
Hence, at the political level, this cultural heritage was displayed in response to the colonial 
denial of African civilization; it is an assertion of the existence of the negated culture. At the 
cultural level, it was a means to engage in conversation with other cultures, and to draw from and 
add to the world’s cultural diversity. The collection and publication of expressions of African 
oral tradition contributed towards this goal. As pertaining to the object of this study, they 
unveiled a folk model of childhood which would be romanticized in works of autofiction in the 
                                               
8	This collecting led to publishing actual printed books with collections of oral narratives. But it also led to literary 
authors writing literary works that used, borrowed from, or recycled oral traditions.	
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face of aggressive encroachment by colonial assimilationism. The romanticizing of traditional 
African childhood was pervasive in the early Sub-Saharan Francophone novels that succeeded 
Socé’s Karim. While Karim is undeniably not an explicitly anticolonial text, as most of the 
subsequent texts are, its principal merit lies in the devising of the divided cultural subject scheme 
through which most decolonization novels, including childhood narratives, were framed. 
Beginning in the 1950s, childhood narratives espousing this polarized framework sowed 
the seed of an African childhood narrative in what I shall characterize as the first of three 
historical waves. This first wave comprises decolonization autobiographies, typically set against 
the background of French colonial rule and concerned with exalting a lost indigenous paradise. 
Prominent works in this category are Camara Laye’s L’enfant noir (1954),9 Bernard Dadié’s 
Climbié (1956), and Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s L’Aventure ambiguë (1961). These three 
autofictions are written as reminiscences of and self-reflections on their authors’ childhood, 
nurtured by both African and European cultures. In L’enfant noir, as in Climbié, the protagonist 
encapsulates the bewilderment of an African boy torn between his traditional and his modern 
childhood. But these two works already signal a shift from the mere exaltation of the indigenous 
ancestral societies (L’enfant noir) to the criticism of colonial encroachment (Climbié). The shift 
becomes more apparent in Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s L’aventure ambiguë (1961), where a choice 
is clearly made to sever children from their ancestral ways of life and adopts the invader’s. This 
process culminates in a point where the protagonist acknowledges himself to “have become the 
two” (101). By this phrase, Kane seems to underscore the idea that the protagonist has embraced 
                                               
9In chapter 3, I give more details about previous use of childhood in African literature in line with recent studies that 
oppose Lilian Kesteloot’s claim on the primacy of poetry in the birth of Francophone African literature. While Guy 
Ossito Midiohouan postulates that “novelistic prose” came first, Edgar Sankara finds it more accurate to assert that 
autobiography was at the birth of this literary tradition, citing Force Bonté, Bakary Diallo’s 1926 pioneering 
autobiographical novel. For more details, see Sankara’s 2011 article. 
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cultural pluralism, a characteristic of what postcolonial theorists would term cultural hybridity. 
But Kane was ahead of his time, since contemporary novels had not yet developed the 
formalistic hybridity that would become pervasive after the independences. Yet, at the center of 
the literary debates on childhood was the question of culture. The child appears as a metaphor for 
the future of human cultural identity, a symbol of the gradual movement towards a hypothetical 
ideal of progress. The three novels are remarkable indeed in the way they synchronize the 
gradual movement from a romanticized traditional African boyhood to the criticism of the 
colonial school to the hybridization of the boy’s identity. A more noticeable depiction of this 
shift is presented in other first-wave novels such as Abdoulaye Sadji’s Maimouna (1953) and 
Seydou Badian’s Sous l’orage (1954), which are clear variations on the pattern initiated by 
L’enfant noir. These works are not autobiographies and do not treat boyhood. They also bring 
forth other ideas of mixtures: the African village as repository of traditions with the city as realm 
of the modern.  
The second wave consists of postcolonial childhood narratives preceding the end of the 
Cold War. These narratives which began in the 1970s, featured a female protagonist and 
criticized atriarchal African customs, especially bias against the female child. In this category, 
De Tilène au Plateau, une enfance dakaroise (1975) and Simone Kaya’s Les danseuses d’Impé-
Eya (1976) denounced the male-privileged traditional society. Both autobiographies not only 
called the phallocentric traditional order into question, but also gazed with envy at a thriving and 
trendy Euro-American culture. In contrast to their male counterparts of the first wave, who 
mourned the loss of an indigenous boyhood paradise, female writers introduced a joyful 
girlhood, due to the very crumbling of the same traditional values. However, the female writers’ 
voices were never categorical in criticizing traditional society. The female child’s most critical 
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voice appeared in the 1980s with well-known works such as Mariama Bâ’s Une si longue lettre 
(1981), Ken Bugul’s Le Baobab fou (1983), and lesser-known works, including Anne-Marie 
Addiafi’s Une vie hypothéquée (1984). Hybridity in these feminist-oriented works takes the form 
of the plurality of cultural spaces which the protagonists navigate, as well as the interstices 
between colliding cultures.10 The awakening to gender imbalance in these works also signals the 
dilemma of African youth with regard to their heritage in a context of cultural change and 
globalization. 
Works published in the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the changes in 
world political dynamics, such as Fatou Keita’s Rebelle (1998) and Ahmadou Kourouma’s Allah 
n’est pas obligé (2001), constitute the third wave and reflect a clear state of revolt by members of 
a generation trapped between and bewildered by their status as both local and global children. In 
these works of fiction, the search for an equilibrium by the child protagonist constantly ends in 
disappointment, whether the choice is made between tradition or modernity. This dramatic 
condition is also translated through the depiction of violence and chaos. This scenario is 
confirmed in other works that dispute the negated place of the child in society, such as Fatou 
Diome’s Le ventre de l’Atlantique (2003) and the collective novel directed by Florent Couao-
Zotti, La petite fille des eaux (2006). The literary imaginations of African childhood in this third 
wave display a pattern of linguistic and stylistic hybridity, in addition to the cultural pluralism 
that the protagonists experience. This is exemplified in creolized language and the use of 
dictionaries in Allah n’est pas obligé, and in the teamwork of seven writers, producing each a 
chapter of a childhood novel in La petite fille des eaux. This more radical display of hybridity 
                                               
10This type of hybridity has been characterized as the “Third Space” or the “Liminal Space” by postcolonial theorist 
Homi Bhabba in his influential work The Location of Culture.  
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sounds like a corroboration of a discourse on social chaos and also a discourse on mixture and 
cultural mélange.  
I examine more closely the three waves of literature presented above in chapter 3, as 
constituting a movement in the literary construction of a changing African childhood identity 
that unmistakably translates multiculturality. In their acclaimed The Empire Writes Back (2002), 
Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin contend more prescriptively that “all postcolonial literatures are 
cross-cultural because they negotiate a gap between ‘worlds’ ” (38) and that it “is always a 
complex and hybridized formation” (108). While African literary hybridity is not limited to 
novels written on the theme of childhood, this type of narrative displays a genealogy of 
hybridization traceable, as outlined above, from the colonial to the postcolonial childhood 
novels. In the Francophone West African context explored in this dissertation, childhood 
narratives are almost always narratives on the mixture of culture. To take two examples from the 
novels named above—Camara Laye’s L’enfant noir (1954) for the colonial era and Ahmadou 
Kourouma’s Allah n’est pas obligé (2001) for more recent narratives—we notice that, in addition 
to discourses on cultural mélange, these novels epitomize the changes that have taken place in 
the portrayal of African childhood over the past half-century. They capture the shift from the use 
of standard European language in depicting romanticized African traditions to the use of 
creolized language in making sense of a changing and mixed society.11 The shifting notion of 
childhood in African literature, along with the hybridized mode in which it is expressed, are 
echoed in the African children’s rights law of 1990. Therefore, I review below the African 
                                               
11 Camara Laye’s and Ahmadou Kourouma’s novels discuss far more complex issues. But for the purpose of my 
argument I only refer to the ways in which these works reflect the changes in the cross-cultural and hybridized 
construction of childhood in the postcolony.   
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Charter on the Rights of the Child for its reflection of a transformed African childhood identity, 
of hybridity and multiculturalism.  
 
3. Hybridity and Multiculturalism in African Children’s Rights Law 
The preambular statement of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(1990) proclaims that the “cultural heritage, historical background and the values of the African 
civilization” should inspire and characterize its drafters’ reflection on the concept of the rights 
and welfare of the child. Scholars have been divided over the importance of this claim. For some, 
this proclamation marks the departure of African children’s rights law from its Western 
counterpart. For others, the reference to the African cultural heritage is merely rhetorical.  
In a comparative study, Frans Viljoen (1998) views the African Charter as departing from 
its international predecessors and reads this as an expression of frustration with the United 
Nations’ process during the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. With only 
three African countries participating consistently in the drafting of the Convention, the African 
voice was left wanting.12 Viljoen concurs with L. Muthoga that the idea of adopting an 
instrument on the rights of the African child corroborates the desire to reassert the African views 
insignificantly represented in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.13  
Despite the African Charter’s contention that reflections on the document should be 
animated by “traditional African values,” it also proclaims adherence and subscription to the 
principles of the rights and welfare of the child contained in the two declarations and the 
                                               
12Viljoen contends that African participation in the drafting process was limited. Only three African states participated for at 
least five of the nine years that the drafting lasted.  “This is the lowest percentage of all the continents, contrasting sharply with 
west European (61% of the continental potential) and even Latin American (29%) participation over a similar period,” he claims. 
However, he adds that by 1989, nine African states were participating in the activities of the working group. 
13While one could also argue that African nations were not prevented from attending and participating, it appears reasonable that 
in the diplomatic hustle of treaty negotiations, the “lightweight” African nations have played the diplomacy of absence rather 
than confrontation with the “heavyweights” of industrialized nations. 
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subsequent United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). These statements have 
led other scholars to argue that the Charter is not an actual departure from the CRC. For Bankole 
Thompson (1992), the Charter is rather a break with African cultural traditionalism. He argues 
that, despite the grandiose preambular language asserting the African cultural heritage as the 
conceptual framework for the Charter, this legal document does not uphold African traditions. 
According to him, the statement stressing the African cultural context is merely a concession to 
an elite that yearns for cultural relativism. To support his arguments, Thompson points to the 
first 31 articles constituting the substantive and procedural rights of the Charter. Dissecting 
article after article, he rightfully notes the rejection by the Charter of African traditional customs 
on issues such as marriage, parental rights, and legitimacy. He also notes the Charter’s explicit 
subscription to many of what he calls “fundamental principle[s] of Western law.” Thompson 
then goes on to analyze the language of rights in the Charter as fundamentally inconsistent at the 
functional level: “By parity of reasoning...it may be contended that the Charter, though a 
progressive regional instrument, may be on a collision course with African cultural heritage and 
traditions in so far as they relate to the status of children” (440). In other words, for Thompson, 
the Charter does not fulfill its goal of upholding the African cultural heritage. But we should not 
mistake the intent in the language of Thompson’s article: he does not encourage the Charter to be 
rooted in African cultural heritage and traditions. He views, for instance, the failure he ironically 
observes above as salutary to the development of children’s rights in Africa. 
What seems contradictory, in Thompson’s view, between the Charter’s attempt to be 
rooted in African cultural heritage and its seemingly Westernized end-product, finds an 
explanation in the hybridized mode of expression embraced in African childhood literature. The 
literary imagination of African childhood is not only steeped in various forms of cultural and 
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artistic hybridity, it is also anchored in the idea of mixture and multiculturalism. The notion of 
African childhood as seen in literature is presumed to be rooted in African cultural tradition. Yet, 
this notion also reflects the cultural blend created by the colonial heritage. It is this hybrid notion 
of childhood that shapes the peculiar framing of the African children’s rights law and its 
language. The Charter thus marks, as Pierre De Vos notes in a 2004 article, a conceptual distance 
from its international precursors, much so because it is an instrument that is married to a hybrid 
postcolonial sociocultural context. Unlike its counterpart in international law, it is neither 
Afrocentric nor Eurocentric. Whether such an approach is productive or not is a very different 
subject, and beyond the scope of this dissertation. My focus is to show the connection between 
the literary phenomenon of portraying a hybridized model of childhood in African literature and 
the manifestation of such hybridity in regional law. This connection proves that children’s rights 
law is tightly connected to a discursive pattern first promoted through literature. Furthermore, it 
answers questions about the need and the nature of this African regional legal instrument. It is 
not mere chance that at the 1979 meeting of African experts preparing the draft of the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) in Dakar, it was a prominent literary figure, 
Leopold Sedar Senghor, then president of Senegal, who made the opening remarks.  
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights is the mother document of the 
African human rights law system. To the drafters of this document, Senghor advocated in his 
opening remarks that “as Africans, we shall neither copy, nor strive for originality, for the sake 
of originality. We must show imagination and effectiveness. We could get inspiration from our 
beautiful and positive traditions. Therefore, you must keep constantly in mind our values of 
civilization and the real needs of Africa” (quoted in Heyns et al. 51). Commentators on the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child alluding to this speech have claimed that 
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Africa’s elite is critical of the human rights movement, characterizing it as a Western conceptual 
contrivance wholly irrelevant to the continent (see the articles by Ronald Nhlapo and Bankole 
Thompson). Contrarily to these claims, the idea guiding Senghor’s recommendation for the 
drafting of the African human rights document lay elsewhere. To shed light on this idea, let us 
consider the other exhortation Senghor gave to the drafters in the same speech:  
We should borrow from modernism only that which does not misrepresent our civilization 
and deep nature.… Africa is watching you: it counts on you to ensure, in the scrupulous 
respect of freedoms and rights, the harmonious development of its civilization in the 
context of the worldwide civilization. (Quoted in Heyns et al. 53) 
Senghor’s request is concerned with a civilizational development on the African 
continent that accounts for encounters with other civilizations. More precisely, this demand finds 
its clearest explanation in Senghor’s own concept of metissage, the notion that postcolonial 
Africa’s civilizational development will result in fecundation with the civilization of the 
European oppressors. In other words, the inspiration from Africa’s civilizational values 
demanded by African elites seems geared toward the hybrid, the metissage, a society that Africa 
has become by virtue of its colonization, rather than a radical cultural fragmentation or narrow 
parochialism. The articulation of the heterogenous nature of Africa’s civilization in the global 
context is what makes the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child unique. To 
argue this uniqueness is not to claim that it is a perfect legal document. Several scholars have 
thoroughly addressed the imperfections of this document (see Olowu and Chirwa). Others, on the 
contrary, have highlighted its merits (Lloyd). The unique nature of the Charter resides in its 
connection to the dyadic postcolonial African identity and the discourses to which it belongs. 
Some commentators of postcolonial affairs have described this dyadic scheme of resistance and 
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adjustment to the Western cultural order as an “African dilemma” (de Kiewet) or as the “African 
predicament” (Ogunbanjo). As Achille Mbembe suggests in “Provisional Notes on the 
Postcolony” (1992), the African postcolonial “subject” has learned to bargain several personas, 
each having its own separate logic not answerable to the others, when operating in certain 
specific contexts. The relationship between people in the postcolony, Mbembe explains, can 
better be understood through a shift in perspective. It is not primarily a relationship of resistance 
or of collaboration, but it can best be characterized as an “illicit cohabitation” (4). While 
Mbembe’s remarks are primarily directed at the relationship between ordinary people and rulers 
in the postcolonial African state, this paradigm is also true in the relationship between African 
and Western discourses, inasmuch as such discourses take place in the “chaotically pluralistic” 
(8) environment that Mbembe depicts. 
At minimum, discourses on childhood exemplify such a dynamic. Thus, the notion of 
childhood reifies in literature as in law what seems to be a larger discursive framework: the 
dynamics of power relations. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and 
African childhood narratives therefore converge in some ways in their treatment of childhood 
through notions and modes of hybridity. This convergence of law and literature in the 
postcolonial African context also reflects the various ways law and literature nurture each other. 
While various concepts of childhood are often linked to the notions of perpetuation and future 
(of a family, a community, a race, a nation), hybridity as a mode of formulating writing about 
childhood—and of inflecting discourses about it—brings in other dimensions regarding cultural 
heritage that can be considered akin to multiculturalism. This tension—between the local and 
narrow culturally based expectations regarding childhood and the hybridity of the modes and 
genres used to speak about and shape it—is a form of “art imitating life” and “life imitating 
 18 
art,”14 a mimesis that brings out deeper social and political discourses. Law should not be 
conceived merely as a system of rules and institutions removed from the social context that give 
them meanings. As Robert Cover puts it, law is better conceived as a normative world, or nomos, 
in which legal rules and institutions interact with other cultural forces in the production of legal 
meaning. In other words, legal norms, to enjoy legitimacy, must reflect the social context in 
which they are created. The fact that law can reflect its social context of origin also implies that 
its particularities can be scrutinized to understand some of the concerns emerging from the 
society in which it is enacted (4-6). 
 
4. Law and Literature in the Postcolonial African Context 
In postcolonial Africa, law and literature have hardly been envisaged as converging and 
conversing. The two disciplines exist secluded from one another, like two neighbors living in 
what might be, in African terms, perceived as an individualistic society. This is an irony of 
culture and history. It is an irony because of the existence of strong traditional communitarian 
local cultures. It is also an irony given the collaborative role of law and literature as “central 
devices of the imperialistic project” (Dolin 169), in which the imaginative and explicatory work 
of literature served the normative and regulatory work of colonial law.  
Beyond such historical allegories, law and literature come together in many ways, in the 
postcolonial context as well as in others. One of the central interests of literature, for instance, is 
to imagine human ideals (i.e. moral and just societies) or to subvert them. Equally, the central 
tenets of legal texts are to reflect such ideals, by normalizing them and prescribing rules against 
their transgression. The interconnections of law and literature are now viewed as established and 
                                               
14I refer to both Aristotle’s idea in Mimesis that art imitates life and to Oscar Wilde’s claim in The Decay of Lying 
that life imitates art.  
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therefore have grown into an academic field of their own. In the United States where this field 
was born in the 1970s and maintains strong roots,15 scholarship usually falls within one of the 
two main approaches: law in literature and law as literature. The former is concerned with the 
representation of law in literature, whereas the latter studies the interpretation of legal texts using 
the methods of literary analysis and critique. Both interpretive approaches are viewed as 
complementary efforts to enhance the understanding of law, and in some cases, to produce better 
lawyers. Studies of this kind, albeit prevalent in the United States, solely echo a scholarly desire 
to incorporate insights and approaches from other disciplines into American legal education 
(Posner 1351). Lately, while some scholars have demanded the “de-Americanization” and 
“opening up” (Olson 383) of the law and literature field, others have noticed new directions (see 
Wharton and Miller). Not only have topics beyond pedagogical concerns in the USA attracted 
these scholars, the field has also splintered into more specialized areas, such as the emerging 
specialization of human rights law and literature.  
A trend in human rights law and literature scholarship has been to demonstrate 
literature’s potential to foster, nurture. and supplement human rights law’s commonsensicality. 
Some illustrations of this trend are the works of Martha Nussbaum, Lynn Hunt, and Joseph 
Slaughter. In Cultivating Humanity (1997), Nussbaum, broadening the pedagogical project of 
law and literature in the USA, argues that the purpose of liberal education is to cultivate 
humanity, that is to develop three capacities, enhanced by literary studies. The first is the ability 
to conduct critical self-examination of one’s own culture and traditions, the second is to see 
                                               
15The traditional narrative places the birth of the field in the 1970s and regards James Boyd White’s The Legal 
Imagination (1973) as its founding text. It also refers to John Wigmore’s and Benjamin Cardozo’s writings as its 
precursors. The conspicuous references to American scholarship in the field’s “etiological” narrative explains 
largely why it mainly draws on the American legal context of common law and its pedagogical interest.  
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oneself as a human being bound to all human beings and sharing common concerns, and the third 
is to be capable of narrative imagination, that is, to be able to empathize with others and put 
oneself in their place. For Nussbaum, only in developing these capacities can one become 
increasingly fit for world citizenship, the ultimate goal of the international human rights project. 
Literature’s potential to foster world citizenship appears therefore as indispensable for liberal 
education, and, as Nussbaum argued elsewhere (see “Cultivating Humanity in Legal 
Education”), it also helps in cultivating humanistic values in legal education. In Inventing 
Human Rights (2007), Lynn Hunt steps away from the pedagogical project and provides a more 
empirical view of the influence of literature on law, arguing that eighteenth-century epistolary 
novels like Samuel Richardson’s Pamela and Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Julie and La Nouvelle 
Heloise taught French readers a new form of empathy that enabled them to imagine social 
justice, bringing forth the notion of equality that inspired the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen in 1789. For Hunt, epistolary novels, by thus teaching their readers a new 
form of empathy, contributed to making the notion of Rights of Man self-evident in the 
eighteenth century. She therefore draws an unambiguous link between literary imagination and 
lawmaking. In Human Rights Inc. (2007), Joseph Slaughter makes further claims on the role of 
literature in making human rights commonsensical. He contends that the twentieth-century rise 
of the novel and the development of human rights law are two connected phenomena, whose 
goal was to imagine a particular conception of the human individual. For Slaughter, the 
Bildungsroman imagined a humanist social vision and provided the conceptual vocabulary and 
the narrative grammar that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and early literary 
theorists both call the “free and full development of the human personality” (4). One of the rare 
scholars in this area to take a postcolonial perspective, Slaughter also examines coming-of-age 
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stories that show the legibility of the promise of human rights and the ways in which postcolonial 
novels and international law are complicit in contemporary projects of globalization and 
humanitarianism. Slaughter’s comprehensive work unveiled even more questions, including 
human rights law’s inability to promote and enforce itself and literature’s role as a cultural 
surrogate for the former’s puny executive authority.  
Slaughter’s attention to postcolonial literature and international human rights signals 
important practical and ethical questions. However, it does not exhaust the wealth of knowledge 
that can be extracted from the connection between human rights law and literature in the 
postcolonial context. Despite the obvious wealth of literary works available for consideration in 
the postcolonial context, the enduring trend in human rights scholarship has been to turn to the 
classics of European literature as the standard for extracting knowledge to illuminate human 
rights theories. The postcolonial African context, in particular, remains the neglected stepchild of 
these studies. Yet, this context is one that offers some interesting cases for study. Human rights 
laws and literature in this context, for instance, seek to depart from European models. However, 
even when adorned with the qualifier “African,” these laws and literatures are still predominantly 
thought and written in European languages. Kenyan literary theorist Ngugi wa Thiong’o reminds 
us in Decolonizing the Mind (1981) that “language, any language, has a dual character: it is both 
a means of communication and a carrier of culture” (13). The use of European languages in these 
literatures—legal or literary—can therefore be read as the sign of their transition through the 
filter of European culture. That also raises further questions on the kind of knowledge that 
different types of literature can yield about human rights discourses.  
I argue in this dissertation that the deployment of hybridity in the African Charter for the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child and in African literature is one way in which law and literature, 
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as reflections of societies, can be read for their representations of broader social and political 
concerns. Notable in the African context is the undercurrent of a desire to assert a cultural 
identity and a voice in a globalizing world. Indeed, the conjunction of hybridity and of childhood 
as epitomes respectively of cultural mélange and cultural heritage appear to denote the cultural 
mélange that the African heritage has turned to. Given the context in which the African 
children’s rights law was adopted, it can also be argued that the document carries the hopes of 
African nations to respond to the global standard notion of childhood steeped in European 
culture. But more importantly, making the claim of a local childhood identity in the face of a 
Europeanized notion of childhood is to assert a distinctive voice in the international arena, where 
Africans arrived late and where they have henceforth only ratified the dominant order already in 
place. The African literary and legal discourses on the inclusiveness of cultural diversity on the 
topic of childhood illustrates this aspiration. These two discourses also unveil a struggle to shed 
the colonial denial of native African civilizations. That specific concern is even stronger on the 
highly controversial topic of childhood. Childhood is not only this ductile stage when human 
beings can be molded into the values of a particular civilization. Among other things, it holds the 
promise of that civilization’s perpetuation. Also, where their agency is acknowledged, children 
are deemed capable of molding culture. British Romantic poet William Wordsworth (1770-1850) 
powerfully captures this fact in his celebrated poem “My Heart Leaps Up,” where he proclaims 
that “The Child is the father of the Man.” This apparently self-evident truth sheds light on the 
importance of the theme of childhood in African literary and legal discourses. The neglect of the 
study of the connection between postcolonial African law and literature, therefore, is a problem 
that bears addressing. 
 
 23 
5. Problems in the Study of African Literature and Human Rights 
A few scholars have tried to overcome the lack of interest in the connection between 
human rights law and the African literary production. In their studies, these scholars selected the 
very neglected narrative form of oral literature as source of inquiry to shed further light on 
human rights discourses. Katrina Powell’s 2015 article “Reading Human Rights through Oral 
Literature” suggests that linking oral literature and the studies of human rights could lend new 
insights into “how different cultural spaces define what might count as human rights” (136). This 
quest for conceptual definition within human rights discourses was first seen in Micere Mugo’s 
African Orature and Human Rights (2001), in which she attempts to read human rights doctrine 
through precolonial narratives such as her native Kenya’s Kikuyu-language songs, poetry, tales, 
and proverbs. This theoretical approach might wrongfully be associated with the cultural 
relativist movement in the controversy that opposes it to the universalist movement in human 
rights debates. The polemic—that on the one hand human rights are universal, and that on the 
other hand they are relative to cultural contexts—has shifted in recent years to a more moderate 
approach wherein each camp acknowledges some pragmatic truth in the opposite claim. 
Nevertheless, the evocation of cultural traditions as a source of human rights often suffices for 
one’s approach to be labeled as cultural relativist. “Individual, Community, and Human Rights: 
A Lesson from Kwasi Wiredu’s Philosophy of Personhood,” an article published in 2009 by 
Senegalese philosopher Souleymane Bachir Diagne, provides an example of a study of oral 
literature and human rights that cannot be merely tagged as cultural relativist and dismissed. In 
his analysis of the Oath of the Manden (circa 1222), Diagne demonstrates that the oral tradition 
passed down through word-of-mouth by that West African secret hunter society has similarities 
with other declarations of rights in various civilizations throughout history. Diagne’s analysis of 
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this African oral tradition does not claim an African version of human rights diverging from 
others; rather, it shows that not only are human rights not the privilege of any particular 
civilization, but they are both universalistic and individualistic in nature, at least as formulated in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Diagne clearly demonstrates that these two 
key tenets of human rights appear in the Oath of the Manden, regardless of the form and 
vocabulary in which these principles are formulated.  
Powell, Mugo, and Diagne’s studies, far from being anachronistic or cultural relativist, 
pinpoint the problem in the literary study of human rights that focuses on the classics of Euro-
American literature. They show precisely that the language of human rights can also heed the 
grammar and vocabulary of civilizations other than that of Western Europeans. Indeed, African 
literary and legal discourses such as those on childhood engage with global discourses on 
universal values. These discourses seem to reclaim a prerogative in framing the shared heritage 
of the human family in more inclusive cultural expressions, rather than just in Western words. 
This struggle can be linked to the pioneering discourses on cultural identity such as 
Négritude. Indeed, having arrived late at the table of global affairs, African intellectuals found it 
difficult to make their voice count. The effort to contribute their voice to global discourses 
began, in literature, as a struggle mainly to assert an identity. The effort later spread into a 
movement which Barthélémy Kotchy and Lilyan Kesteloot have thoroughly described as having 
evolved in strides. In the African context, three such strides capture the evolution of the African 
voice. It first started in the diaspora, with African-Americans’ rediscovery of their identity. 
W.E.B. Du Bois’s (1868-1963) The Souls of Black Folk (1903) and the creation of publications 
such as The Crisis (the NAACP organ launched in 1910 and edited by Du Bois) and The Negro 
World (1918) mark this beginning. Then came René Maran’s efforts in Batouala (1921) to give 
 25 
readers direct access to the “African mind and way of life.” Lastly followed the Négritude 
Movement and its concern with the Negro identity. While the subsequent generations of African 
writers appeared divided in the post-independence context, such a division has given rise to a 
more legible approach in the literary representation of childhood: a postcolonial approach more 
accurately captured as neither pure resistance nor pure collaboration, but one of “illicit 
cohabitation” of the two (Mbembe 4), merging the colonial with the African heritage. To 
investigate this African literary discourse on childhood identity as well as its reflection in 
African law, I base my analysis on a tripartite corpus, whose components are read in relation and 
response to each other. 
 
6. The Corpus of the Study 
The first component of my corpus includes a group of folk narratives (folktales and 
legends) from Francophone West Africa. This oral literature was collected and consigned to 
print, initially by French colonial scholars such as Maurice Delafosse (1900), René Basset 
(1903), and Victor François Ecquilbecq (1913), and later by African scholars. Ousmane Socé’s 
Contes et légendes d’Afrique noire (1938) started this tradition, cultivated by Birago Diop with 
Les contes d’Amadou Koumba (1947), Abdoulaye Sadji and Léopold Sédar Senghor with La 
belle histoire de Leuk-le-lièvre (1953), Bernard Dadié (1954), and Boubou Hama (1972), to 
name a few. Representations of childhood in such oral literature present the potential to reflect 
and partake in the construction of their real-world corollaries. In the African context, folktales 
contain important information on the place, the role, and the activities of children (see the studies 
by Platiel, N’da, and Erny); legends are “museums,” “monuments,” and “commemorative street 
plaques” that keep history alive and guide a society’s path toward the future (Dadié “Le rôle de 
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la légende”). In order to provide a social context for the folk notion of childhood, I examine 
twenty-one folk narratives including those drawn from Diop’s Les contes d’Amadou Koumba 
(1947) and Dadié’s Le pagne noir (1954): these  two collections are representative of the 
similarities and dissimilarities within three specific West African cultures—the Malinke, Wolof, 
and Akan—on the same theme of childhood, and also present the important particularity of being 
hybrid texts, created between oral tradition and written literary works.  
The second component of the corpus comprises childhood narratives produced since 
1954, the date of publication of the seminal autobiography L’enfant noir and ending with the 
generation of works of fiction represented by Allah n’est pas obligé (2001). Taking these two 
works as points of reference, I chronologically analyze Francophone African writers’ portrayal 
of childhood until the years following the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in 1989. The advent of the Convention, as shall become clear, has been 
instrumental in the development of the third wave of childhood narratives, following the 
consecration of the global notion of childhood. Fifteen novels, five from each wave—L’enfant 
noir, Climbié, L’aventure ambiguë, Maimouna, and Sous l’orage (first wave); Les danseuses de 
Impé-Eya, De Tilene au Plateau, Une si longue lettre, Le baobab fou, and Une vie hypothéquée 
(second wave); and Rebelle, Allah n’est pas obligé, L’ainé des orphelins, Le ventre de 
l’atlantique, and La petite fille des eaux (third wave) —will be analyzed in this second 
component of the corpus. I also incidentally refer to other works where necessary to present 
alternative narratives.16  
                                               
16 While there is a legible literary trend about childhood portrayal and discourse in each wave, I also notice 
dissenting voices which I describe in chapter 3.  
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The third component of my corpus is the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (1990). This legal document is enacted with the view to incorporate the “virtue of 
African values and civilization” into international law. However, the African children’s rights 
charter is often characterized as inconsistent because of the high incidence of Western values in 
its provisions. I read this document as using, informing, and shadowing the other two types of 
texts.  
This tripartite corpus is necessary to engage with the scholarship—both in the humanities 
and in the social sciences—that in recent years have suggested a connection between literature 
and human rights. It also serves as a basis, not only to analyze the particularities of the 
constructions of childhood in African literature, but also to contextualize such a construction 
within a tradition of the search for cultural identity. The conceptual framework to engage with 
such corpus must therefore espouse theories of cultural identity. 
 
7. Theoretical Framework 
I discuss these literary and legal discourses on childhood within a theoretical framework 
that cuts across disciplines. The political and cultural theory of return to the source serves as my 
catalyst to investigate a distinctive African childhood identity in literature and law. It is Amilcar 
Cabral, the leader of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde 
Islands (PAIGC), who is credited with the theory of return to the source. Cabral clarified his 
political and cultural theory in a lecture he gave at Syracuse University on February 20, 1970. 
For him, if imperialist domination has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national 
liberation is necessarily an act of culture. In this sense, he contends, “A people who free 
themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally only if, without complexes and 
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without under-estimating the importance of positive accretions from the oppressor and other 
cultures, they return to the upward path of their own culture” (Cabral, “National Liberation and 
Culture” 262). Cabral’s theory, however, is to be distinguished from an earlier understanding of 
the return to the source, one which looked to an imagined pristine African cultural purity. That 
return was a literary imagination nostalgic of a certain precolonial African Eden, an Africa of 
empires and great civilizations. The remembrance of this lost Golden Age, often romanticized, is 
a characteristic trait of the first wave of childhood narratives presented above. Cabral’s return to 
the source, along with its earlier version, will serve to illustrate the mode of representation of the 
African child’s specific identity. 
Second, the idealist philosophical theory of the civilization of the universal coined by 
French philosopher and priest Father Theillard de Chardin (1881-1955) and appropriated by 
Léopold Sédar Senghor, one of the Négritude movement’s founders, will shed light on the 
significance of the literary choices made in the portrayal of African childhood. The crux of 
Senghor’s tale of the civilization of the universal is its emphasis on the liberation of African 
people through the elimination of the binary opposition artificially erected between their heritage 
and their colonially acquired culture: 
Notre vocation de colonisés est de surmonter les contradictions de la conjoncture, l’antinomie 
artificiellement dressée entre l’Afrique et l’Europe, notre hérédité et notre éducation. C’est de la 
greffe de celle-ci sur celle-là que doit naître la liberté. (Liberté I 103) 
Our vocation as colonized is to overcome the contradictions of the conjuncture, the antinomy 
artificially erected between Africa and Europe, our inheritance and our education. It is from the 
graft of it on that that liberty must be born. (My translation)  
 
The idea of a mutual implant within the two cultures as a bearer of liberty brings the 
theory of civilization of the universal closer to Senghor’s other concept, that of cultural 
metissage. Civilization of the universal and metissage speak to the idea of cultural crossbreeding. 
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However, crossbreeding is also accounted for in postcolonial studies, prominently by the theories 
of hybridity. Mikhail Bakhtin and Homi K. Bhabha are among the most prominent theorists of 
hybridity. Broadly taken, the notion of hybridity has ramifications in almost every field today. In 
postcolonial and cultural studies, it “has become a master trope across many spheres of cultural 
research, theory, and criticism” (Kraidy 316) and denotes ideas and styles of mixture. It refers to 
notions of syncretism in anthropology and of creolization in linguistics. In his linguistic approach 
to hybridity, Bakhtin perceives genre as an expression of worldview and ideology. He defines the 
linguistic process of hybridization in Dialogic imagination (1981) as “a mixture of two social 
languages within the limits of a single utterance” and as an encounter between “two different 
linguistic consciousnesses” (358). This notion of a polyphony of voices in society takes on an 
anti-imperialistic significance at the hand of the foremost theorist of hybridity, Homi K. Bhabha, 
who calls into question fixed identities based on essentialisms and suggests that the recognition 
of an empowering hybridity may resolve the clash of cultures. In The Location of Culture (1994), 
Bhabha contends that the negotiation of cultural hybridity involves the continual interexchange 
of cultures that in turn produces a mutual and mutable representation of cultural difference. He 
contends that “the social articulation of difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, 
on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of 
historical transformation” (2). This negotiation also takes place in the interstices between 
colliding cultures, a liminal space, which Bhabha terms the “Third Space,” where, new cultural 
identities are formed, reformed, and constantly in a state of becoming. 
Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (1998) note that hybridity, as is often the case for most 
cultural concepts, is “one of the most widely employed and disputed [term] in post-colonial 
theory” (118). In effect, the use of the term hybridity in post-colonial discourse to mean simply 
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cross-cultural ‘exchange’ is widely criticized, for it supposedly implies negation of and 
obliviousness to an inequality of power relations between colonized and colonizers. In presenting 
Bhabha’s conceptual model, I am not disregarding criticisms that his formulation is problematic. 
He has been scolded for neglecting to adequately conceptualize the historical and material 
conditions susceptible to developing within a framework of colonial discourse analysis. 
Exemplars of such disapproval are Chinese cultural critics Rey Chow and Lei Zhou, who see 
Bhabha’s use of hybridity as a replication of assimilationist policies in the way it masks cultural 
differences. They contend that “what Bhabha’s word ‘hybridity’ revives, in the masquerade of 
deconstructing anti-imperialism, and ‘difficult’ theory, is an old functionalist notion of what a 
dominant culture permits in the interest of maintaining its own equilibrium” (35). For Chow and 
Zhou, who see the notion as hegemonically constructed in the interest of dominant ideologies, 
the postcolonial text’s hybridity would mean that the postcolonial subject can speak, which 
would contradict another major postcolonial idea, proposed by theorist Gayatri Spivak, mainly 
that the “subaltern cannot speak.” They wonder “what kind of an argument is it to say that the 
subaltern’s “voice” can be found in the ambivalence of imperialist speech?” (35). While such 
criticisms are warranted, in my view, Bhabha’s framework remains a useful tool to examine 
postcolonial reality, inasmuch as one does not celebrate the false sense of liberation from the 
continued influence of the historical colonial encounter. The usefulness of Bhabha’s hybridity to 
my analysis resides in particular in the ‘in-between,’ liminal or “Third Space,” where, new 
cultural identities form, reform and constantly reinvent themselves. In fact, as sociologist Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse puts it, recognizing the in-between and the interstices means to go beyond 
dualism, binary thinking and Aristotelian logic. Overcoming binary thinking and Aristotelian 
logic is the hallmark of post-structuralism, postmodernism and deconstruction theories, which 
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according to Pieterse is “an epistemological shift outside the boxes of Cartesian epistemology” 
(238). 
A major object of inquiry in this dissertation is the specific postcolonial African 
phenomenon of law’s and literature’s common desire17 for hybridity on the theme of childhood. 
African children’s rights law and childhood literature share a fascination for hybridity, both at 
their formal (aesthetic) and content (ethical) level. I consider hybridity in its broader sense as 
mixture, but also in its postcolonial meaning as cultural mélange. This mixture and cultural 
mélange are central to the form and the content of the corpus I explore in this dissertation. The 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted by the Organization of African 
Unity18 in 1990, for instance, is a curiously hybrid document. Its bears the marks of a struggle to 
make sense of postcolonial African realities, mainly concealed or snubbed by an earlier treaty, 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been criticized as Eurocentric.  
The Sub-Saharan literary and legal portrayal of childhood borrows from hybridity to 
contextualize duality as the mark of negotiation between the servile imitation of Western 
impositions and the preservation of the African cultural past. This reconciliation of the African 
cultural past with Western standards also epitomizes the continued creolization of global 
concepts, which is in line with the cross-cultural approach to human rights that scholars such as 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im have called for. This cross-cultural approach to human rights might 
be a link between the various discourses—literary, legal, and political—and their underlying 
ambition to foster both internal and external dialogue able o provide a wider and, therefore, more 
inclusive basis for the universal conception of children’s rights. 
                                               
17 I use “desire” here after Robert Young’s 2005 book Colonial Desire. 
18 Renamed the African Union (AU) in 1990.		
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This dissertation contains four chapters. This introduction has identified a topic—the 
disregard for the hybrid nature of African law and literature on the theme of childhood—and the 
necessity to read it for better understanding of law and literature’s connection in the postcolonial 
context. It has also contextualized the topic within the broader approach to human rights and 
literary studies, described the corpus of the study, and proposed a theoretical framework for 
examining the problems. In chapter 1, I offer a definition of the notion of global childhood, 
tracing its ideological genealogy in Western philosophy and defining its limits within current 
critical theories. In chapter 2, I explore the ideal(s) of childhood as represented in African oral 
folk narratives such as folktales and legends. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the analysis of 
postcolonial discourses in the three waves of African childhood narratives that span 1950 to 
2000. Chapter 4 illustrates how African legal discourses reflect the polarity of African childhood, 
between African traditional heritage and Western European modernity. Both chapters 3 and 4 
illustrate how hybridity serves as a metaphor of multiculturalism and how childhood represents 
Africa’s cultural heritage. Hybridity as mode and competing visions of childhood in these 
chapters further translate the assertion of an African mixed cultural identity through law, a 






THE NOTION OF GLOBAL CHILDHOOD 
 
 
1. Defining Global Childhood 
This chapter seeks to shed light on a notion attached to childhood that has been presumed 
to hold a universal value: global childhood. The notion emerged out of two phenomena. First, it 
stems from the internationalization of a particular ideal of childhood traceable to Romantic 
literature and thus often characterized as Western. This reputed Western notion of childhood, in 
the words of Sommerville (1982), is a “carefree, safe, secure and happy phase of human 
existence” (quoted in Prout and James 168). The idea, in fact, is a generous imagination of 
childhood from the end of the early-modern period to the nineteenth century, when the figure of 
the child became a central topic in poetry, prose, and philosophical debates. As the chapter will 
show, at that time, ideas such as children’s innocence, purity, and vulnerability were 
conveniently created for the European ruling class, the bourgeoisie and its progeny, while it was 
cynically absent for the working class and their children. Today, as this romantic ideal is 
universalized through international law, it remains more of an aspirational goal than a reality, 
even in the industrialized countries of the Global North. Second, the notion of global childhood 
is a product of a phenomenon akin to what both Lynn Avery Hunt and Joseph Slaughter have 
described: literature and international law’s mutual efforts to nurture one another. Hence, if the 
Romantic literary imagination of childhood can be said to have provided substance for the legal 
formulation of children’s rights, children’s rights law in turn can be said to have given rise to the 
notion of global childhood, which now informs literary creation.  
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An examination of the cooperative efforts of literature and international law in shaping 
the notion of global childhood is important to understand its connotations in the contemporary 
context of a diverse world. While the goal of the notion is to ultimately promote a standard view 
of childhood worldwide and make children’s rights law intelligible and commonsensical, it 
functions as a trope rather than an actual concept, and therefore runs into resistance in various 
sociocultural spaces, where literary tropes for childhood differ. The achievement of consensus 
around the notion of universal childhood, therefore, remains utopian.  
Indeed, the universalization of childhood was first seeded with the inscription of the 
Romantic literary trope of childhood innocence and carefreeness, captured in the sentence 
“mankind owes to the child the best that it has to give,” in the preamble of the first two 
international declarations to establish children’s rights law: the Declaration of Geneva, adopted 
by the League of Nations in 1924, and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, adopted by the 
United Nations in 1959. In these two legal documents, the Romantic idea that children are 
innocent and vulnerable led to the treatment of childhood as a period of dependency in 
international law. Thus, in these declarations, children were only afforded the right to nurturance, 
that is, rights pertaining to the obligation of others in society to provide for and safeguard their 
emotional, psychological, or physical welfare (for this definition of nurturance rights, see Ruck 
et al., “Children’s and Adolescents’ Understanding of Rights,” 404).  
As the children’s rights movement developed, new aspects of children’s lives came to the 
fore. By the 1970s, the incorporation of the theory of self-determination in international law,1 the 
                                               
1See Lung-chu Chen’s 1976 chapter “Self-Determination as a Human Right.” She insists that the principle of self-
determination is deeply rooted in the notions of human dignity and human rights. See also Abraham H. Maslow’s 
theory that every human being harbors biologically based needs “for life, for safety and security, for belongingness 
and affection, for respect and self-respect, and for self-actualization.” Maslow expands on his theory in The Farther 
Reaches of Human Nature (1971), an extension of his 1953 classic Toward a Psychology of Being.    
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development of a literature on childhood activism,2 and reports by international organizations on 
child labor,3 among others, brought increased awareness of new dimensions of children’s lives. 
Their political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights came to light, and children’s rights 
activists vigorously made a case for them in the years leading to the adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this context, the Convention sought to account 
for these parameters, which have become more apparent, by making provisions for children’s 
rights to self-determination, that is, as Ruck et al. define it, children’s right to have some measure 
of control over their own lives (“Children’s and Adolescents’ Understanding of Rights” 404). 
This progressive development, however, appeared to conflict with other provisions 
included in the same convention: the nurturance rights, which compel parents and legal 
guardians to make decisions “in the best interests of children,” to protect them from harm, and to 
mold their development. Hence, while the preamble of the Convention states that “the child, by 
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguard and care,” Article 12 
emphasizes that “states parties shall ensure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the rights to express those views freely, on all matters affecting the child.” This tension 
within the Convention has led some scholars, including Martha Nussbaum, to criticize its poor 
theoretical basis and to offer an alternate, coherent, intellectual foundation for children’s rights 
(see Nussbaum “Children’s Rights and a Capabilities Approach”). This tension within the 
Convention also represents the divergence of views on childhood that the treaty was intended to 
reconcile. During the ten-year travaux préparatoires leading to the adoption of the convention, 
                                               
2Søren Hansen and Jesper Jensen’s 1971 work The Little Red School-Book encourages young people to question 
societal norms and instructs them on how to do this. See also Nasaw, Children of the City. 
3See Detrick et al. A famous example documented in the book is the figures suddenly announced by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1979 and widely publicized, during the International Year of the Child, 
that brought to light that fifty-five million children around the world work (20). 
 36 
various factors, including the low level of participation of the Global South and the diplomatic 
strength of the nations involved, led to the triumph of a model of childhood that scholars 
unmistakably identify as rooted in the culture and history of the dominant nations of the Global 
North, a notion of Romantic childhood. This “colonization” of the concept of childhood in 
international law did not, however, happen for a lack of initiatives on the part of the developing 
countries. Along with other Global South delegations, especially from the Islamic countries, 
African nations such as Senegal and Algeria sought to draw the attention of the drafting 
committee to aspects of children’s lives relevant to their regions. In one instance, the 
representative of Senegal brought to the attention of the Working Group the “Declaration of 
Dakar,” the results of the West African seminar on the draft convention held in Senegal in 
November 1983, which stressed the need to take into account the cultural values of Africa in the 
drafting of the convention on the rights of the child (Detrick et al. 625). In another instance, the 
delegation from Algeria proposed the following paragraph to be included in the draft convention: 
“Children should be educated in a social climate imbued with the national values and the cultural 
identity of the children, with respect for civilizations different from their own and for the rights 
of peoples. In no case may children of countries still under colonial domination and foreign 
occupation or racist regimes be deprived of their cultural and national identity.” Representatives 
from Argentina, China, and Venezuela supported the proposal (Detrick et al. 402). But these 
efforts only succeeded in getting the Working Group to insert a few sentences in the draft 
convention, as a matter of concession.4 The concept of child welfare and the model of childhood 
                                               
4	The proposal from Senegal contributed the phrase “taking due account of the importance of the traditions and 
cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child” to paragraph 11 of the 
Convention’s preamble. The proposal from Algeria was heavily transformed and can be found in Article 29 (c): “the 
development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national 
values of the country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for 
civilizations different from his or her own.”	
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that emerged from the Convention—global childhood—is mainly informed by the Euro-
American Romantic childhood ideal, although it became a standard applicable worldwide. This 
is not to say that such a Romantic model of childhood itself is a reality in the Global North where 
it has been imagined. Given the concerns raised during the search for consensus, one is tempted 
to recall the question Gayatri Spivak famously formulated: can the subaltern speak? In fact, the 
Convention illustrates the extent to which the voice of the postcolonial African state is 
meaningless in international debates. Scholars started to denounce this unequal representation 
even before the adoption of the draft Convention by calling it “a case of Eurocentrism in 
standard-setting” (Barsh 24). Since then, criticisms of the convention have taken aim at its 
cultural bias. A brief historical background is therefore necessary to describe the turn these 
criticisms have taken in recent years. A trend in children’s rights scholarship has been to object 
to the internationalization of a notion of childhood considered as anchored in the Global North. 
However, as shall become clear later, this Romantic childhood is only an ideal, one that was 
never entirely fulfilled in the industrialized countries of the world. 
In the decade following 1989, the date of the adoption of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), many scholars expressed reservations about what appeared to 
them as a narrow conceptualization of the idea of childhood in international law. British 
childhood scholar Jo Boyden, writing in 1990, was among the first to object that the modern 
“ideal of safe, happy and protected childhood” underlying children’s rights law was “culturally 
and historically bound to the social preoccupations and priorities of the capitalist countries of 
Europe and the United States” (168-169). Boyden’s point was to warn against the spread of this 
childhood model in parts of the world where it might not be understood. Sudanese-American 
legal scholar Abdullahi An-Na’im raised similar concerns, warning that the normative 
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universality of children’s rights should not be “the universalization of norms and institutions of 
dominant cultures” (“Cultural Transformation and Normative Consensus” 62). During these first 
years following the adoption of the Convention, the mounting criticism led the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to sponsor several studies through its International Child 
Development Center (ICDC).5 Preoccupied with framing an “emerging global ethic for 
children,” these studies appeared as a forum to resolve the initially unheeded cultural diversity 
questions. This focus is obvious in the title of The Best Interests Principle: Towards a 
Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights (1994), a volume edited by Australian childhood 
scholar Philippe Alston. Other studies commissioned by the United Nations, which produced 
titles less oriented ostensibly to matters of culture,6 also addressed the cultural issue. Swedish 
anthropologist Karl Eric Knutsson addressed the same cultural idea in the volume Children: 
Noble Causes or Worthy Citizens (1997). Knutsson rejected the protomodern conception of 
childhood deriving from a “romanticized Western view” (4), which considers children as 
essentially isolated from the rest of society. Thus, he called for a fresh approach to the idea of 
childhood that would tend toward acknowledging the cultural variety of the world. 
The studies sponsored by UNICEF were hardly the only ones questioning the narrow 
conceptualization of childhood. Other childhood scholars, including British Martin Woodhead, 
warned against the global exportation of a Western model of childhood. In his 1999 article 
“Reconstructing Developmental Psychology,” Woodhead accused that field of projecting a 
                                               
5	The ICDC has been renamed the UNICEF Office of Research—Innocenti. It is the dedicated research center for 
UNICEF. 	
6 Other titles include “Double Jeopardy: The Children of Ethnic Minorities” (Stavenhagen),  “Exploring Alternative 
Approaches to Combating Child Labour: Case Studies from Developing Countries” (Boyden and Myers), “Ugly 
Facts and Fancy Theories: Children and Youth During The Transition” (Cornia, on situations in Central and Eastern 
Europe), “A Child Belongs to Everyone” (Armstrong, on Zimbabwe), and Children, Law and Justice: A South Asian 
Perspective (Goonesekere). 
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standardized image of childhood that has been normalized to regulate social action at individual, 
family, and school levels in the industrialized world. He was concerned that these idealized 
images were being treated as a standard for judging the quality of childhood in contexts “far 
removed from their Euro-American origins” (1). Thus, to characterize the universalization of this 
Euro-American-centered concept of childhood, scholars have come to use the term global 
childhood.  
The expression appeared timidly in academic research in the 1990s with references to 
“global childhood standards” or “global construction of childhood” (Boyden 221-22). Soon after, 
it became part of the common lexicon in several studies (see Burman, “Local, Global or 
Globalized?”; Woodhead, “Towards a Global Paradigm”; Nieuwenhuys, “Global Childhood”) 
and has since grown as a concept of its own, continuing to fascinate researchers. Even leading 
publishing companies, including SAGE Publications, give this new terminology a dimension that 
is noticeable in the mission statements of the company and the orientation of published papers, 
through their peer-reviewed journals such as Childhood (created in 1993) and Global Studies of 
Childhood (created in 2011). Yet, oddly enough, the notion of global childhood has never been 
clearly defined. It remains a nebulous notion in scholarship, to the extent that Dutch childhood 
scholar Olga Nieuwenhuys conceded in an editorial in Childhood that she does “not believe we 
have understood well enough the term global childhood” (8) to be able to decide whether the 
word should be written in the plural. Nieuwenhuys’s remark came in response to scholars Jens 
Qvortrup and Chris Jenks’s suggestion that one pluralize the word childhood to refer to the 
multiple childhoods existing around the world.7 
                                               
7	See Olga Nieuwenhuys, “Theorizing Childhood(s).” In that 2013 editorial, Olga Nieuwenhuys states that she does 
not believe that “we have understood well enough what we designate as ‘global childhood’ to decide, as Jens 
Qvortrup and Chris Jenks sought to do some time ago in the pages of this journal, whether we should use the notion 
childhood or childhoods” (8).	
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Despite the lack of definition, the expression global childhood is used consistently in 
scholarship to describe the same reality: the failure to recognize multiplicity and diversity in the 
notion of childhood. Scholars have been drawn in three directions with respect to characterizing 
the notion of global childhood. First, there are scholars who perceive the notion of global 
childhood as simply the manifestation of globalization in children’s lives worldwide. Cindi Katz, 
for instance, illustrates this manifestation by describing how the global economy and its modes 
of production, distribution, and consumption shape children’s lives in Sudan and New York (see 
Growing Up Global). For Helen Penn, however, global childhood is the product of the ways in 
which international organizations and charities headquartered in the Global North export a 
common lexicon of buzzwords and theories as they intervene in childhood education, care, and 
welfare in the Global South. Other studies by this first category of scholars emphasize how 
children themselves live global lives, either as migrants or within multiracial communities, or by 
connecting to other cultures through the new media (e.g., Buckingham and De Block).  
Secondly, there is the tension between the “social” and the “material” in the notion of 
childhood. The “social” line holds that childhood is constructed by social processes and is 
historically and culturally specific. This idea is rooted in the “new” sociology of childhood,8 also 
referred to as the new social studies of childhood that emerged in the 1990s with Allison James 
et al. (see Theorizing Childhood). This school rejects the dominant views of childhood in 
developmental psychology and traditional socialization theory, while at the same time 
recognizing some truth in its “material” line. The latter line contends that childhood is universal 
                                               
8 The “new” sociology of childhood is also referred to as the new social studies of childhood. It rejects dominant 
views of childhood in developmental psychology and traditional socialization theory. While it views childhood as a 
social process, developmental psychology views childhood as a natural process focused on natural cognitive 
maturation, suggesting the idea that the child is “not yet competent.” This idea of the developing child coincides 
with traditional socialization theory which sees society as a powerful determinant in shaping behavior. 
 41 
on material grounds such as biology. Allison James and Adrian James (“Key Concepts in 
Childhood Studies”) thus recognize global childhood as the idea that children in different parts of 
the world share similar experiences of childhood. Such commonalities are visible in children’s 
lives, in their immaturity and their dependency on adults for basic needs, and in the regulation of 
their lives by governments and international organizations. For proponents of the “social” line, 
global childhood is the extension of a Western social and historical construction of childhood to 
other cultural regions. The Western construction, according to a binary image created by Chris 
Jenks in a 2005 work, comprises the Dionysian child, viewed as a “little devil” in need of 
discipline and protection from him/herself, and the Apollonian child, viewed as a “little angel” in 
need of play and protection from the world (James, Key Concepts in Childhood Studies 165-67). 
For Karen Smith, Jenks clearly associates the Dionysian child with pre-liberal, early-modern 
governments and the Apollonian child with the liberal capitalist governments that arose after 
industrialization. She contends that the Apollonian child, coming out of Rousseau’s Émile, is 
linked to the modern industrial society because of the emphasis on “individuality and 
uniqueness” (Smith 60). But Boyden asserts that both “highly selective, stereotyped perceptions 
of childhood—of the innocent child victim on the one hand and the young deviant on the other—
have been exported from the industrial world to the South” (Boyden, “Childhood and the Policy 
Makers” 173). This “social” line is rooted in the “new sociology of childhood” and in the social 
constructionist theory advocated by James and Prout (1997). 
Third, there are scholars who criticize the international children’s rights regime for its 
moral or political discourses. Building on social constructivism, these scholars criticize these 
discourses that cast the Western model of childhood as superior and thus universally extendable 
(Boyden, “Children’s Experience of Conflict-Related Disasters” 256). For Vanessa Pupavac, the 
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institutionalization of this Western model of childhood is not just a question of relevance to the 
circumstances of children in developing countries, it is a “pathologisation of the South” (Pupavac 
101). Norman Lewis pushes this idea even further, stating that by setting this standard, “southern 
childhood is not only effectively erased from international view, but the western model of 
childhood becomes the standard by which to judge southern societies” (Quoted in Pupavac 101). 
The moral or political school of criticism of global childhood is by far the most developed today. 
It goes as far as to accuse children’s rights advocates of paternalism. “This paternalism is 
illustrated by the comprehensive remit adopted by the experts in the Committee on the Rights of 
the Rights of the Child, encompassing cultural, economic, educational, legal, political and 
welfare reform” (Pupavac 101). 
Although deployed to highlight different aspects of children’s lives, global capitalism, 
and international politics, the expression global childhood is widely used to emphasize how a 
global model of childhood has superseded the various local models. It is not surprising that the 
social constructivist movement within childhood studies has taken aim at this idea in recent 
studies in the humanities and social sciences. Indeed, the thrust of these studies has been to show 
why and how childhood differs from one corner of the world to the other. For instance, the 
collection of papers edited by Sharon Stephens, Children and the Politics of Culture (1995), 
explores various models of childhood around the world and the ways in which they reflect the 
dynamics of a global politics of culture. Central to the spread of the idea of plural childhood is 
the notion that childhood is a social artifact rather than a biological necessity. The contention of 
sociologists Alan Prout and Allison James that “the immaturity of children is a biological fact of 
life, but the ways in which this immaturity is understood and made meaningful is a fact of 
culture” (“New Paradigm” 7), encapsulates this new trend in the modern study of childhood.  
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The claim that childhood is a social and cultural construction also acquires more 
significance in consideration of what the studies surveyed above perceive as a Global North 
conception of childhood. In fact, the notion that childhood is a privileged time of innocence, 
carefreeness and happiness is a mere construction, an idealistic imagination of children’s lives 
which is hardly translated in real life, even in the industrialized countries, where it originates. In 
what follows, I draw from a body of historical accounts of childhood to show how a selective 
imagination of childhood has led to the consecration of the literary Romantic idea of childhood, 
which in turn has grown into a global ideology. 
 
2. Childhood in Western History 
In order to trace the historical development of the notion of global childhood, one needs 
first to define the idea of childhood. As Jenks has noted, in the contemporary global context, the 
conceptualization of childhood as a social practice remains perpetually diffuse and ambiguous 
(2). However, there has been a long cultural commitment to the good of the child and an 
intellectual engagement, although relatively recent, with the topic of childhood. Studies by 
anthropologists such as Margaret Mead and Bronislaw Malinowski in the 1920s and 1930s were 
pioneering in suggesting the variety in childhood around the world. Mead and Wolfenstein, 
writing in 1955, particularly felt that “[a]lthough each historic period of which we have any 
record has had its own version of childhood…childhood was still something one took for 
granted, a figure of speech, a mythological subject rather than a subject of articulate scrutiny” 
(3). In countering what appears as only a literary view of childhood, anthropologists sought to 
offer a diverse view of the notion. Yet childhood elsewhere, as described by anthropologists in 
the first half of the twentieth century amid heightened colonial racism, came across as primitive. 
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The idea of childhood that would make history, therefore, is strongly entrenched in European 
culture. Historians’ accounts of European childhood, however, are highly controversial. Two 
types of scholarships clash on the earlier periods of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. On the 
one hand, there are those who argue for a substantial change in the perceptions of childhood 
from the medieval to the early-modern period. On the other hand, there are those, mostly 
medieval scholars, who for the most part see continuity rather than discontinuity (Hanawalt 440). 
While proponents of the discontinuity thesis emphasize a radical change from a stage of 
barbarism to a more polished cultural idea of childhood, proponents of the continuity thesis 
provide evidence that childhood, back in the distant past, was not as awful as has been claimed.    
The polemic began with the influential work of French historian Philippe Ariès. In 
L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous l’ancien régime (1960), translated by Robert Baldick as 
Centuries of Childhood (1962), Ariès, studying exclusively the European context, claimed, “in 
medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist” (30). Ariès meant that the idea of childhood 
as understood in the contemporary world did not exist in the Middle Ages. However, his 
contention would not only draw scholarly attention to the overlooked topic of childhood, but 
most importantly, would provoke the reaction of scholars, including medievalists, who undertook 
to set the record straight on the historical period they master. Indeed, medievalists do not share 
Ariès’s dismissal of the notion of childhood in the Middle Ages. Basing themselves on records 
such as miracle narratives, learned and popular writing, visual culture, artifacts, and dress 
(Hanawalt 456), they demonstrated that people in the Middle Ages did have a notion of 
childhood. It was a concept so well known that the distinction between childhood and other 
stages of adolescence and adulthood existed. A notable refutation of Ariès’s thesis, in the French 
context, is for instance Pierre Riché and Danièle Alexandre-Bidon’s book L’enfance au moyen 
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âge (1996). Their book used manuscript sources of learned texts, of literature, as well as visual 
imagery that they retrieved through painstaking research. They wanted to show that medieval 
society did recognize a notion of childhood. The use of these sources is deemed remarkable 
because part of Ariès’s claim is based on the idea that there was no record of childhood and, 
therefore, that this idea was unknown. Riché’s and Alexandre-Bidon’s book places a great deal 
of emphasis on highlighting the abundance of sources and even breaks them down into major 
areas: iconography, didactic literature, especially medical literature, archival records (wills, 
notarial contracts, inventories, etc.), hagiography, monastic rules, and legal rules, to which must 
be added literary fictions. To completely close this debate, the authors also offer a bibliography 
of 228 titles. 
But counterreactions to Ariès’s claim seem to have arrived late, or at least have been 
ignored. In fact, medievalists were hardly alone in disputing the idea that childhood did not exist 
in the past. Historian Linda A. Pollock also stressed continuity in the history of childhood. In 
Pollock’s 1983 thesis, mostly built to contradict Ariès, she contended that childhood existed in 
medieval times and that parents loved and pampered their children, as they still do today. Her 
work, one of the earliest to contradict Ariès, never gained enough influence to eclipse the 
discontinuity thesis. This thesis, that childhood was worse in previous ages and has radically 
changed in the modern era, would be relayed by an entire generation of historians. Cunningham 
(1995) noted that Ariès’s theory would be “accepted as important and authoritative” (7) in the 
social sciences and that it has retained this status to this day. But a major support to Ariès’s 
theory of discontinuity came from the development of social history between the 1960s and 
1970s. Three books published at that time epitomize what scholars now characterize as the 1970s 
approach to childhood: Lloyd de Mause’s History of Childhood (1974), Edward Shorter’s The 
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Making of the Modern Family (1975), and Lawrence Stone’s Family, Sex, and Marriage (1977). 
These books, widely informed by Ariès’s work, faithfully spread the discontinuity theory. To 
take just an example, in his book, de Mause identifies several modes of parent-child relations, 
describing a progressive but radical change from the “infanticidal” to the “helping.” In de 
Mause’s words, “the further back in history one goes, the lower is the level of child care, and the 
more likely children are to be killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized, and sexually abused” (1).  
Hugh Cunningham’s 1995 book Children and Childhood in Western Society since 1500 
seemed to be a critique of the discontinuity theory. It is, however, based on the previous studies 
that have shaped modern scholarship on (European) childhood and it does heed the debate 
between proponents and opponents of the discontinuity thesis. Taking a position, Cunningham 
distances himself from Ariès’s discontinuity thesis by choosing the camp of those emphasizing 
continuity. Paradoxically, his work displays many historical ideas that shaped the chronological 
shifting of Western childhood. He starts off with the medieval world. The most important change 
brought to the idea of childhood during these times came from the Christian doctrine of original 
sin. According to this doctrine, human beings were born sinful and efforts had to be made during 
childhood to redeem their souls. Moving to the period beginning around the year 1500, he 
describes the rise of what he calls a “middle class ideology of childhood,” for which he credits 
thinkers such as Erasmus, Locke, and Rousseau. Erasmus’s emphasis on the importance of the 
father in children’s education, especially for boys, was in Cunningham’s view the rise of a 
distinctly modern vision of childhood. Locke’s main contribution was to undermine the idea of 
original sin by supporting the secularization of the Western ideal of childhood. Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, according to him, furthered Locke’s secular ideal to its logical conclusion. For 
Rousseau, it was nature, and not the Church, that should guide a child’s upbringing. 
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Cunningham’s line of narrating Western childhood with clear-cut evolving steps corresponds to 
the work of most childhood historians writing in the twentieth century, following in the footsteps 
of Ariès. 
Colin Heywood’s A History of Childhood: Children and Childhood in the West from 
Medieval to Modern Times (2001) accounts for new paradigms in childhood scholarship. It 
follows, for instance, the “social constructionist” theory, which not only highlights plurality in 
childhoods but also seeks to capture adults’ attitudes affecting children’s lives, perspectives, and 
agency. Also, unlike most childhood histories written in the twentieth century that choose a 
chronological presentation of the evolution of childhood, Heywood’s book is organized by 
themes, “interpreting the material rather than the details of what happened” (8). He reviews adult 
ideas about childhood (cultural history) as a background to his examination of children’s 
experience (social history), both in the family and outside of that sphere. While Heywood does 
not follow the logic of chronological change or continuity as his predecessors do, his study 
demonstrates another change in the perception of childhood. This change, pervasive in the 
structure of his work, concerns the new ways the twenty-first century imagines the idea of 
childhood. Heywood agrees with current research on childhood that any idea of purely “natural 
childhood” becomes unsustainable since children readily adjust to their environment. Despite the 
undeniable improvements in Western children’s lives, Heywood stresses the persistence of 
inequalities among classes, ethnicities, and regions to “avoid an air of triumphalism” (145).  
The narrative of Western childhood, as presented above, has mainly been built on a 
scenario of childhood’s progress towards perfection. In fact, it serves the notion of enlightened 
Western modernity to embrace the idea that humanity has gotten better in the treatment of 
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children than people in previous ages (and later, in other cultural spaces). The discontinuity 
thesis implies that there is a shift in human development, evolving beyond what modern culture 
considers pre-modern. As Hanawalt explains, part of the reasons for the negative view of 
medieval childhood comes from Western folk culture, which calls everything undesirable 
“medieval” whether or not the practices at hand have anything to do with the Middle Ages.  
Hanawalt’s view accurately explains the triumph of the discontinuity thesis, which 
secludes modernity from a medieval conception of childhood. Indeed, despite the outpouring of 
criticism of Ariès’s work by medievalists, the historical account of childhood that widely informs 
modern childhood studies and children’s rights scholarship is drawn from the perpetuators of his 
thesis. These classics of Western childhood history, by emphasizing a shifting notion of 
childhood, also concur in shaping the idea that modern childhood has been molded by romantic 
idealization. Both works by Cunningham and Heywood, for instance, quote Wordsworth’s “Ode: 
Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood” as a typical example. In 
Cunningham’s words, this poetry “came to encapsulate what was thought of as a romantic 
attitude to childhood,” namely that “childhood was the best part of life” (74). For Heywood, 
Wordsworth’s “Ode on Intimations” was arguably as powerful an influence on the nineteenth-
century ideas of childhood as Freud has been on present-day ones. According to him, the lines 
indicating that we are born “trailing clouds of glory and that Heaven lies about us in our infancy” 
(27) were repeatedly quoted, plagiarized, and adapted by later writers. While such a widespread 
quoting, plagiarizing, and adaptation of Wordsworth’s romantic ideas of childhood in literature 
sounds exaggerated, it translates the desire to account for a historical shift of childhood in 
Western Europe, from barbaric to Romantic, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
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The historical accounts reviewed above are not mere acknowledgments of what 
childhood was in the past; they signal steps in efforts to imagine a category and a stage in human 
existence that reflects modernity’s philosophy of human progress. The polemic between 
proponents and opponents of the discontinuity thesis, if anything, shows indeed that childhood in 
Western medieval civilization, despite being different from contemporary childhood and 
characteristically peculiar to that time, was rich, complex, and certainly not worse.  
Writing in the twentieth century, the proponents of the continuity thesis failed to 
recognize the role of the Enlightenment in casting previous ages as barbaric. The Enlightenment 
thinkers in Europe were questioning traditional authority to bring improvement to humanity 
through rational change. As such, they sought to imagine a better childhood in order to raise 
better citizens. Enlightenment philosophy led to the emergence of the ideas of children’s 
innocence and vulnerability. These ideas in turn triggered a new phase that American 
anthropologist Georges Boas in 1966 called the “cult of childhood.” This cult, characterized by 
the celebration of childhood in literature and popular culture, ultimately evolved into the 
conception of contemporary childhood, global childhood. 
This evolution, as far as French literature is concerned, dates to Jean Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778). In his book Émile, ou de l’éducation (1762), now considered an early manifesto of 
contemporary child-centered ideology, Rousseau claims that children are intrinsically innocent 
and only become sullied when they enter the corrupted world of adults. Following Rousseau’s 
theorization of children’s innocence, this ideal found its way into a variety of literary works, 
including Bernadin de Saint Pierre’s Paul et Virginie (1788) and later, in various collections of 
Victor Hugo: Les orientales (1829), Les chants du crépuscule (1835), among others. Rousseau’s 
influence extended way beyond France, and his theory of child innocence and purity reached 
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William Blake’s Songs of Innocence and of Experience (1794) and Wordsworth’s Ode: 
Intimations of Immortality (1807). These romanticized literary images of childhood and their 
pitfalls fed the cult of childhood that deeply influenced literary works throughout the nineteenth 
century, both in Europe and in the New World.  
Beside the images of romantic childhood, other less glorious images emerged in works 
such as Charles Dickens’s Oliver Twist (1837), Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables (1862), and 
Hector Malot’s Sans famille (1878), to name but a few. Central to these narratives is the 
suffering of children in the face of an indifferent society. These images send two contradictory 
messages. While the theme of suffering children resonates powerfully in literature because of the 
tropes of childhood as a time of innocence and of vulnerability, it also signals the existence of a 
phenomenon that modern European society considers as belonging to dated medieval time. The 
Romantics used the choking contrast between the tropes of innocence, purity, and vulnerability 
and the plague of suffering children to promote a literary image of idealized childhood. The 
topos of Romantic childhood, as Bethlenfalvay observes, remained influential way into the 
twentieth century (22). 
Over the years, with the triumph of liberalism, the pressure of the global economy, and 
the development of international law, the literary idealized childhood evolved into what 
American sociologist Viviana Zelizer described in 1985 as the “sentimentalization” of children. 
Zelizer examined the period from 1870 to 1930 and concluded that American children of most 
social classes lost their status as bread-earners to become their parents’ emotional treasures. 
Zelizer graphically noted that children have become “economically worthless” but “emotionally 
priceless.” Her claim, however, is to be taken with reserve: child labor was pervasive in the 
United States until 1930—at any rate, the US Congress only passed the Fair Labor Standards Act 
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in 1938, regulating the work of those under 16-18, and still today children can work in 
agriculture and in any business owned by their parents as long as the work is not hazardous.  
Beyond the United States, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw horrendous 
exploitation of children, especially in relation to the Industrial Revolution and wars in Europe. 
Children’s predicaments during these times came to light through literary works such as the 
aforementioned novels by Dickens, Hugo, and Malot. Scholarship hardly addressed this issue, to 
the point that historian Peter Laslett noted in The World We Have Lost (1967) that laboring 
children were “strangely absent from the written record” (109-110). The mythical nature of the 
Western Romantic ideal of childhood, in fact, is class-based. Whereas the ruling class, the 
bourgeoisie, and the liberal middle class enjoy a happy childhood, working-class children and 
minorities can work in factories and go to jail. In recent years, child labor in the West has been 
replaced by other horrible forms of abuse: namely child trafficking and a discrepancy in many 
countries between the way girls and boys are affected by the lack of empathy for childhood. 
Contemporary views on childhood, therefore, are the products of a complex social and historical 
constructions. 
 
3. The Rise of the Idea of Global Childhood 
By retracing the historical development of this notion of global childhood, which is the 
backbone of international legislation protecting children, I hope to shed light on how such a 
concept achieved the status of an international standard. Yet, in doing so, it is not my intention to 
berate the liberal model of childhood it promotes, or to suggest that the children’s rights treaties 
that this notion inspired are inapplicable in certain parts of the world. I simply argue that, in 
contemporary modern society, despite the numerous assaults on the well-being of children 
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worldwide, childhood is still being conceived of as a social category whose members —children 
—live in a blessed time, free of responsibility and full of amusements. Our own digital age has 
been highly effective in spreading worldwide this conception of childhood that John 
Sommerville describes in his 1982 work Rise and Fall of Childhood as a carefree, safe, secure, 
and happy phase of human existence. In various media, this conception of fantasized childhood 
is captured with aphorisms, such as “childhood is that wonderful time of life when all you need 
do to lose weight is to take a bath,”9 and “there is a garden in every childhood, an enchanted 
place where colors are brighter, the air softer, and the morning more fragrant than ever again.”10 
These bright descriptions of childhood, however, fail to conceal the dramatic reality of poverty, 
homelessness, opioid addiction, mass shootings, drive-by shootings, violence in schools, and 
bullying in which children are victims.  
The completely artificial, invented, and mendacious nature of the romantic idea of 
childhood is often exploited by corporations in selling dreams and commodities. The ideal draws 
its strengths from the European celebration of childhood that reached its pinnacle with the 
Romanticism movement in England and France, as shown above. During the Romantic era, 
poems such as “My Heart Leaps Up” by English poet William Wordsworth (1770-1850) and 
L’enfant heureux [The happy child] by French children’s author Arnaud Berquin (1747-1791) 
were classic celebrations of childhood as a glorious time, expressions of that “cult of childhood” 
George Boas identified. Childhood, even as understood in today’s increasingly globalizing 
society, still belongs for some to a lineage of the images of childhood developed in this European 
                                               
9 Math professor and joke collector Desmond MacHale, in his 2005 book Wit, attributes this quote to the business 
communication writer Richard S. Zera (76). 
10 Charlotte Observer columnist Elisabeth Lawrence used this depiction of childhood in her 1995 collection of 
articles titled Through the Garden Gate. 
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literary tradition. Although this generous imagination of childhood nurtures a narrative of normal 
childhood, scholars have shown that it remains an ideal that fails to recognize other models. 
In a 1996 study of early childhood conducted in France, Kenya, India, and Venezuela, 
Martin Woodhead observed for instance that in agrarian and rural societies, “children have 
traditionally been valued as essential contributors to family well-being. Within a few years of 
birth, they carry out domestic chores, help with cultivation, look after animals and care for 
younger children” (Woodhead, In Search of the Rainbow 15). Woodhead then counsels those 
involved in early childhood development to recognize that many of their most cherished beliefs 
about what is best for children are cultural constructions. Several findings in the social sciences11 
and legal studies12 uphold Woodhead’s conclusion as it pertains to the African context. In 
chapters 2 and 3, I present some aspects of what is often referred to as the African model of 
childhood on the basis of selected folk narratives and novels. However, as shall become clear in 
chapter 4, this childhood model is one in transition, and therefore is neither faithful to this 
traditional model nor completely detached from the Western model. 
The idea of global childhood was born at the dawn of the twentieth century and quickly 
secured international recognition. In the wake of European and world warfare, journalists and 
photographers produced a popular awareness of the terrible consequences of war on children. 
Soon after these wars, as Bruno Cabanes has shown, an impulse to recreate a shared humanist 
culture favored the proliferation of humanitarian initiatives. For better or for worse, the media 
has turned children into objects of pity and highlighted their exploitation. Among activists 
hoping to reduce human suffering, in general, and that of children in particular, was Eglantyne 
                                               
11 See the works by cultural psychologist A. B. Nsamenang and by anthropologist Olga Nieuwenhyus (“Global 
Childhood and the Politics of Contempt”).  
12 See the works by African legal scholars such as Welshman Ncube and Thoko Kaime. 
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Jebb (1876-1928), an educator, philanthropist, and social activist in the era of Queen Victoria. 
Miss Jebb was known for her involvement in the major struggles of her time to change the world 
for the better. Her most lasting legacy is the founding in January 1920 of the Save the Children 
Fund,13 a charity that still serves children worldwide to this day. Through this charity, Jebb made 
an indelible impact on children’s welfare and protection law by drafting14 in 1923 what she first 
titled the “World Child Welfare Charter.” The first words of the preamble of this document 
resonated with the Victorian and Romantic ideal of childhood: “Mankind owes to the Child the 
best that it has to give.” Jebb’s pioneering work sowed the seeds of contemporary children’s 
rights law, although Francesca M. Wilson’s 1967 biography Rebel Daughter of a Country House 
contends that her image as the “sister of all the world” and martyr for child welfare was 
constructed by her sister Dorothy Jebb (1881-1963) in the hope to win her the Nobel Prize.  
Jebb’s other passion—poetry—was not publicly known until the publication of two volumes of 
her highly sentimental essays and poetry, The Real Enemy (1928) and Post Tenebras Lux (1928), 
which were intended as fundraising literature for the Save the Children Fund. Yet, her oft-
overlooked talent as a poet indisputably influenced her “World Child Welfare Charter,” which 
the League of Nations adopted in 1924, one year after its drafting, as the Geneva Declaration of 
the Rights of the Child. This declaration constituted the first document dedicated to the active 
promotion worldwide of the rights of children as a special group in need of protection. Although 
not legally binding, the adoption of the declaration still constituted an important event in the 
history of international relations. For the first time in history, children had the attention of the 
                                               
13In April 2018, Save the Children faced a formal investigation by the UK government for mishandling staff 
misconduct.  
14According to Philip Veerman, Jebb drafted the declaration with the help of Etienne Clouzot (1881-1944), the 
Secretary General of Save the Children International Union, who was a geographer known as a man of letters and 
“ambassadeur de la culture Française” (see also Lemaitre). 
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highest circles of international diplomacy. Moreover, the adoption of the declaration validated 
the universal scope and applicability of an ideal of childhood—even though that ideal was 
neither respected nor practiced in the very Western societies promoting it. By adopting the text, 
the League of Nations intended to implement a general and systematic commitment to children 
as human beings. Most important, this consecration of an ideal of childhood, which was 
translated into many languages and widely distributed by national governments, powerfully 
launched the idea of the “global child” with specific needs, “beyond and above all considerations 
of race, nationality, or creed.” The power of the idea that Jebb’s declaration unleashed resides 
mainly in the deployment of the Romantic ideals that characterized global childhood:   
1. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal 
development, both materially and spiritually. 
2. The child that is hungry must be fed, the child that is sick must 
be helped, the child that is backward must be helped, the 
delinquent child must be reclaimed, and the orphan and the waif 
must be sheltered and succored. 
3. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress. 
4. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood, and 
must be protected against every form of exploitation. 
5. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its 
talents must be devoted to the service of its fellow men. 
A declaration is a public or solemn proclamation which usually follows a specific 
wording that is characteristic of legal writing. Jebb’s “World Child Welfare Charter,” however, 
is closer to poetry than to a legal document. Jebb’s poetic approach recalls what Victor Hugo 
exposes in “La fonction du poète” (“The Function of the Poet”), a poem included in Les rayons 
et les ombres (1840). For the master of the French Romantic movement that irradiated through 
the rest of Europe, the poet must use art to guide society, for only he embraces God and Man and 
 56 
can imagine the future. In her poetic declaration, Jebb appears as this visionary and foretelling 
poet by exploiting the two main attributes of romanticized European childhood to define the 
future of a global childhood. The child is described as an innocent human being but also as 
vulnerable and thus passive and incapable. The two notions of innocence and vulnerability are 
built into the text in ways that entail consequences, both at the content and at the formal levels. 
With respect to content, the trope of innocence and vulnerability derives from the child’s 
association with need and helplessness. This is evident in the lexicon: must “be given,” “be fed,” 
“be helped,” “be reclaimed,” and “be sheltered and succored.” This position of helplessness of 
the child has implications in terms of rights: innocence and vulnerability not only make the child 
guiltless and powerless, they bequeath him/her rights. Though the five stanza-like sentences of 
the declaration are not explicit about whose responsibility it is to provide for these rights, such 
responsibilities obviously rest on “Mankind,” as stated in the preamble, and especially on 
adults—viewed as sources of nature’s degradation—to bear the responsibility for fulfilling 
children’s needs. This responsibility cannot be evaded. In fact, it is an obligation, as shown by 
the use of the modal verb “must,” and this onus ranges from providing “the means requisite” for 
their “normal development, both materially and spiritually” (stanza 1) to their protection first and 
foremost in times of distress (stanza 3). 
At the formal level, the trope of the child’s innocence and vulnerability is illustrated in 
the text by two literary devices: the passive voice and repetition. The passive voice emphasizes 
the beneficiary of rights and places the actor in a minor position not worth mentioning. Again, 
children must “be given,” “be fed,” “be helped,” “be reclaimed,” and “be sheltered and 
succored,” without any mention of the performer of the action. In this position, the child is a 
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passive receiver of adults’ beneficence. However, adults are not mentioned in the text, as a way 
to emphasize the preeminence of the child’s entitlements. Repetition is a device that serves in 
emphasizing a feeling or idea, to create rhythm and develop a sense of urgency. The Declaration 
deploys a specific type of repetition: anaphora, the deliberate use of the same words, usually at 
the start or end of each clause, for a literary effect. Jebb makes good use of this device to appeal 
to the emotions of the audience, in order to plead the case of the innocent and vulnerable child: 
“The child must be given… The child that is hungry… the child that is sick…. the child that is 
backward…” In repeating the words “child that is,” the author not only adds rhythm and artistic 
effect, but also adds emphasis and gives prominence to this idea. 
If anything, Jebb’s poetic declaration emphasizes the connection between law and 
literature and how the content and the form coalesce to stress adults’ and society’s obligation to 
attend to children’s needs, as well as to the passivity of the child. Needs and passivity, in 
conjunction with the Lockean philosophy of childhood, inspired the earlier notions on children’s 
rights, known as nurturance rights. John Locke (1689), envisioning citizens of a state rather than 
subjects of a king, thought it crucial to distinguish the rational and capable adult citizen from the 
child. This distinction, however, implied that children were non-rational and incapable. This 
stance on children as citizens in waiting, in “becoming,” fueled the earlier social and political 
commitments that were concerned with protecting the child and providing him/her with rights. 
As Paula Fass explains in her 2011 work, the right to be cared for and protected defined the 
ideals that international institutions adopted in earlier documents (18). The three hard Ps—
Provision, Protection, and Participation—that characterize children’s rights law today constitute 
a recent development. Indeed, in recent years, international law’s focus has shifted to the child’s 
self-determination and participation rights. At one point, the earlier and the new version clashed 
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in what is known as the “becoming and being” controversy. Liberal theories such as Locke’s 
were rejected by children’s rights theorists, including Michael Freeman who, writing in 1983, 
found the “exclusion” of children from the human family unfair and emphasized that children are 
“beings” deserving of legal rights, including self-determination and participation rights. 
However, as several studies have found, children themselves are more likely to claim age-
appropriate nurturance than self-determination rights (Ruck and Horn 692). 
The history of childhood in the Global North and the children’s rights movement 
coincide with these ideas of the needy, innocent, and vulnerable child. This genealogy is telling 
regarding the conception of childhood that would triumph during the negotiations leading to the 
adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989. Although the Geneva Declaration 
of 1924 was a mere listing of affirmations to the benefit of children rather than a definite 
declaration of rights, it is acknowledged as an important precursor to later key documents in the 
history of global children’s rights, such as the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Not only does the Geneva 
Declaration remain the frame of reference, but the model of childhood it promotes was 
successfully imposed on the Global South nations during colonization.  
Indeed, at the same time as the Western world was creating international legislation 
related to children’s rights, colonial travelers and literati were intrigued by the lives of children 
in the colonies. They wrote profusely about them, having in mind their own European ideals 
concerning children’s welfare and well-being. The tropes of innocence and passivity are 
conspicuously present in these writings. 
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Ethnographic and fictional depictions of Francophone African childhoods were striking 
for their tantalizing dissimilarity from Western childhood. In L’Afrique fantôme (1934), Michel 
Leiris describes African children as if they “give an impression of gaiety and life” that he has 
“not encountered anywhere else” (34). Though Leiris’s famously paternalistic perception of 
Africans may have played out in this evocation of children’s lives, his idealization of African 
childhood is clearly related to a fascination for a life free from the constraints of what the 
colonial mind called the “civilized world” (Clarck-Taoua 483). The study of infants in general 
along with “primitives” and natural history was, in fact, a fascination of the mid-nineteenth 
century. These studies were obsessed with discovering the origins and specific workings of the 
human mind, that is, the adult’s mind (see Burman, “How Animals” 16). The initiative was 
related to similar enterprises by ethnographers who were closely allied with European 
imperialism seeking to assert racial hierarchy to justify colonial rule. In a bid to compare the 
“savage” or “undeveloped” mythical Africa with early-twentieth-century Western society, 
colonial ethnographers showed a rare interest in the seemingly fulfilled childhood of the so-
called “primitives.” At the time, the idea of innocence in these texts works as a reminder of how 
adults lose their “purity” after childhood and thus how the colonized—viewed as children—
could lose their natural lives. 
In his 1938 study of childhood in the Senufo tribe of Cote d’Ivoire, the Reverend Father 
Knops describes children’s lack of moral education. “Until the age of reason,” he writes, “the 
little Senufo does whatever he wishes: no one cares about his moral education” (482). The 
Belgian missionary added that “beating a child seems dishonorable in the eyes of these 
primitives,” who neglected children’s moral education as they were confident that the social 
organization of kinship would keep all its members under an iron discipline. He described the 
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habits of the child’s life among the Senufo because he felt that European rules were rapidly 
demolishing their customs, suppressing their sacred family laws, and causing their ancestral 
edifice to crumble.  
Photographs and representations of African children also revealed the deep-rooted 
hypocrisy of the so-called “colonial benevolence.” Alice Seeley Harris produced a series of 
photographs between 1896 and 1905, including Congolese children mutilated by the Belgian 
colonizers. She was a pioneer in using imagery of suffering African children “surrounded by 
flies” to advocate humanitarian causes. These campaigns—however questionable in the light of 
the current humanitarian ethic— had a powerful effect as they exposed the colonial hypocritical 
mission to civilize, while also mobilizing the Romantic trope of childhood as a weapon in 
achieving humanitarian goals. While Seeley’s photographs show degrading images of children in 
support of early human rights campaigns, other images produced in colonial French Africa in the 
early twentieth century appear to serve as tools to dehumanize and objectify the colonial subject. 
Postcards published by Malek Alloula in his The Colonial Harem (1986) revealed what he calls 
the “images of suberoticism” in a voyeuristic representation of colonial Algerian women, 
including teenagers. The historical and political conjunctures of racial politics at work within 
photography, in general, has garnered scholarly interest with scholars seeking to understand the 
effects of these photography on those who have been culturally erased, made invisible or less 
than human (see, for instance, Sealy). 
The Romantic perception of childhood made it even harder for Western audiences to 
accept broad-minded scholarship. As with earlier ethnographies on non-Western childhood, the 
public was not prepared to understand alternative conceptions of childhood. In “Samoan 
Children at Work and Play” (1928), Margaret Mead described children entrusted at age five with 
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responsibilities such as taking care of their younger siblings and doing gender-specific tasks. In 
Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) she exposed the torrid sexual lives of Samoan adolescent girls. 
Her ethnographic accounts of Samoan childhood shocked the Western mind with their depiction 
of the “abnormal” ways children behaved and were treated on the Samoan island. Similar 
untraditional accounts of childhood flourished in the first half of the twentieth century with 
studies such as Bronislaw Malinowski’s The Sexual Life of Savages (1929) and Fortes Meyers’s 
ethonography Tallensi Childhood (1938) on northern Ghanaian culture. In his foreword to 
Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa, Franz Boas, “the father of American anthropology,” warned 
the lay reader against ethnocentric interpretation of these accounts of childhood: 
We are accustomed to consider all those actions that are part and parcel of our own culture, 
standards, which we follow automatically, as common to all mankind. They are deeply 
ingrained in our behavior. We are molded in their forms so that we cannot think but that 
they must be valid everywhere. (xiv) 
 Boas found it necessary to issue this warning to the Western reader because of the natural 
fear of the cultural other, but his warning fell on deaf ears. Francophone colonial literature, for 
instance, remained rife with depictions of childhood in which the Eurocentric ideal was deemed 
valid everywhere. This colonial view is noticeable in works of fiction as diverse and spanning 
several decades such as Pierre Loti’s Roman d’un Spahi (1898) and Louis Ferdinand Celine’s 
Voyage (1932). Such projections of the Western model upon the colonial subject were also 
pursued in international policy and law as reflected in the earlier treaties adopted before the 
1960s. The Declaration drafted by Englantyne Jebb and adopted by the League of Nations in 
1924 was the first account of a Romantic ideal of childhood in a global legal discourse. The 
League of Nations, which was created four years earlier, counted 55 member-states and had the 
ambition to create an inclusive world after World War I. The International Labor Organization 
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(ILO), created in 1919, became one of its main agencies. In 1921, the ILO’s first convention 
regulating child labor—ILO Convention No. 5—entered into force. The main provision of the 
Convention was the prohibition of child labor “in any public or private industrial undertaking” 
(Article 2). The reference to public or private industrial undertakings created the impression that 
the convention was mainly directed at Western industrialized countries. It had, though, specific 
provisions targeting some Asian countries (including industrialized Japan, and the less 
industrialized India). 
With the issue of children’s legal status on the agenda of international politics, European 
colonial powers started to feel the pressure to stop the highly profitable child exploitation (Diptee 
and Klein 3). In French colonies, the urge to bring a better childhood to African children would 
be triggered, as Lisa McNee explains, by three factors: the League of Nations’ attempts to 
promote globally the first Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1924); the creation of the 
United Nations, which decided to extend its child protection programs in postwar Europe to the 
colonies (Ward); and internal pressure from colonial administrators to extend French child 
legislation to the colonies. Sembène Ousmane’s acclaimed God’s Bits of Wood (1960) provides 
glimpses of the impact that these measures had on the colonized. One of the primary demands of 
the 1947 railroad workers’ strike, according to the novel, was to claim the family allowance 
(benefit for children), which was consistent with the French culture that was imposed on them. 
The battle for the children’s benefit in God’s Bits of Wood reflects the ways in which the family 
life of working-class colonized subjects was being shaped in urban centers of Senegal.  
Following independence, most African countries struggled with the legacy of their 
colonial legal systems. The African elite educated in the European system sought to imitate the 
metropole, rather than create new laws (Saada). As Robert Delavignette noted about French 
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African colonies, “The African republics have gone from white officials to black officials, but 
they have not changed the structure of their administration” (Cohen and Rosenzweig 130). 
English-speaking Africa presented a similar scenario, where “English law has been applied 
without regard to its adequacy to local conditions” (Gower 29). Sandra Fullerton Joireman aptly 
notes that it was not because these systems were necessarily better than traditional African legal 
systems, but rather because of the prevalence of the colonial institutions (576). In Francophone 
Africa, Joireman, citing Le Roy (1994), refers to the example of Senegal, which adopted a civil 
code as old as 1960 that resembled French law and rejected customary law. It is in keeping with 
this trend that the legal system established by the colonizers became an integral part of the 
domestic laws in most post-independence African nations.  
This does not mean that the inherited colonial laws were the only legal system operating 
in the African space. The colonial African territories were the site of legal pluralism (Hooker). 
Customary law, recognized or accepted by the colonial rulers after conquest, became an 
unofficial law coexisting with the European system. As Francis G. Snyder shows, this law was 
often predominantly oral rather than written, and derived from sources of authority outside the 
colonial state. No wonder that, according to Snyder, this customary law was targeted by the 
colonial regime. In fact, customary law was turned from an indigenous law into a colonial 
instrument. Customary law, Snyder insists, is in itself a colonial concept that tries to reinterpret 
African legal forms in terms of European legal categories to uphold the ideology of those classes 
most closely associated with the colonial state. Even the apparently technical designation of 
African law as “customary” because it was oral was in fact a camouflage of the intent to classify 
it as subordinate to the colonial law of European origin. For Snyder, thus, a better analysis of the 
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role that law plays in postcolonial societies would be conducted in light of dependency theory 
rather than modernization theory.  
National authorities then found it imperative to Africanize their legal system. This urge 
was first observed as a reaction to human rights law. In June 1981, the 18th Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—rebaptized in 1990 as 
the African Union—adopted the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, also known as 
the Banjul Charter. For legal commentators such as Rumu Sarkar, the Charter’s departure from 
Western human rights traditions represents the “Africanization of human rights” (242). The 
success of this effort can be said to have encouraged various changes in domestic laws, as well as 
the “Africanization” of children’s rights law. The latter event, however, is supposedly related to 
a more particular incident: the sentiment of frustration that Africans felt following the adoption 
of the Convention of the Rights of the Child in 1989. Most Global South countries were not part 
of the discussion and adoption of the founding legal norms on children that emerged after World 
War I. As a matter of fact, African territories, with a few exceptions,15 were still under colonial 
rule until the late 1960s. After gaining their independence, these countries were compelled to 
subscribe to an already designed international order, including its laws. It was in this manner that 
these African societies became part of the United Nations, whose operational system was already 
in place. Contemporary children’s rights law had already been set up through the first two 
declarations, deriving from Jebb’s charter. The new urge to Africanize national laws seems 
oriented, in part, toward the deconstruction of these Western foundations of international laws.  
The adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, in 1989, 
affirmed the Western-invented Romantic concept of childhood as a world standard. The process 
                                               
15 Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent black African countries that were members of the League of 
Nations at the time. Most African countries won their sovereignty after 1960. 
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leading to the adoption of the convention ignored the views of most African nations. As a result, 
despite an initial race to ratify the CRC, African nations clamped down afterwards when the time 
came for implementation. At ratification time, African governments submitted reservations (see 
Schabas) that, retrospectively, could explain their reluctance in applying the CRC. The 
difference in views was already eloquently displayed during the drafting of the convention. Just 
one year after the adoption of the CRC, in 1990, the heads of African governments adopted the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC). The ACRWC’s preamble 
indicates that “cultural heritage, historical background and the values of the African civilization” 
should be taken into account in defining children rights. The Charter, however, could seem 
disappointing to those expecting a legal document rooted in African traditionalism. It features 
legal norms that speak both to the African and the global context. For critics such as Bankole 
Thompson, despite the grandiose preambular language inscribing the charter in the African 
cultural heritage, the legal document does not uphold African traditions. Thompson analyzed the 
first 31 articles constituting the substantive and procedural rights of the Charter and concluded 
that it is fundamentally inconsistent at the functional level. As he stated, by parity of reasoning, 
the discourse of the Charter runs against African cultural heritage and traditions on the matter of 
the status of children (440). Thus, for Thompson, the Charter does not fulfill its goal of 
upholding the African cultural heritage. His reading, however, seem to disregard an important 
element: the context. What is viewed as a “miscarriage” of equitable principles finds its 
explanation in some African artistic productions, especially in literature. The examination of this 
literature is the subject of the third chapter of this dissertation, and I discuss these literary works 
with the premise that global childhood is a very limited concept.  
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4. The Limits of Global Childhood 
Critics of children’s rights law often underscore the disconnection between the notion of 
global childhood in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the reality of Global South 
societies. The same is true even in the industrialized world. The “global child” of children’s 
rights law also suffers from another discrepancy induced by the illusion that he/she is fully 
empowered with a legal personality, that is, he/she has the capacity for legal relations. The 
philosophy of childhood underlying the Convention on the Rights of the Child has undoubtedly 
mitigated the paternalistic, protective attitudes towards the child embedded in the first two 
declarations of 1924 and 1959. This shift in discourse on children’s rights is more aptly captured 
as “de l’amour vers le respect” (“from love to respect”) (Toschi). This shift from the purely 
sentimental relation to a relation of equality and respect entails the independence, although 
partial, and the empowerment of children as legal persons rather than objects of charity and 
benevolence (Holzscheiter). This utterly novel development in children’s rights also creates a 
strikingly ambiguous legal identity of the child. This legal ambiguity is noticeable in the legal 
fiction that the Convention introduces, in assuming that the child is a rights holder and a bearer 
of legal personality, instead of taking steps toward making that a reality.  
A classical conceptualization of rights under modern law is to consider the will and the 
capacity of rights holders in the protection of their own rights. The rights holders in this instance 
are also the moral agents who claim and defend those rights. Katherine Federle was first to note 
that “[h]aving a right means having the power to command respect, to make claims, and to have 
them heard” (1316-17). In human rights law, however, as D. Chandler notes, the agency of the 
rights holder is ambiguous since the impulse for human rights is premised on the lack of agency 
on the part of the rights holder (quoted in Pupavac 98). Human rights violations leave the rights 
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holder/victims incapable of claiming their rights. Thus, this rights holder/victim needs 
sponsorship from some sort of altruistic moral agent to defend the violated rights. This scenario 
applies to the entire human rights regime, and with even more acuity to the case of the child. The 
preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the Child stipulates that “the child, by reason of his 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth.” Understandably, Article 3 of the Convention provides 
for “the best interests of the child” to be “a primary consideration” in all actions concerning 
children, implying that those actions are taken by others, whether by public or private authorities 
or by legislative bodies. The language in Article 12, however, is very different. Article 12 (1) 
urges state parties to “assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the 
right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child.” The article goes on to say 
that the views of the child must be given due weight in accordance with his or her age and 
maturity. Two ideas are salient in this article: on the one hand, children may be incapable of 
expressing their views; on the other hand, insofar as they can do so, they should be welcome to 
express their views, which might run the danger of being disregarded. Therefore, state parties 
must provide safeguards. In other words, even if children can make claims, it is still up to adults, 
who have tremendous power, to decide which claims are worthy of attention. This language fails 
to conceal the tutelage that is still associated with childhood. A corollary to this situation of the 
child is the illusory legal personality that he or she is granted under the Convention.  
Before this legal fiction is addressed, a brief definition of the term “legal person” is 
necessary. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edition), a legal person is an entity “given 
certain legal rights and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose 
of legal reasoning is treated more or less as a human being” (Garner and Black 3619). Basing 
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itself on John Salmond’s Jurisprudence 318 (Salmond and Williams), the dictionary adds that “so 
far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights 
and duties. Any being that is so capable is a person, whether a human being or not, and no being 
that is not so capable is a person, even though he be a man. Persons are the substances of which 
rights and duties are the attributes. It is only in this respect that persons possess juridical 
significance, and this is the exclusive point of view from which personality receives legal 
recognition.” This dictionary definition suggests the possibility of granting legal personality to a 
mere fiction. In fact, for legal theorists, the term person does not necessarily correlate with 
human being. Arcelia Quintana quotes Mexican philosopher and legal scholar Eduardo García 
Máynez as asserting that, “person” in law derives from the Latin personare, a term that denotes 
larva histrionalis, defined as “mask.” The mask was used to cover the face of an actor during a 
play, making his/her voice resonate on the stage. At the same time, the mask translates a type of 
personality the actor is meant to impersonate. Quintana concludes that people come to use the 
term “person” (the mask) as a synecdoche to refer to the actor. Legal personhood is thus a mask 
associated with the being behind it (Quintana 367). 
Legal doctrine separates persons into two kinds: natural and juridical persons. The natural 
person (also physical person) is a human being. The juridical person, or persona ficta, is, 
however, a fictitious person that represents a moral entity such as a corporation. But legal 
scholars are divided about these notions of legal person. Legal scholar Ngaire Naffine perceives 
three groups within this division. First, there are those jurists who insist that the legal person is a 
persona ficta, a pure legal artifice, attributable to any entity. Second come those convinced that 
the legal person is a natural person, a privileged being having human nature, and never an 
artificial device of law. The third type includes legal theorists who declare that the legal person is 
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not just a human being but has to be quintessentially an intelligent and responsible subject, that 
is, a moral agent. This responsible and rational subject of law is also the one most commonly 
found in areas of international law, such as human rights. As Katherine Federle objected, the 
rational subject of law constitutes a problem for children’s rights. She observes important 
connections between maturity, judgment, and choice in rights theory, which compel rights 
discourses to exclude children from the class of rights holders. Children are considered 
immature, irrational, or undeveloped and thus excluded from participation in the social contract, 
which holds that individual liberty and state power may coexist because of the presence of a 
social convention between a competent, consenting individual and the state. 
The idea that the child holds a separate legal personality resulting from the Convention is 
in the current state of affair more of a legal fiction than a reality. Caroline Sawyer contends that 
“the child is not a [legal] person.” Sawyer examines the nature of the rights purportedly granted 
to children and categorizes them as variously protective (Articles 3, 4, 17, 20-27), as benefiting 
parents or families rather than children (Articles 5, 9, 10, 18), as being assertive of rights to self-
fulfillment that are also claimed elsewhere, or as aiming at people in general and not children in 
particular (Articles 12-16, 28-29). The global child’s legal agency is thus seriously weakened. He 
or she may be a subject of law with legal rights but has no objective legal capacity or 
responsibility. Jacqueline Bhabha’s 2006 article “The Child—What Sort of Human?” explains 
the specificities of the child’s legal personality. Bhabha outlines the paradox that children are 
granted fundamental rights while at the same time denied the legal capacity to claim those rights. 
Indeed, children are entitled to a legal identity and a nationality at birth, but they do not have the 
legal capacity to assert, for example, family reunion rights. Similarly, the recent assertion that 
children have the right to take part in decisions that concern them remains a myth; children’s 
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agency is kept at bay by the sentimental and idealized vision that dominates childhood 
discourses. The limits of the legal theorization surrounding children’s legal personality led 
Martha Nussbaum to devise the capability approach, based on Nobel Prize philosopher Amartya 
Sen’s theory. 
The difficulty of reconciling the Convention’s depiction of the child’s immaturity and his 
or her ability to have legal relations are two examples of legal puzzles that seriously weaken the 
conceptual credibility of global childhood. This limit is further underlined by a developing set of 
critical theories in childhood studies. The starting point for the new paradigm in the sociology of 
childhood, for instance, is grounded in social constructivist theory, according to which human 
social lives and institutions are the product of society, rather than naturally or divinely given. In 
their Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological 
Study of Childhood (1989), James and Prout argue that, although the immaturity of children may 
be a biological fact of life, this immaturity is understood according to a cultural bias. In this 
sense, the social transformation from childhood to adulthood does not flow directly from 
physical growth but is understood in a socially oriented form of discourse. Academic 
commentaries about the impact of the modern notion of childhood on the African family have 
used this social constructivist approach. 
In doing so, they have highlighted major differences between what is now characterized 
as the Western conception of childhood and the non-Western. Age, for instance, is an important 
criterion to determine when childhood starts and ends. In most national and international 
regulations, childhood ends at age 18. Such criterion is far from the non-Western conception, 
especially the African conception of childhood. Cultural psychologist A. B. Nsamenang, 
describing the West African context in general, argues that childhood is a never-ending process 
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of seeking adulthood. “As long as one’s parents are alive, a child is always a child” and must 
come under “some sphere of parental authority even vicariously” (151). Using Nsamenang’s 
assertion may limit the idea of childhood to the child-parent relations, but it is helpful to 
understanding how, from the traditional African perspective, the end of childhood—or reaching 
adulthood—has little to do with attaining a particular age. Welshman Ncube provides a better 
explanation of this idea by arguing that “the notion that someone by some magical wand on the 
stroke of a pen turns into a fully competent, mature, wise, and autonomous individual upon 
attaining a certain arbitrary fixed age has no scientific empirical basis in fact and reality” (20). 
Ncube’s point is that, in the traditional African context, childhood ends when someone has the 
material capacity to perform acts that adults usually do. British philosopher David Archard’s 
observation of non-Western childhood corroborates Ncube’s opinion. Archard states that in non-
Western societies, the end of childhood is associated with the ability to marry, to establish a new 
home, or to show some responsibility to provide for oneself. Archard explains that it is not 
obvious that “a person considered as a child, legally and/or epistemologically, is also a child in 
terms of reproductive capacity or self-sufficiency” (37). Thus, there is no doubt that childhood 
appears within all cultures as being different from adulthood; however, the definition of this 
difference reflects a society’s general prevailing beliefs, assumptions, and priorities. This 
difference plays out in discourses in ways that undermine the universal potential of a global 
childhood. 
Another difference between the global and the local notion of childhood is the place of 
the child within the family. The distribution of power between children and parents can be very 
significant. The modern notion considers the child as a rights bearer and, at the same time, as an 
innocent and vulnerable being in need of protection and guidance, primarily from the family. 
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Paradoxically, the family also appears to be a source of child abuse that children’s rights doctrine 
tries to fight. As Welshman Ncube notes, “much of the language of children’s rights is directed 
at making the family environment a better and safer place for children” (25). This apparent 
tension between children’s privileges in the more recent rights to voice, agency, and active 
participation (Articles 12 to 16 of the CRC), for instance, is a source of conflict in the African 
family (Rwezaura 100). In African communal societies, individual interest—not rights—is 
incorporated into or aggregated within the group interest. Personal interest is linked to 
community interest, making it acceptable for elders to make decisions for the youngest. Child-
parent relations in this social configuration are built under the paternalistic concept of filial 
respect. But with the changing nature of the African family, the protective role of the family has 
weakened, and individual interests have brought social conflict and tensions (Rwezaura 83).  
A further limitation to the concept of global childhood is the prominence of cultural 
rights. The CRC recommends in its preamble that “the importance of the traditions and cultural 
values of each people” should be considered “for the protection and harmonious development of 
the child.” In light of this requirement, Ncube believes that “there is no point setting international 
standards which are subject to the nebulous and indeterminate framework of cultural context” 
(14). Ncube’s argument relies on the family’s role in reproducing and legitimizing basic cultural 
and religious habits. Even though the substantive rights granted to children go beyond cultural 
and religious considerations, they are usually interpreted within these frameworks. This reality 
can be significant in Africa, where social changes are the cause of identity crises.   
Given the flaws that limit global childhood’s currency, many legal concepts, including 
the notion of legal incapacity, can help circumvent the question of legal personality. The 
definition of a standardized type of child within the family, however, still faces not only social 
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constructivist theory but also other theories, including the human ecology theory of 
Brofenbrenner and the psycho-cultural theory of Sumie Okazaki and colleagues.  
Brofenbrenner’s human ecology theory (1979) is an irrefutable limitation to a concept of 
universal childhood. Brofenbrenner argues that human development occurs as a mutual 
interaction between the individual and his or her environment, allowing these influences to be 
part of the person an individual becomes. Bronfenbrenner’s groundbreaking theory widely 
influenced and shaped the way “human ecology”—human beings and their environments (from 
the family to economic and political structures)—became part of the journey from childhood 
through adulthood. Scholars have since expanded on this theory, elaborating on specific 
variations of the social phenomenon it concerns. Okazaki, David, and Abelman, in their psycho-
cultural theory, have emphasized the influence of major geopolitical events such as colonialism 
and historical processes on the lives of people, including children, and suggest that colonialism 
and its legacies exert a powerful influence on many worldwide populations.  
Having reviewed what scholars view as a Eurocentric origin and development of the 
modern notion of childhood and its emergence as a global ideology, my next chapters discuss the 
conditions under which other muted ideals and experiences of childhood are expressed. In the 




CHILDHOOD IN AFRICAN ORAL TRADITIONS 
 
1.  Oral Traditions and Orature Today 
This chapter discusses representations of West African childhood as reflected in folktales 
and legends, which are oral narratives deriving from oral tradition. Oral narratives are verbally 
enunciated and/or sung forms of expression, whose social function is to preserve, perform, and 
transmit cultural knowledge across generations. Such narratives can be found in cultures from all 
corners of the world. Their influence on social life, however, is not identical in all societies, and 
in some cultures, these narratives have become mere artifacts of the past without any connection 
to contemporary life—for example the Old French chansons de geste. In much of the non-
Western world, however, oral traditions in general and oral narratives in particular are an integral 
part of social life still today (Boateng 326; Chevrier, L’arbre à palabres 8-9). In many parts of 
Africa, folktales, legends, proverbs, riddles, and nursery rhymes—to name a few forms of oral 
expression—are still very present. They are in fact not just present in the folk life of the majority 
rural dwellers of Africa, but circulate now in multimedia forms, on television, the radio, the 
Internet, in animation films, as well as in print (see Leguy; see also Adejunmobi). Print has been 
the primary form in which African oral narratives have been read and circulated as literature 
beyond the societies that produced them. The term “oral literature” designates the verbal, spoken 
form in which this type of “text” in the semiotic sense materializes at all stages—origin, creation, 
performance, and transmission. Despite the fact that what is created in an oral form is often 
transmitted, in the modern world, in print form, the term “oral literature” has been viewed by 
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some as oxymoronic for semantic-linguistic reasons (if it is literature, it is written, not oral) and 
rejected by others as rudimentary and “pre-literary” for cultural reasons.  
The semantic-linguistic argument indeed posits that literature, in accordance with its 
Latin etymologies litera and literatura, designates letters or all that which is written. Therefore, 
non-written “literature” is excluded from serious literary and aesthetic considerations (for an 
extended discussion, see Lorentzon). The cultural objection to the notion of oral literature is 
linked to its status as something primitive, and in the case of African cultural productions, is 
based on the colonial prejudice that Africa lacks any civilization worthy of the name. French 
colonial scholar René Basset (1855-1924), who traveled all over Africa to collect folktales, noted 
in the preface of his Contes populaires d’Afrique (1903) that:  
L’idée de morale, dans le sens où nous l’entendons, se rencontre rarement dans les contes des 
noirs.... Mais ce qui domine, c’est le triomphe de la ruse sur la force brutale: c’est à cette morale 
aussi primitive que peu relevée, que se réduit l’enseignement de presque tous les contes. Les 
idées de devoir, de justice désintéressée, d’honneur sont absentes. (16-17) 
The idea of morality as we understand it hardly exists in the tale of blacks.... What dominates is 
the triumph of ruse over brutal force: it is to this morality, as primitive as it is base, that the 
teaching of almost all tales is reduced. The ideas of duty, of disinterested justice, of honour are 
absent. (My translation)  
Basset was hardly alone in thinking that African folktales had no other functions than to serve 
merely as a “folksy, domestic entertainment.”1 Most colonial authors2 shared that judgment. 
                                               
1The expression is borrowed from Furniss and Gunner, who contend in their introduction to Power, Marginality and 
African Oral Literature (2008) that “African oral literature, like other forms of popular culture, is not merely folksy, 
domestic entertainment but a domain in which individuals in a variety of social roles are free to comment on power 
relations in society.”  
2See also de Golbéry, Fragments d’un voyage en Afrique (1802), vol. 1. De Golbéry wrote: “C’est là que se 
réunissent des coteries de nègres qui y passent des journées entières à fumer, à jouer, mais surtout à causer, et à faire 
des contes et des histoires.... Car les contes les plus absurdes, les histoires les plus mensongères sont le souverain 
délice et le plus grand amusement des hommes, qui parviennent à la vieillesse sans être sortis de l’enfance (386) 
This is where coteries of negroes spend whole days smoking, playing, but especially talking, and telling stories and 
quarrelling.... For the most absurd stories, the most deceptive stories are the supreme delight and the greatest 
amusement of these men, who reach old age without having come out of childhood.” (My translation). See also 
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However, as early as in the 1940s, African writers objected to this belittlement of African oral 
traditions and oral literature in manifestos of cultural resistance. These responses appeared in 
particular in the prefaces of collections of oral narratives edited by Africans writers (Mouralis). 
In line with this movement of contestation, in the seventies, Ugandan linguist Pio Zirimu coined 
the word “orature” to remediate the perceived oxymoron in the term “oral literature.” These 
initiatives were responses to the widespread belief in the Western cultural tradition that oral 
forms of artistic expression are subordinate to the written. For instance, in The Childhood of 
Fiction: A Study of Folk Tales and Primitive Thought (1905), while author John Arnott 
MacCulloch did not hesitate to regard orally transmitted narratives such as folktales as literature, 
he thought of them as a “literature of early man and of primitive people wherever found” (viii). 
The association in the book’s title of folktales with childhood, which at the beginning of the 
twentieth century implies the paternalism of those considered mature, conveys the idea that oral 
literature is an undeveloped literature. This conception of oral production was somewhat 
challenged with the publication by Hector Munro and Nora Kershaw Chadwick of three volumes 
titled The Growth of Literature between 1932 and 1940. Not only did Munro and Chadwick 
reject the oxymoron label by using the expression “oral literature” in their work, but they also 
took the opposite stance to the position that oral literature is lower in the hierarchy of human 
artistic expression:  
Our own ancestors were acquainted to writing—perhaps many centuries—before they applied it 
to the preservation of literature. Again, most of the literary genres familiar to us are found among 
peoples to whom writing is—or was until yesterday—wholly unknown. And there is no reason 
for doubting that among our ancestors, if not throughout the whole civilized world, these genres 
have taken form before writing was employed. In these formative periods, as among remote and 
                                               
Equilbecq, Contes populaires d’Afrique occidentale (1972). Equilbecq writes : “Les fables indigènes sont des récits 
exclusivement destinés à l’amusement des auditeurs et n’ont nullement pour but d’enseigner une morale, fut-elle 
uniquement pratique, ni dénoncer les abus sociaux” (83). 
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backward communities of the present day, “literature” must have consisted of records of 
intellectual activities preserved in speech, not in writing. A man’s memory was his library. (xi) 
 
For Munro and Chadwick, even in the so-called “civilized world,” literature was first known 
primarily in oral form; only later was it preserved in written form. For these critics, the 
association of literature with writing in the so-called “civilized world” was therefore only 
accidental and to be reconsidered. But, as was to be expected in the Eurocentric context in which 
these authors wrote, communities considered “remote and backward” were thought to be 
unacquainted with writing. The prevalence of this idea and obliviousness to the fact that orality 
and writing coexisted in many regions of the world could explain why the assumption that oral 
literature was inferior has remained so entrenched in Western scholarship. That said, one also has 
to acknowledge that there have been exceptions: Western scholars, folklorists and Celticists in 
particular, have been praising the value of oral literature as the irrepressible voice of the people 
and national culture since at least the nineteenth century; in the twentieth century, several 
scholars (i.e. Ruth Finnegan, John Foley, Furniss and Gunner) have vehemently opposed the 
rejection of oral tradition as inferior, regardless of where it comes from. The rejection stance has 
been that of scholars, some of them colonialists, who have expressed contempt towards African 
traditions, as discussed above. It has also been the dominant stance in scholarly practice in the 
social and humanistic disciplines, as discussed below.  
Despite the importance of oral literature in all societies, it has not been considered 
terribly relevant in the study of the modern and globalizing world. Indeed, social and humanistic 
scholars have long been divided over the value of oral tradition in general, and oral narratives in 
particular, for scholarly research. Different disciplines have shown varying degrees of distrust 
towards oral narratives. For instance, early anthropologists tend to privilege ethnography over 
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collected folk narratives data. Notable anthropologist and folklorist William Bascom has 
criticized “[t]his marginal position which oral narratives have occupied in anthropological 
studies” as “not due to the inherent nature of the material but to a failure to exploit fully the 
potentialities of such data” (333) (see also Smith 305 and Bascom). In history, written materials 
have prevailed as trustworthy documentation over oral history. In an attempt to discourage this 
disciplinary culture, respected historian Jan Vansina advises his colleagues that “[a]ny historian 
who deals with oral tradition will have to unlearn this prejudice in order to rediscover the full 
wonder of word” (442). For Vansina, “[b]ecause most societies in Africa south of the Sahara 
were oral, even if they used writing marginally, historians who study them must confront the 
question of the validity of oral traditions as sources for history,” that is, they must resist the urge 
“to go by our experience of what sources survived orally in Europe” (443), where for centuries 
all data felt to be socially important was written down. Anything unwritten was thus considered 
trivia (see also Irwin and Henige).3 In literary theory, orality has been berated outright as a form 
of expression for primitive societies (Ong and Hartley). 
Other scholars have challenged this condescending gaze upon orality, emphasizing the 
important role of oral tradition in civilizations around the world. For John Foley (1986), 
“Homeric epics served the society that perpetuated them as a set of oral encyclopedias, a digest 
of attitudes, beliefs, behavior patterns, and customs encoded in the exemplary actions of their 
heroes” (5). The Iliad and the Odyssey are thus not mere tales; they are equal to chronicles and 
other compilations that written cultures reverently keep on reference book shelves. A pioneer in 
the study of African oral traditions, Ruth Finnegan, contested the misconceptions that oral 
tradition is the opposite of the modern/Western/literate/individual/creative tradition. The term 
                                               
3In Liptako Speaks, Paul Irwin contends that oral history is an unreliable “chain of testimonies,” binding past and 
present, for only the link that lies in the present is accessible (23). 
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oral tradition, she remarks, serves to “gather questions of textuality, orality, voice, text, 
performance, verbal art in a way too often ignored elsewhere. It fills—and challenges—gaps left 
in the canons of many established academic disciplines” (‘Oral Tradition’ 84). Finnegan’s 
statement is an invitation to the student of oral tradition to be free of the negative constraints that 
abound in academic disciplines. This dissertation takes this invitation seriously, especially in 
making a connection between oral tradition and knowledge-sharing in the contemporary global 
world.  
Zirimu coined the term orature to honor orality’s value. The meaning he ascribed to 
orature was to enable the rejection of the term “oral literature” and thus to counter the tendency 
to perceive orality as inferior in the linear development of literature (Wa Thiong’o, “Notes 
towards a Performance Theory”). It was Kenyan literary theorist Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o who took 
the term beyond its Zirimian usage. For Wa Thiong’o (Penpoints, Gunpoints, and Dreams), 
orature refers to “a total system of performance linked to a very specific idea of space and time” 
(111). Wa Thiong’o underscores the centrality of performance to orature, for it is the means to 
realize the message and for connecting the transmitter and the receiver, the performer and the 
audience. Thus, for the proper interpretation and evaluation of any utterance, knowing the total 
context of its performance is required (Gikandi, “Oral Literature and Performance” 584-585). 
Orature, as Wa Thiong’o puts it, does not simply refer to Africa; it extends to any culture, and 
there are Asian, European, Pacific, and Latin American forms of orature. Additionally, besides 
classical orature such as epics and contemporary orature such as hip-hop, a cyber-orature or 
cyberture has emerged, emanating from communication technologies. Ngũgĩ coined the word 
cyberture to counter the belief that the development of communication technologies is 
synonymous with the disappearance of oral traditions (Globaletics 44, 77). Thus, the term 
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orature transcends mere oral-aural information transmission and takes on a much broader sense, 
encompassing verbally transmitted information and its performance as well as cyberture. 
Although this chapter focuses on the notion of childhood reflected in verbally transmitted 
information that is now consigned to print,4 and thus on the content of the narratives and what 
they contribute to a broad understanding of how African childhood can be conceptualized in a 
variety of media and genres, it also accounts, albeit briefly, for performance and cyberture to 
contextualize the real-life materialization of oral traditions.  
The increasingly ameliorative scholarship on oral tradition in the second half of the 
twentieth century has contributed to shifting the perception of oral traditions from a futile form 
of domestic entertainment (de Golbéry 1802) to an instrument of democracy at the disposal of 
individuals who want to comment on power relations in traditional society (Furniss and Gunner). 
This shift has led, in the twenty-first century, the United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to acknowledge oral traditions as an “intangible cultural 
heritage” and as a mode of imparting knowledge and ensuring cultural continuity. UNESCO has 
since adopted an International Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage (2003) not only to protect this heritage, but also to raise awareness about it and promote 
it for the sake of cultural diversity.  
In this chapter, I aim to bring out the importance of folk beliefs and principles regarding 
childhood in African folktales and legends. In doing so, I hope to bring into focus the relevance 
of this humanistic corpus to global debates. The study of local narratives in connection to global 
discourses aligns with the goal of humanistic studies, seeking to enrich and better the human 
                                               
4 This working definition of oral literature as oral traditions consigned to print also brings up the issue of translation 
and transcription which I discuss in the next section. 
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condition.5 A tangible illustration of this relevance is the connection of African regional 
children’s rights law with a traditional notion of childhood, partially traceable in these genres of 
oral narratives. The traditional notions of childhood from oral traditions also influence written 
literature, thereby perpetuating their ideology. The appearance of cultural tradition in regional 
law is one type of evidence that the messages from folktales and legends are still part of 
contemporary life, contrarily to some scholarly predictions that it might soon disappear (see 
Donnelly 312).6  
Folktales and legends differ from other genres of orature such as proverbs and riddles. 
Whereas folktales and legends are folk narratives, proverbs and riddles are short enunciations. 
The former are widespread among almost all peoples and are largely independent of epochs and 
individuals (see Lüthi); the latter are said to be particularly prominent in Africa in contrast to 
some other areas of the world, such as aboriginal America and Polynesia (Finnegan 379). 
Proverbs and riddles also differ from one another. Proverbs are usually ready-made statements 
that can be prescriptive: one cites the proverb to elicit a certain type of behavior, codified over 
centuries. Riddles are forms of traditional verbal expression that consist of one or more 
descriptive elements and may have a mantic or ludic function. A pair of these elements may be in 
opposition, and their referent is to be guessed (Georges and Dundes 113). Both, however, convey 
culturally agreed upon ideas.  
Folktales and legends are also two genres of oral narratives that have much in common; 
they originate independently of a particular narrator, appear to be impersonal, and belong to a 
community. However, beyond similarities, the discipline of folklore deems folktales and legends 
                                               
5This ambition is more visible today through the rising field of “applied humanities,” envisioned by humanistic 
authorities such as Henri Peyre (see his 1966 editorial). See also Erwin R Steinberg’s 1974 article “Applied 
Humanities?”  
6Donnelly evokes in this paper the “implausible, and generally undesired reemergence of the traditional order.” 
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to be two different, albeit sometimes overlapping, genres. Folktales are popular fictions that can 
have many versions and variants. Legends, on the contrary, are semi-true stories, supposedly 
based on historical facts which are significantly mythologized with heroic characters, sometimes 
developing fantastic powers that translate the beliefs of the culture in which they originate. In the 
African context, some writers have insisted on the close relationship between folktales and 
legends. Leopold Sedar Senghor, for one, contended that the separation of genres in African oral 
tradition is a gross simplification:  
Il n’y a, en Afrique noire, ni douaniers, ni poteaux indicateurs aux frontières. Du mythe au 
proverbe, en passant par la légende, le conte, la fable, il n’y a pas de frontière. (Preface to Diop, 
Nouveaux Contes d’Amadou Koumba) 
In black Africa, there are neither customs nor signposts on the borders. From the myth to the 
proverb, through the legend, story, fable, there is no border. (My translation) 
 
Bernard Dadié is another writer who describes the two genres as performing the functions of 
museums, monuments, street signs, and books: 
Contes et légendes sont pour nous des musées, des monuments, des plaques de rues, en somme, 
nos seuls livres. Et c’est pourquoi ils occupent une si grande place dans notre existence 
quotidienne. Chaque soir nous les feuilletons, et nous aussi, même emportés dans le tourbillon 
actuel, nous nous accrochons chaque soir au passé. (“Le rôle de la légende” 165) 
Tales and legends are for us museums, monuments, street signs, in short, our only books. And 
that’s why they hold such an important place in our daily existence. Every night we skim through 
them, and we too, although carried away in the current whirlwind, we cling to the past every 
night. (My translation)  
As is evident from their statements, these literary scholars belonging to the Négritude movement 
were more preoccupied with presenting the particularities and the richness of black culture than 
with abiding by disciplinary conventions within folklore scholarship. Even though distinctions 
between genres of oral narratives are an important aspect within folklore studies, for the purpose 
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of my argument in this thesis, I find that Senghor and Dadié’s assignment of the same functions 
to tales and legends translates a real continuum between legends and tales in African oral 
tradition. Indeed, the symbolic significance of a past event in a legend eventually takes on 
greater historical importance than the facts. Hence, over time, the legend sheds the centrality of 
the facts of the original event, if any, and keeps its most important component: the message to be 
perpetuated. In this sense, the main stake in a legend is not to seek to preserve the historical 
validity of the narratives; it is rather, as Mamoussé Diagne (2005) explained about the epic, a 
matter of setting up procedures through which these narratives generate a memorable verbal 
narrative. Both types of stories, like other genres, are rooted, for many West African cultures, in 
the nocturnal storytelling tradition around the fire.7  This tradition is what Dadié compares to 
book reading— “every night we skim through them, and we too, although carried away in the 
current whirlwind, we cling to the past every night.” Yet, Dadié’s mention that legends and tales 
are “our only books” should not be taken too literally. African civilizations have a long history of 
writing, which scholars8 have emphasized by rejecting the frequent identification of the continent 
with orality. Recalling this simple truth does not in any way diminish the merit of orality, for its 
                                               
7 Throughout Africa, the tradition of telling folk narratives at night is fueled by superstitions aiming at maintaining 
the mystery surrounding these stories and ensuring that storytelling happens after working hours. Telling tales by 
day is believed to have serious consequences, and Pierre Nda (1984) lists some of these superstitions, as follows: for 
the Baoule, one gets lost in the forest; for the Bantou, one becomes bold (aging faster); for the Beti, one’s mother 
dies; etc. (25). For the Nzima and Agni people, where the superstition is loosely based on the idea that whoever tells 
tales by day finds bad luck, Dadié (1957) simply contends that: “c’est autour du feu, la famille réunie, en compagnie 
des amis que l’on conte le soir, pour se reposer des travaux du jour” (“It is around the fire, the family reunited, in the 
company of friends that we tell stories in the evening, to rest from the work of the day”) (166). Jack Berry, 
collecting stories among the Akan in the 1960s, contends that “[t]hroughout the area, tales are told only at night” 
(see Preface of West African Folktales). Berry also noted that he had heard tales in the daytime only for funeral rites 
of famous storytellers. For the Mandé, see the expression “Au coin du feu” (“by the fire”) in the title of Issa Baba 
Traoré’s Au coin du feu: Légendes du pays bamanan (Editions Jamana, 1989). See more generally, Lebrun, “Pour 
une exploration du conte africain en classe” (“For an exploration of the African folktale in the classroom”) (my 
translations). 
8 In The Meanings of Timbuktu (2012) Souleymane B. Diagne, while acknowledging orality as important in all 
cultures and especially in those of Africa, points to the continent’s scriptural history and literature found in the 
manuscripts of Timbuktu in the forms of chronicles, myths and praise poetries.  
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forms are suited for preserving as well as performing important messages. Indeed, villagers in 
Africa do gather in circles around the fire in the evening to tell folktales and legends, for both 
entertainment and educational purposes. 
Folktales and legends offer a unique opportunity to explore the cultural construction of 
childhood in the African context. There is an abundance of stories in African folktales and 
legends that delineate the world of children. As a social phenomenon, childhood is quickly 
changing all over the world, but this change in the conception of childhood also implies previous 
ideas from which the change stems. In order to retrieve some notions of childhood prior to those 
current in the globalized world, this study examines folk notions that were used to portray 
childhood in folktales and legends. A folk concept, according to Bernstein (2010), is a notion 
that has a general, popularly understood meaning particular to a sociocultural grouping, and a 
meaning that has not been formally defined or standardized, for instance by law. The notions of 
childhood upheld in these oral narratives correspond to this definition. The perspectives on 
childhood that I explore here are not only locally relevant; at times, they also conflict with the 
standardized version of childhood encountered in international discourse (see chapter 4).  
Given that the primary focus of this chapter is the representations of folk notions of 
childhood in oral narratives that are now consigned to print, it directs its approach away from 
classical folklorist studies. Within their strict disciplinary approach, folklorists pursue a 
completely different goal: identifying and collecting the lore of a social group, preferably in situ, 
and documenting it for preservation and study. Critical works in folklore studies are therefore 
often concerned with typologies, morphologies, repertories, nomenclatures, and comparisons, 
and such studies understandably maintain disciplinary conventions and terminology. In my 
examination of folktales in this study, however, I follow a hybrid methodology used in other 
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social sciences and humanistic studies, especially in interdisciplinary studies (see Leguy et al., 
“Expression of Parenthood”). In so doing, I seek not only to do justice to the focus of this study, 
but also to take into account the expectation of folklorists themselves who wish “the use of 
folklore in service of other disciplines” (Wilson 14). 
 
2. The Child in Folktales and Legends 
The twenty-one folktales and legends analyzed in this dissertation are drawn from various 
West African cultures: principally, the Akan, the Mande, and the Wolof. The corpus I analyze is 
based on three types of printed collections which I present here chronologically by date of first 
publication. A first group of collections comprises works produced by French colonial 
administrators who sometimes were also scholars. In striving to make sense of the psychology of 
the people they sought to subjugate, French colonizers explored and interrogated indigenous 
folklore for clues. This prying into traditional culture was widespread, and examples exist 
beyond Africa.9 Excerpts from administrator Maurice Delafosse’s Essai de manuel de la langue 
Agni (1900) and from ethnologist François-Victor Equilbecq’s Contes populaires d’Afrique 
occidentale, essai sur la littérature merveilleuse des Noirs (1913) are thus included in the corpus. 
A second group of collections emanates from African writers belonging to the Négritude 
movement. In the struggle to reassert a negated African civilization, these scholars engaged in 
the collection and diffusion of what they considered, in the words of Senghor (see preface to 
Kamanda 5), an illustration of “la première civilisation humaine digne de ce nom” (“the first 
human civilization worthy of the name”). In my discussion of certain types of tales and 
                                               
9 Alfonso Ortiz, in his preface to Ruth Benedict’s Tales of the Cochiti Indians (1931) cites the example of Noel 
Dumarest, a French priest who collected the first published Cochiti Indian folk narratives in New Mexico, in the 
1900s (p.1). 
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categories of child characters, I refer to some of the tales from Bernard Dadié’s Le pagne noir 
(1954) and Légendes Africaines (1966), and from Birago Diop’s Les Nouveaux Contes 
d’Amadou Koumba (1961). While their versions are often literary renditions of an original 
folktale or group of folktales in a composite version, they do help us envisage how certain 
narratives and motifs contribute to making legible folk ideas about the child and childhood. 
Collections of the third type were gathered by both local and international scholars interested in 
African folklore since the sixties and the typologies and morphologies of the collected stories 
were analyzed in the eighties and nineties. These collectors sought to interpret African folk 
narratives and place them within global culture. Five such works, Veronika Görög-Karady’s 
Histoire d’enfants terribles (Afrique Noire), études et anthologie (1980) and L’enfant dans les 
contes africains (1988), Nicole Tersis’s Contes zarma du Niger: Les génies et les hommes 
(1980), Pierre N’da’s Le conte africain et l’éducation (1984), Jacques Chevrier’s L’arbre à 
palabre (1988), and Jack Berry’s West African Folktales (1991) contribute many narratives to 
the corpus. In fact, the bulk of the folktales constituting the corpus of this chapter are drawn from 
this last category of collections. 
I have chosen the narratives in this corpus for the ways they reflect folk notions of 
childhood, as depicted in folktales and legends. Certainly, there are many ways in which such a 
corpus could be studied to explore some overlooked aspects of African folk narratives. For 
instance, one could compare the colonial to the non-colonial texts. One could also go beyond the 
comparison of child characters in folktales, already begun in works such as Paulme’s La mère 
dévorante (1972) and Görög-Karady’s and Baumgardt’s L’enfant dans les contes Africains 
(1988), to contrast them with child characters in legends. Another possibility would be to 
compare a cycle of authentic folktales, collected in situ, such as “Le conte des deux filles” 
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collected by Veronika Görög-Karady (1979)10 with versions that have been reshaped to fit 
literary style and tastes, such as Dadié’s “La cruche.” However, the purpose of this thesis is not 
to engage in such specialized comparative effort, but to focus on specific content related to the 
value that traditional societies ascribe to their children and the values they seek to instil in 
them.11 This corpus aims to seize the child character in folk narratives under three main aspects. 
These three aspects are transversal in this study but do not correspond to the units under which I 
examine the folk narratives. One set of stories emphasizes the place of the imagined child within 
the family: “A Mother’s Love” (Berry 31), “Le conte des deux filles” (Chevrier 77), “L’enfant et 
la flute” (Nda 203). Another set of stories is concerned with the place of the child within the 
wider society: “The Voice of the Child” (Berry 54), “The Wise Child” (Berry 46), “Les trois 
frères” (Chevrier 127). A third set of stories is concerned with child characters in extraordinary 
circumstances: “Le canari merveilleux” (Equilibecq 116), “Adele and the Pineapple Child” 
(Berry 52), “L’enfant lépreux” (Görög-Karady 29). Some stories, however, transcend this 
grouping, and one finds stories such as “Les deux soeurs et le chien” (Tersier 62), which 
combines both the child within the family and the wider society.  These stories represent a 
sample of the twenty-one stories examined below and a part of the complete list of folk 
narratives presented in the appendix. 
It is important to acknowledge that ethnographic explanations have their limits and that 
tales and legends are not always a faithful and complete picture of society. To recognize these 
limitations, however, is not to deny the capacity of folk narratives, which, as many scholars 
(Kesteloot 1981; Paulme; Chevrier, “Roman et société”; Erny) insist, can be read as a reliable 
                                               
10 See Contes Bambara du Mali, Paris: P.O.F., 1979. This folktale, although first collected by Görög-Karady, is 
associated with Chevrier’s L’arbre à palabra, where I found it.  
11 For the summary of each tale see appendix I of this dissertation.  
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source to interpret the social model on which they are predicated. Indeed, in Lilian Kesteloot’s 
words: 
Cette littérature charrie non seulement les trésors des mythes et les exubérances de l’imagination 
populaire, mais (aussi) véhicule les histoires, les généalogies, les traditions familiales, les 
formules du droit coutumier, aussi bien que le rituel religieux et les règles de la morale. 
(Anthologie Négro-Africaine 6) 
This literature does not only carry the treasures of myth and the exuberance of popular 
imagination, but (also) conveys stories, genealogies, family traditions, customary law formulas, 
as well as religious rituals and moral rules. (My translation) 
 
Through such popular imaginations, family traditions, customary laws, and moral rules, one can 
grasp a sense of what childhood meant to the society that produced them. Previous studies have 
given serious attention to the representation of children and their social journey in folktales and 
legends. This topic encompasses an abundant corpus (Platiel),12 prompting specialists of African 
oral narratives to devise various classifications for child characters. Scholars have thus offered 
their own categorizations, rejecting the classical classifications of folktales such as the Aarne-
Thompson tale type index (1961) and the morphology proposed by Vladimir Propp (1968) as 
unfit for the child characters in African folktales. In La mère dévorante: Essai sur la 
morphologie des contes africain (1976), Denise Paulme puts forward the character of the enfant 
malin or enfant rusé, who uses subversive repartie for satirical effects. An ingenious child, s/he 
fights abuse of power and restores justice (chapters 8-9). An analogous character is the enfant 
terrible, whose full-fledged study (undertaken by the Oral Literature Research Group of the 
CNRS, Centre National de Recherche Scientifique) is presented in Histoire d’enfants terribles 
(Afrique Noire), études et anthologie (1980). This character, described as typically West African, 
                                               
12	In a 1981 study “L’enfant, sujet et objet du conte (Sanan-Haute Volta),” Suzanne Platiel noted that one third out 
of a corpus of 327 West African folktales feature children as their main characters.	
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is always portrayed as born under exceptional conditions, which is the sign of his/her special 
destiny. S/he differs from the enfant malin in that, as Calame-Griaule explains, s/he offers no 
apparent justification for his/her strikingly supernatural—and often gratuitously cruel—actions, 
whereas the actions of the enfant malin result entirely from ingenuity and are justified by the 
nature of the opponent (the powerful character who abuses his authority). The enfant malin and 
the enfant terrible, who are often compared to their equivalent international counterparts,13 are 
not ordinary children.    
What I characterize as an ordinary child14 belongs to a second category of child character. 
This type of child character has been split into several further categories by scholars. In L’enfant 
dans les contes Africains: Études et textes (1988), edited by Veronika Görög-Karady and Ursula 
Baumgardt, we learn of six such categories. These are: the unloved child, who strives to survive 
his murderous parents or guardians (11); the abused child, who teaches righteousness to his 
persecutors (43); the abandoned child, who may be a victim of abduction or rejected, but returns 
for justice (83); the brave child, who saves his siblings (115); the dutiful child, who honors his 
parents; and the rascal child, disrespectful, but clever and courageous (171). All these child 
characters seem to satirize various issues observed in African traditional society. For one, it 
shows that this society was not free of problems plaguing children, including abuse and 
abandonment. Secondly, it shows the values on which this society places emphasis, such as 
bravery and dutifulness, among others. Finally, it also presents this society’s fears and 
expectations with regard to the ambivalence of childhood: the rascal child embodying, for 
instance, both bad habits and good qualities.  
                                               
13 For Calame Griaule (Conte Dogon du Mali), the international equivalents of enfant malin and enfant terrible, are 
“Le petit Poucet”(T327), “L’enfant chez l’ogre” (T327), and “Jean le fort” (T650).  
14 Pierre Nda also identifies the ordinary child as one of his types.		
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A third category of child character has been much less studied by the scholars reviewed 
above, perhaps precisely because of its wide international range: the orphan. In her 1999 analysis 
of fifty folktales from different cultures around the world, Melanie Kimball (1999) concludes 
that, while the details of orphan stories vary, they reveal universal elements. In fact, orphan 
characters are at once pitiable and noble; they symbolize the outcast; they are tangible reflections 
of all humans’ fear of isolation; they are a reminder of the possibility of utterly undesired 
solitude for any human being. This deplorable situation differentiates orphans from ordinary 
children. 
Beyond these different categories, child characters in African folk narratives share a 
variety of traits. On the one hand, there are those who are well-behaved, obey elders, honor 
moral and social institutions, are brave, etc. On the other hand, there are those who misbehave, 
disobey and dishonor moral and social institutions, or are simply lazy. These commonalities and 
categories constitute ways to grasp these folk narratives. However, the range of African folk 
narratives with child characters is apparently inexhaustible, and even those already studied 
appear to present several new implications. Jacques Chevrier’s L’arbre à palabres: Essai sur les 
contes et récits traditionnels d’Afrique noire (1986) brings into focus child heroes whose 
characteristics resemble the ones identified by Görög-Karady and Baumgardt, adding such cycles 
as the difficult girl or rivalry among siblings. Two studies, Christiane Seydou’s Contes de 
l’enfant de beurre (1978) and Paul N’da’s Le conte Africain et l’éducation (1984), also illustrate 
this capaciousness. Seydou presents the enfant de beurre as a character whose birth 
circumstances predict his/her ephemeral existence. Such characters are born after a deal between 
a childless parent and a spirit. The deal is always broken, and no amount of supplications from 
the parent will prevent the child from dying or returning to the world where s/he belongs. There 
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are also several versions of this tale type in which the ephemeral child is not the product of a 
deal, and no mention is made of the parents or the circumstances of the child’s coming into 
existence. N’da speaks of the enfant pianique, always unhealthy and a victim of man’s 
wickedness. The enfant pianique character strikes back with supernatural power after he has 
been mistreated during his brief life by punishing the individual, the family or the community 
who failed to protect him or attend to his needs. But even in this case, this child character is close 
to other types of ephemeral children, including the “born to die” child category described in 
literary studies (McCabe) and ethnology (Schneider) and believed, in African traditions, to be a 
spirit who refuses to stay among human beings. These children are known under various names: 
abiku among the Yoruba, obanje among the Ibo, nit ku bon among the Wolof (Smith, 
“Naissances et destins”).  
Given the variety of these child characters and considering that many previous studies 
have focused on the form of storytelling rather than on content, and finally, to better serve this 
dissertation’s emphasis on folk notions of childhood, I have opted to base my analysis on my 
own categorizations: extraordinary child, ordinary child, and disadvantaged child. These 
categories are defined and examined below. I extrapolate this categorization by drawing on the 
articulations evident in the different groupings discussed above. Central to this new enunciation 
is the investigation of the characteristics of the folk child, that is, the child of traditional, 
predominantly rural, society.  
 
3. Characteristics of the Folk Child in Folktales and Legends 
The extraordinary child character is depicted with several facets, and the analysis of some 
of these differences can shed light on a wide range of representations of childhood that are 
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informed by local beliefs. Aside from the common characteristic of being born under special 
circumstances, the extraordinary child may be an enfant malin or enfant rusé as in “The Wise 
Child” (Berry 46) or can be an enfant terrible as in “Les enfants terribles” (Chevrier, “L’arbre à 
palabres” 40). 
In “The Wise Child,” a child gives himself the name “I am-wiser-than-a chief.” The 
chief, offended by the name, commands the child to serve as his coiffeur as a sign of submission. 
The child in turn asks the chief to provide him with a kernel of corn for each hair he cuts. The 
chief falls into the trap, and no soon has the child cut a few hairs, that the chief is out of his corn 
supply. The child then stops fashioning his hair. The chief now requests that his hair be 
reinstated, but the child then requests that the corn kernels be also reinstated on their cobs. 
“Alright! Debt cancels debt!” concludes the chief, who also orders the boy out of his kingdom. 
The following day, the boy is found to be destroying a property next to the chief’s compound. He 
is then captured and given to the soldiers for execution by drowning. On their way, the soldiers 
leave the sack in which the child was bound to fetch a canoe. The child, clever as he is, lures an 
old man and makes him believe that he is being taken forcibly to marry the chief’s daughter. The 
old man agrees to take his place and is drowned. In the meantime, the chief believes that the 
child who symbolizes rebellion to his authority had died. He is celebrating when the child 
appears again, declaring: “Listen, that place where you sent me under the sea, there is nothing 
but money!” Amazed by the news, the chief sends his wife. “Be careful, she might not return, 
because of all that money,” warns the child. Indeed, the wife does not return, and the chief 
decides to get himself tied up and thrown into the sea. Thereafter, the child replaces the chief on 
his throne.  
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We see some rational motivations in the actions of the enfant malin. He rebels against a 
tyrannical authority. In the process, he ridicules the figure of that authority without denying the 
institution he represents. The enfant malin’s action aims to deride weaknesses such as the 
greediness or stupidity of the individual representing the institution. There is a clear message in 
these types of narratives: that in the face of injustice or excessive behavior, children may show 
resourcefulness or conduct conventionally prohibited. Always successful through values such as 
perspicacity and courage, the enfant malin appears as a revolutionary figure. He acts for a good 
cause while also being defiant of rules and order. Not all folk narratives provide a context to 
situate the child’s salutary action. This could, however, be explained by the social context in 
which the tale is recounted. In Tales of Amadou Koumba, the English translation version of his 
famous collection, Birago Diop, the author, recounts: “This story was told to me one evening 
when we had just met a young man who had married a woman older than himself” (124). The 
“Wise Child” story is drawn from the Akan tradition. But the performance context in Diop’s 
Wolof culture is also valid, and folktales can be motivated by the intention to illustrate a real-life 
situation with an age-old story. This performance context is also true in the Mande culture from 
which the next story is drawn.  
The enfant terrible’s story defies all social norms. It is a story that does not pursue a 
rational social objective. In “Les enfants terribles” (Chevrier “L’arbre à palabres” 40), we learn 
of two twins, a girl and a boy, who mock moral institutions and social norms for no cogent 
reason but to create anarchy. These story types are longer than usual and always present a series 
of ungrateful behaviors. Of the two children, in this case, the boy takes the initiative of the 
mischief and convinces his reluctant sister.15 They start off by killing their own parents. The king 
                                               
15Chevrier notes that the boy is the elder; the initiative left to him seems to be due to that seniority rather than to 
gender role.		
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of their country condemns them never to be fed; whoever feeds them is to be killed. But the 
queen, seized with pity, provides them with food. The ungrateful children denounce her to the 
king, who executes the queen. Taking advantage of the confusion, the kids find refuge on the 
biggest tree in the king’s courtyard. The king sits under the tree to rest from the recent events. 
The boy then defecates on his head just as a matter of play. Order is given to cut the big tree to 
capture the offenders and kill them. But as the tree bends under the bite of the hatchets, a small 
lizard sneezes and reinstates the tree. The boy kills the lizard. The tree finally falls. But, just in 
time, an eagle takes the twins on his wings to save them from certain death. The boy stings the 
bird’s anus with a sharp object. The bird drops these ungrateful children and, as they fall on the 
ground, they are saved by a turtle. The boy decides to eat the turtle and goes on to the next 
village in search of fire. The sister releases the turtle, but the boy finds it on his way back. The 
turtle is grilled and eaten. Thereafter, the two children are welcomed at a nearby farm and served 
food. Then, they are asked to care for the host’s child. They must grill a frog and feed the host’s 
child. Instead, they grill the child and give it to the frog. These enfants terribles also make fun of 
their benefactors. They call their hosts and tell them: “hey my friends, we grilled the child and 
gave it to the frog. But the frog does not seem interested,” before running away. Similar 
misbehavior continues until, at the end, the two twins disappear into the sky following a 
wrestling contest, which starts on earth but continues in the sky. This denouement, with the 
cosmic travel of the protagonists, signals a transfer to the metaphysical and indicates that they do 
not belong to the earthly world. This shift might generate significances for those initiated to the 
hidden aspects of traditions.     
This type of enfant terrible story does not seem to produce any direct rational 
understanding of the child in African society, although it is close to cycles of cosmological 
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myths in which tricksters are central. Any fictional character who is seen to be clever, deceitful, 
and selfish is considered a trickster. Such characters are found worldwide, and scholars in the 
Western context have sought to provide a rational explanation for their manifestations. David 
Abrams and Brian Sutton-Smith, in their 1977 study of trickster tales, examined from the 
standpoint of child development what they consider a major trickster figure in American 
childhood traditions, namely the Bugs Bunny cartoon. They concluded that the trickster 
characterizes a lower level of socialization: “there are indeed different kinds of ‘trickster’ tales; 
some are regressive, and some more logical, and each corresponds to different levels of child 
development” (41). Abrams and Sutton-Smith also acknowledge that the differences noted 
anthropologically might also correspond to differences in cultural patterns.  
Görög-Karady’s 1980 reading of the enfant terrible in the African context is perhaps 
consistent with this rational view. In fact, she contends that the enfant terrible character can be 
associated with the uncircumcised child, who carries evil energies. The suicidal actions of the 
enfant terrible and his rebellious attitude testify to the child’s incompleteness and ignorance of 
pain and death (41-42). The enfant terrible displays trickster-like characteristics by playing 
ungrateful jokes on his benefactors, by rejecting all friendship ties and all forms of solidarity. In 
so doing, Görög-Karady contends, he is able to exert his power and prove his freedom.  
Other commentators of the African context, however, have taken a different line. In the 
Mande culture, where the examined enfant terrible tale is drawn, there exists a belief that 
children are already imbued with knowledge from the ancestors they incarnate (Erny 1972). 
Furthering this latter worldview, Chevrier contends that the enfant terrible symbolises the 
initiated who knows the hidden side of things: if he kills his parents, it is to become an adult and 
responsible; if he despises material wealth, it is to acquire knowledge, the only wealth worthy of 
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ambitions (Chevrier “L’arbre à palabres” 40). Chevrier’s understanding of the enfant terrible 
character sheds lights on other narratives grounded in legendary founding myths, such as that of 
Soundiata Keita. The character of the child in “Soundiata Keita, héros historique et légendaire, 
empereur du Manding” (Sidibé) lines up with a variant in the enfant terrible tale. In this variant, 
the character of enfant malin and that of enfant terrible are combined, making the hero not a 
sheer wrongdoer for the sake of anarchy. Rather, because his actions are particularly empowered 
by the supernatural world, this leads him to restore justice and set fair rules for the people. The 
legend of Soundjata Keita, based on the founding myth of the historical Manding empire, 
conforms in many regards to this type of enfant terrible tale. He is born in spectacular 
circumstances. Subsequently, his father dies, and he performs miracles. He defies and ridicules 
kings. As a young boy, he turns down the highest military rank in a rich kingdom. He engages in 
a military campaign against Soumangourou Kante, and saves the “world” from this dreaded and 
vicious king. Finally, he restores justice and set rules for a peaceful society.  
The difficult hermeneutics of the tale of the enfant terrible, who breaks social rules, still 
bemuses scholars. Leguy et al. (“The Expression of Parenthood”), for instance, wonder: “to what 
extent is the relationship of obedience, a social expectation of children towards their elders, truly 
constructive for the children themselves and for society?” (183). The child developmental 
interpretation of Abrams and Sutton-Smith in the American context and the mystical 
interpretation of Chevrier in the African context show attempts to shed light on some enigmatic 
aspects of childhood. Michael Carroll, reading Levi-Strauss’s and Freud’s understanding of the 
trickster tale, contends that they see it as a myth. While Levi-Strauss views the myth as providing 
a conceptual model that openly expresses some dilemma, and at the same time, a basis for 
evading that dilemma, Freud sees myths as deriving ultimately from the shared childhood 
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experiences of the members of a given culture. In this Freudian sense, myths are projective 
systems in which those sexual impulses which are repressed during early childhood are finally 
expressed. 
Whatever the proper interpretations, the character of the enfant terrible is treated with a 
great deal of artistry. Piercing the mystery of such stories imposes, on children and adults alike, 
challenges that seem to invite one to a much higher philosophical reflection than simply 
reflecting an idea of childhood.  
In the cycle of the extraordinary child, besides the enfant malin and the enfant terrible, 
there is the enfant beurre. This story type is about a child character born artificially, usually 
made from shea butter, and whose existence is subsequently ephemeral, jeopardized by the risk 
that the butter will melt. The life of this character, as described by Seydou (1978), is also 
threatened by the conditions imposed on the parents and the child. Once the interdiction of 
revealing the child’s origin is broken, the child’s life ends. This type of child character is found 
in other tales where birth results not from shea butter, but from a similar supernatural process. I 
illustrate this type with the tale “Adele and the Pineapple Child” (Berry 52). In this tale, one of 
the two wives of a man is barren. A childless mother in the African traditional society is 
desperate, because a child is a mother’s greatest achievement in a marriage. One day, while 
going to the farm with her husband, the woman meets an old man in the forest who decides to 
fulfill her deepest desire. The unknown old man makes a child out of a pineapple and gives it to 
the woman. The condition imposed is to never call this child a pineapple child. Back in the 
village with the baby, the woman is ecstatic. Yet while singing as she cares for the baby, she 
unwittingly reveals what must never be said to the baby herself. Her co-wife, who is jealous and 
is spying on her, learns the secret. Several years pass and the child is now a young girl. One day, 
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the mother leaves the child in the care of the co-wife and goes to the farm with her husband. 
Instead of attending to the child’s request for food, the co-wife grows angry and shouts: “Why 
are you so spoiled? Be quiet and give me some peace. After all, you are nothing but a pineapple 
child.” As soon as the child hears what must never be said, she begins to cry, leaves the house, 
and heads towards the forest. At the return of the couple, they learn what has happened and the 
man runs after the girl, but too late. The little girl has taken up the spot where the old man 
uprooted the pineapple to make her. She begins to sing, and as she sings, she sinks into the 
ground. The man tries to pull her out but is only able to grasp her hair and hold it tightly to his 
breast. That is why man has hair on his chest. This is an aetiological tale, whose function is to 
explain the origin of things and natural phenomenon. It still provides us with a glimpse into the 
psychological grasp of the ephemeral child character.  
This child appears as a test to his/her parents by spirits. The child’s departure from her 
parents is the result of human misbehavior. The invisible world of African cosmogony governs 
the visible world. Although the story does not say it explicitly—because the society in which it is 
told is aware of this belief—spirits distribute children to either reward or punish parents for their 
behavior. It is assumed that the man and the woman in this story have been rewarded with the 
pineapple child for their upright social conduct. The sad ending, however, might be interpreted in 
several ways. It could be the mother’s incapacity to keep the secret which she disclosed 
inadvertently to her co-wife. It could also be due to the co-wife’s jealousy and pure human 
wickedness. But the key point in this story lies in the ability of the spirits to give and take a child. 
This belief also informs the conception that such children could be good or bad. A bad child 
could be given by a vicious spirit or by the gods to punish. It could also be the reincarnation of 
an undesirable ancestor. The various beliefs surrounding the birth of this type of extraordinary 
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child character explain but do not justify the abusive practices, normalized under institutions 
such as the abiku, famously described by Nigerian Nobel prize writer Wole Soyinka in his 
autofiction, Aké: The Years of Childhood (1981). The abiku among the Yoruba, is also known as 
obanje among the Igbo, as nit-ku-bon among the Wolof, and as yewaya among the Moose 
(Bonnet). The defect with which these children are born is construed as a sign of the gods and 
leads to abandonment, mistreatment or, worse, infanticide. These practices, however widespread 
they might be, are, contrarily to common belief, exceptions. Even as an exception, they were 
opposed by communities, and many folktales in which abandoned children are nursed by animal 
or other good spirits attest to this internal resistance. The extraordinary child character in general 
(enfant malin, enfant terrible, enfant beurre) therefore seems to speak to a belief system that 
gives prominence to the invisible. In the face of a world full of unexplained mystery, some child 
behaviors seem to correspond to the phantasms of the supernatural and the magical that exclude 
any rationality. 
The character of the ordinary child,16 on the contrary, refers to the child who is in no way 
special by circumstances of birth in the folktale’s diegesis. The ordinary child manifests 
him/herself in various forms in folktales, illustrating some deep-rooted traditional ideas about 
children. These ideas are also rooted in the belief system prevalent in Africa, according to which 
no dividing line exists between the world of the living and that of the dead, between the visible 
and the invisible. The ordinary child character shows that the child is the raison d’être of the 
traditional family. In that society, the absence of children is considered such a malediction that 
those who remain childless for a long time woo the spirits of the ancestors to reincarnate in them. 
Leo Frobenius (1873-1938) gives an account of a prayer among the Mundang of Cameroon, in 
                                               
16	N’da (Le conte africain) also identifies the ordinary child as one of his types.		
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which brides go to their father’s or grandfather’s grave to beg for children: “You see, 
grandfather, I have not had a child yet. See to it that I have one. Speak to your fathers and 
brothers so that they may help me; I will take care of my children very well” (quoted in Erny 
108). This belief exists in other forms in all parts of Africa. Among the Bambara of Mali, 
childless women express their anguish in songs. The Bambara version is translated in French by 
the collector as follows:  
Mon mari m’a donné  
Mon mari m’a donné des boucles d’oreilles en or 
Mais des boucles d’oreilles en or 
Ça n’est pas ce que je veux 
Ce que je veux, c’est un enfant. 
Mon mari m’a donné  
Mon mari m’a donné les robes de l’épouse préférée 
Mais des robes, 
Ça n’est pas ce que je veux 
Ce que je veux, c’est un enfant. 
Avoir un enfant, avoir un enfant, ô hommes! (Rene Luneau, quoted in Chevrier “L’arbre à 
palabres” 253)  
My husband gave me 
My husband gave me gold earrings 
But gold earrings 
That’s not what I want 
What I want is a child. 
My husband gave me 
My husband gave me the dresses of the favorite wife 
But dresses, 
That’s not what I want 
What I want is a child. 
To have a child, to have a child, O men! (My translation) 
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The ordinary child character in folktales speaks to parental love in very complex ways. Only two 
examples will be sampled here, in “Taweloro” (Dadié 81) and “A Mother’s love” (Berry 31). 
More stories in this category are listed in appendix I. In “Taweloro,” a king and a queen have 
been desperately hoping for a child, when suddenly the queen becomes pregnant. The kingdom 
celebrates for months. The queen gives birth to a girl of incomparable beauty. The two parents 
love their daughter so much that they refuse to marry her to any of the numerous suitors. Angry, 
the girl leaves the parental house and goes to the ocean. The queen searches for her everywhere 
in the world. She finally finds her near the ocean. But the girl has become a mermaid and refuses 
to return to the human world. Since then, the queen has been living on the beach, crying and 
supplicating her beloved daughter. The tale says that she is the fog seen sometimes on the beach. 
This story resembles an aetiological story, but the author may have adapted it from other models. 
It nevertheless sends a strong message against excessive and egoistic parental love for a child. In 
fact, parental love for their child is considered the norm. However, as in anything, excess is 
prohibited.  
Other tales stress the inconveniences for the child and the parents, of spoiling a child (see 
for instance “Le conte des deux filles” [Chevrier “L’arbre à palabres” 76], in which the spoiled 
girl fails in her prosperity quest). Just because parental love must not be excessive, this does not 
imply that parents should be negligent or too harsh with their children. “A Mother’s Love” 
relates the story of a single daughter whose mother is so negligent that she has left her in the care 
of her co-wife. The co-wife, barren and jealous, mistreats the child. The child then weeps and 
sings, telling travelers through her song to let her mother know her sufferings. As she sings, she 
sinks into the ground. When her mother returns and finds her, several days later, she is neck-deep 
into the ground. The mother then weeps and begs the child not to leave her. Following her 
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promises for better attention, the gods take pity, cracking the ground and freeing the girl. The 
happy ending of this story is more intended to redress the injustice of mistreatment inflicted on 
the child than to compensate the negligent mother. The child, as a link between the past and the 
future in traditional African society, cannot be mistreated without consequences. As such, ill-
treatment of children is always punished by the gods and the ancestors, who may take away the 
child or strike the foul parent (Erny 1973). This is true in the Akan cosmogony from which these 
two tales are drawn, but it is also true in most African traditions (Gottlieb 2004).  
In the tales of the ordinary child, the physical portrait of the child is only fleetingly 
described, if not altogether ignored (Holas, 166). A single word (healthy, beautiful, well-
behaved) suffices. But the child’s psychological portrayal is emphasized (Nda: 64). In both 
“Taweloro” and “A Mother’s Love,” a sorrowful song is used as narrative strategy for this effect. 
Yet, the effect of sadness due to the suffering of children is hardly deployed to pity the child. It is 
often used to stress the parents’ desperation in losing their only child. This twist of the tale, I 
contend, serves to emphasize the value of children to their parents, justifying why parents who 
fail to be reasonably loving or are negligent are punished.  
Two other examples are “Araignée et son fils” (Le pagne noir 143) and “The Cruel 
Mother” (Berry 43). In the first story, the father throws his child away, for he is ugly and lazy. In 
the second story it is a mother who flogs her daughter because she is lazy. In both stories, the 
wicked parents are punished. At the end of “The Cruel Mother,” the moral reads: “this story 
teaches us that we should never be cruel to our children” (Berry 43). 
The ordinary child character may also serve as epitome for the value of children to the 
society in general, as in “La conquête du Baoulé” (Delafosse 159) and “The Voice of the Child” 
(Berry 54). “La conquête du Baoulé” is a legend, presented as based on the tribal war that drove 
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the Baoulé people of Côte d’Ivoire away from their Ashanti brothers of Ghana. The story has 
several versions. In the version published in Essai de manuel de la langue Agni parlée dans la 
moitié orientale de la Côte d’Ivoire (1900) by colonial scholar Delafosse, Queen Pokou, whose 
army has been defeated, runs away with her people to escape the Ashanti warriors. At the river 
Comoe, Pokou asks her people to throw their babies into the water. All of them refuse. Then, 
Pokou takes her only son, adorns him with gold, and throws him to the water. Instantly, a big tree 
bends to bridge the two banks of the river, allowing Pokou and her people to cross. When the 
enemy arrives, the tree stands up. Queen Pokou leads her people into the new lands where she 
rules until she dies. Delafosse’s version presents some differences from the version released by 
Dadié, a scholar native to the Akan culture from which the story originates. In Légendes 
Africaines (1966), Dadié recounts that Queen Pokou and her people fleeing the Ashanti assault 
arrive at an agitated river. The diviner advises that, to appease the river and cross its stream, the 
fleeing crowd must sacrifice their most valuable belonging. All the gold and ivory is given. But 
the diviner pushes away the jewelry, pointing at the baby prince as the most valuable belonging. 
The queen, at first reluctant, gives up her only child, and when he is thrown to the river, a 
barrage of hippopotamuses comes out of the water allowing the crowd to cross. Once safe, the 
people bow down before the queen, who has only one word to say: “Ba-ou-le,” that is, “the child 
is dead.” That word becomes the name of the Baoulé tribe. 
The difference between Delafosse’s and Dadié’s version is a matter of factual details. 
While in written literature there is a lot to be said about this variation, factual details can be 
irrelevant to the economy of oral traditions.17 The major element in the legend is not the degree 
                                               
17 Mamousse Diagne contends that the “memorable oral” reveals a certain conception of the past and its use and, 
although it evokes in most cases facts and real persons, oral tradition should not be considered as historical 
testimony, but as a work aiming at giving meaning to the past so as to highlight values that can be the basis of 
people’s actions today. Hence the oscillation between the marvelous and the familiar/everyday. 
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of historical validity. Rather, the “memorable oral” of the story rests on the transferable message 
to be perpetuated. In this instance, the message is to highlight values likely to found the action of 
men in present or future actions. In both stories, the sacrifice of the child testifies to the 
prominent place of children in traditional society. The entire Baoulé tribe owes its existence to a 
child. But, as Véronique Tadjo (2006) remarks, legends such as Queen Pokou’s lose their 
transferable messages, precisely because they have taken a permanent form in books.18 But one 
should also not forget that legends such as Queen Pokou’s are powerful in that, besides the 
written versions,19 many children grow up hearing the oral versions (Tadjo 7). This folk idea that 
children have importance for the entire society is also found in the next folktale. 
In “The Voice of the Child” (Berry 54), “a dirty-looking little child all covered over with 
yaw” asks the elders, who have been trying desperately to save a dying woman, if he may say a 
word. “Get out of our way,” the men shout. But at the request of an old woman (the symbolic 
figure of the wise), the child is heard. His recommendations lead to the diagnosis of the illness, 
and three remedies are prescribed. One of the remedies is to provide the sick woman with a black 
cobra’s tongue, which the husband cannot get without risking his own life. The little child then 
kills the snake and provides the remedy, saving the man and his wife.  
As in the previous story, very little is said about the personality of the child savior. In the 
last story, the child has no family link whatsoever with the member of the community he has 
saved. The emphasis is placed on the act of salvation. This expectation of salvation from a child 
                                               
18See the online Revue Plurielles of January 18, 2006, p. 111. Tadjo asserts: “ainsi la légende se retrouva soudain 
figée sur le papier, faisant abstraction des différents niveaux de lecture qui existaient dans la tradition orale... 
Malheureusement, telle qu’elle nous est présentée aujourd’hui dans sa forme statique, la légende est devenue 
dangereuse. Elle est devenue dangereuse parce qu’elle ne nous apporte plus qu’une interprétation au premier degré 
du récit” (“Thus, the legend was suddenly frozen on paper, ignoring the different levels of reading that existed in the 
oral tradition... Unfortunately, as it is presented to us today in its static form, the legend has become dangerous. It 
has become dangerous because it brings us only a first-degree interpretation of the story” (my translation). 
19 Pokou’s legend has been at the center of a prolific literature. One version is Zègoua Gbessi Nokan’s Abraha 
Pokou: ou, Une grande Africaine: Théâtre (1971). 
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instantiates a crucial social role, which finds its manifestation first towards parents. As in every 
society, the child represents its parents’ perpetuation. But this also involves, in traditional Africa, 
a duty to bring this expectation to life. A song from the Weme people of Benin proclaims, for 
instance:   
Une tombe bien faite, c’est l’enfant qui vous l’assure au jour de votre mort. 
Car, au jour du départ! 
Au jour du grand départ, la beauté de notre tombe incombe à l’enfant.  
Même s’il nous en reste qu’un seul, 
Il viendra s’asseoir au bord de la fosse, et là, il dira, il dira que vous êtes son père.  
(Ascension Bogniaho, quoted in Chevrier “L’arbre à palabres” 256) 
A well-made grave is the child who provides it on the day of your death. 
Because, on the day of departure! 
On the day of the final departure, the beauty of our tomb falls to the child. 
Even if we only have one,  
He will come and sit on the edge of the pit, and there, he will say, he will say that you are his 
father. (My translation) 
This song’s emphasis on providing funeral rites to the parents is obviously important for the 
traditional African parent’s soul, which otherwise may be condemned to wander without rest. 
But further ontological reasons exist, including renewing oneself. One who does not have a child 
is completely dead, whereas to have one allows the parent to become an ancestor and to 
reincarnate. Erny quotes the Bambara (Mande) as saying, “Death has no medicine; death has no 
remedy, if not the child” (87). The ordinary child character in folktales thus serves to discuss the 
place, the role and the importance of any child to its parents and to the wider society.  
The ordinary child may also serve to underscore qualities, good or bad, that a given story 
ought to highlight. A story might stress the drawbacks of disobedience, as in “L’enfant et la 
flute” (Nda 203) and “Le canari merveilleux” (Equilibecq 116). In “L’enfant et la flute,” the 
child disobeys his parents and goes back to the farm at night to fetch his flute. The monsters of 
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the forest capture him. He struggles to escape, while his parents are looking for him. At this stage 
of the story, songs are introduced. This performance aspect stresses the child’s remorse and 
creates an effect of suspense. The story ends when the child finally escapes. In “Le canari 
merveilleux,” a disrespectful little girl buys a pottery piece not from the hands of a merchant, but 
by throwing money to the ground. It turns out that the pottery is a terrifying bird, which has 
metamorphosed to live among humans. The bird captures the girl and takes her to the top of a big 
tree. She is finally rescued by her parents’ dog. In both stories, the suspense created with the 
child at the hands of terrifying monsters, not being able to return home, is supposed to serve as a 
warning to disrespectful children. As Yao Lambert Konan puts it, it is a sort of pedagogy through 
fear. By ricochet, it stresses the expected social behavior of obedience and respect for parents 
and other adults. Respect for the elders and obedience therefore can be understood as 
quintessential elements of ordinary childhood. This pedagogy by fear does not work unilaterally. 
In a world dominated by the invisible, supernatural beings such as gods and ancestors alike may 
also punish or reward the adults and watch after the child. In this instance, the most protected 
figure is the defenseless child: the orphan. 
The orphan is among the third type of characters, the disadvantaged child. The orphan is 
a typical figure of defenselessness and misfortune, and the mistreatment of an orphan in folktales 
attracts malediction on those responsible. An illustration of this theme is found in a tale 
frequently told in West Africa, one that has distinct European analogues, in which a stepchild 
who is mistreated comes back from a lethal set of trials with many riches. This cycle, known as 
La calebasse brisée, contains a rich repertoire of stories. Some examples listed in the appendix 
are “Les deux sœurs et le chien” and “Les deux sœurs et la vieille femme,” drawn from the 
collection Contes Zarma du Niger (1981) by Nicole Tersis. Other examples are “Le conte des 
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deux filles” and “La cuiller sale.” For the purpose of this discussion, I focus on Dadié’s artful 
literary rendition of this tale type, “La cruche.” In this tale, an orphan boy breaks his 
stepmother’s pitcher. Angry, the stepmother sends the boy to find one that is exactly the same. 
The boy sets out for the difficult assignment. Throughout his journey he encounters different 
types of frightening creatures. First, he meets a crocodile who threatens to eat him. However, 
after he tells his story, the mighty animal is moved. The crocodile then asks the boy to scrub his 
back, a back that has edges as sharp as machetes and spines as tapered as needles. In scrubbing 
this hazardous back, he hurts his fingers, but does not give up. Once satisfied, the crocodile takes 
the orphan boy to another place. There he meets a foul-smelling monster who also threatens to 
kill him. The orphan tells his story to the monster who, then moved, asks him to comb his foul-
smelling hair. The boy does it jauntily and the monster, satisfied, turns him over to a devil whose 
head is lost in the clouds and whose feet are hidden in the ground. After he tells his story, the 
devil takes the orphan boy atop a very high mountain and then asks him to let himself fall off.  
As always, the orphan obeys, and after he falls from the mountain, he is given keys to open the 
door to a village of old women. In this village, he must tell his story to each of the many old 
women, each of whom asks him to comb her hair, clean her fingernails and toenails, wash her, 
and fetch water for her. The orphan once again submits to these various tasks willingly and with 
a smile. The old women are satisfied and give him two gourds, with specific recommendations 
on what to do with them. He does as he is told and magically finds himself in the company of his 
mother, who in turn gives him a pitcher in replacement of the one he had broken, and three more 
gourds. The mother also leaves the boy with firm instructions on what to do with the gourds 
given to him. The boy follows these instructions scrupulously. Upon arriving in his village, he 
gives the pitcher to his stepmother, then he breaks the gourds. From the broken gourds emerge, 
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successively, castles, riches, and people to inhabit the kingdom that has just surfaced. The orphan 
is now a wealthy and powerful king. 
However, this happy development for the orphan boy is not the end of the story. The 
stepmother, having grown envious of the orphan’s fortune, sends her own son, a spoiled child, to 
do as the orphan did and become rich. So, the stepmother’s son sets out for the same journey as 
the orphan. But, as he meets various creatures, the same ones the orphan encountered, he refuses 
to submit to the tasks given to him. Nevertheless, he is given the gourds at the end of his journey 
with the same recommendations the orphan was given. But the stepmother’s son has not only 
disrespected all the creatures, but also ignored their instructions on what to do with the gourds. 
As a result, when he breaks the last gourds, the earth opens and swallows him along with his 
wicked mother.  
Folktale scholars (e.g., Genevieve Calame-Griaule) have documented the mirror structure 
in which this story is woven. This structure appears to be a discursive strategy through which the 
tale skillfully weaves its key message. The mirror structure in folktales is one in which a hero 
and an antihero are in play in two symmetrical parts of the story. The two characters undertake a 
quest during which they are subjected to a series of tests. However, their reverse behaviors bring 
results where the first triumphs because of certain traits of character, bringing back fabulous 
riches, while the second, who is jealous of the first and strives to obtain the same advantages, 
accomplishes the tasks badly, again because of certain traits of character, and ends up with 
severe punishment, often death. This apparently simple symmetrical narrative structure actually 
carries a wealth of recursively fragmented messages conveying strong values about social 
justice. I shall only focus on one aspect, relevant to the folk notion of childhood. The parallel 
structure of the tale indeed reflects the idea that in every human being both positive and negative 
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characteristics coexist. Both characters are thoroughly presented in the tale, and the positive 
character is implicitly commended through the success in his endeavor. This message, however, 
further splits into two more: it must not be understood simply as a modest cautionary tale for 
children, it is also a warning for adults. The message to adults is poignantly emphasized in the 
storyline of “La cruche,” with the story ending when death strikes the stepmother and her son. 
For children who hear such a folktale—often at night, this performance context adding to their 
fear—there is a double question to reflect on: how should children behave towards adults, and 
what treatment should children expect from adults? In other words, what is the place of a child in 
the family and in society at large? “La cruche,” a story drawn from Dadié’s Akan culture,20 
parodies the social expectation for the Akan child in an explicit twist of the plot. The story 
purposefully portrays two child figures (the orphan and his half-brother) in their rapport with two 
types of adult figures, a family member (the stepmother) and strangers (the creatures).  
The two child figures present two contrasting types of childhood characteristics. On one 
side, the orphan is described as dutiful and brave. On the other side, his half-brother is 
disrespectful and lazy. The end of the story indicates that the orphan’s character is the most 
praised. Despite hostile environments, deprivations, and the difficulty of the tasks requested from 
him, the orphan is shown to always demonstrate dutifulness and courage. These are two highly 
regarded values, with serious implications for the achievement of what is known in today’s 
human rights discourse as “full realization of human personality.” In the Akan society, 
philosopher Kwasi Wiredu observes a difference made between a human—a biological entity—
                                               
20 I assume that the story represents an Akan world, even in the case that this story is distorted by his author’s 
literary style. The preface of the collection Le pagne noir indicates the author’s intention to offer stories from the 
Agni peoples of the East of Cote d’Ivoire.  
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and a person—a moral and metaphysical agent (see also Menkiti).21 Human status is not 
disputable, subjected to degrees, or conferred as a “reward” for any achievement (i.e. a non-
human may never turn human). In contrast, personhood is something for a human to acquire, and 
such quality is susceptible to varying degrees through individual achievements. An individual’s 
human status, therefore, is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for personhood.22 Indeed, at 
the end of the day, the tasks the orphan has accomplished without objection, whether reasonable 
or not, have prepared him to become a ruler. It can be inferred from this development of the story 
that, in fact, the Akan child must bravely serve the adults to properly develop his human 
personality. An indication that the story refers to all children in general is the way in which the 
two boys in the tale are asked to perform all kinds of tasks, including tasks such as combing hair 
or fetching water, normally reserved for female children. The sense of duty towards the adult is 
sacred and is equally expected from boys and girls. To disregard it is to prepare for an absolute 
social downfall and eventually for death. The fate of the stepmother’s son, arrogantly 
disrespectful and lazy, is here to serve as example. There is no doubt that an important message 
of the story is that serving the adults is an initiation process, a training to adulthood. For obvious 
reasons, the tale does not make apparent that this story also reinforces traditional society’s 
entrenched provision of duty towards the elderly. But this privilege of the elderly is not left 
unchecked. This is where the second question of the tale comes up: what can children expect 
from adults in traditional Akan society?  
The tale deals with this question in two steps. First, it presents the rapport of the orphan 
child with his stepmother. Second, it presents the two child figures in their interactions with the 
                                               
21	Ifeanyi Menkiti contends that personhood is something which has to be achieved and is not given simply because 
one is born of human seed. “As far as African societies are concerned, personhood is something at which individuals 
could fail, at which they could be competent or ineffective, better or worse” (172-73). 
22 This Akan concept is close to the contemporary legal definition of “personality.” 
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wider society, which is symbolized by all types of creatures. The narrative device of the mirror 
story is once again used here with sophistication to contrast two types of treatments of children 
by adults. In the first part of the story, the stepmother mistreats the orphan. Most African 
folktales use the stereotype of orphan-stepmother relations to symbolize how society (the non-
biological mother) should not treat children, especially those in disadvantaged positions (the 
orphan). In the second example, total strangers, including animals and imaginary creatures, treat 
the misbehaving child fairly, by giving him as many gourds as they gave to the well-behaved 
boy. The misbehaving boy is nevertheless punished by his own misconduct and his disregard for 
the instructions given to him. The various messages woven within this story cannot be exhausted 
in this analysis. However, it is worth stressing how the two symmetrical sides of the mirror story 
are also each divided into two, between a child and an adult. Thus, in the first part of the story, 
the orphan boy and the stepmother share the same diegetic space that helps contrast a good 
child’s behavior with a wrong adult behavior. In the second part of the story, the image is 
reversed, and the half-brother is the one displaying the wrong child behavior, whereas the adults, 
all strangers, treat him with fairness. These two parallel and identical depictions convey the 
notion of equilibrium; that is, there are always two sides to the story: both children and adults 
have entitlements and obligations towards one another. This representation of childhood is not 
only true in the Akan culture; it can be extended to the great majority of other African cultures. 
The characteristics of “La cruche” are identical to “La cuiller sale” (Diop 177), confirming not 
only that this storytelling technique is meaningful, but also that the interpretation given here is 
applicable in other places such as in Diop’s Wolof culture. But Dadié’s and Diop’s account of 
this cycle known as La calebasse brisée, resemble what Stith Thompson characterizes as 
“reshaped to suit...literary taste” (xv). Despite their alteration of the original model, certainly to 
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reach their Western audience, their accounts retain the symbolic value described above. “Le 
conte des deux filles,” collected by Görög-Karady and included in Chevrier’s L’arbre à palabre, 
which provides an authentic version of the same story from the Bambara people of Mali, does 
not present major differences. One such minor difference is, for instance, the nature of the 
reward. In “La cruche,” Dadié speaks of castles and servants (a European motif), whereas in “Le 
conte des deux filles,” Görög-Karady’s informant describes the reward as gold, diamonds, and 
slaves. These latter motifs are also similar to those found in the two tales from Contes Zarma du 
Niger. In all these stories the tasks are similar, and equally extended. Beyond the literary aspect, 
the similarities confirm the validity of the lessons from “La cruche” in the three West African 
cultures where the same folktales are found.                
Other types of disadvantaged child characters, such as the enfant pianique (for N’da) or 
the unloved child (for Platiel), find their illustration in “L’enfant lépreux” (Görög-Karady and 
Baumgardt 29). A woman has four children, one of whom is leprous. She brings fruits from the 
farm to feed her children. When she comes, she sings a song in which she calls every child by 
name and asks him to come help her discharge the load and eat the basket of fruit. Only the 
leprous child is not invited to do so. The sick child is only left with the seed kernel of the fruits to 
lick, after his brothers have eaten all the meaty parts. This life goes on for a while. But a 
crocodile has been spying on this family. One day when the mother is out, the crocodile comes 
and sings the song. The spoiled children try to open the door, but the leprous child warns them 
that the voice is not their mother’s. They do not open the door but report to their mother that the 
leprous child forbade them to open the door when altruistic people came to offer them some 
food. The mother flogs the leprous child and tells him never to interfere when strangers try to 
help. The following day, when the crocodile comes back, the spoiled children open the door and 
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the crocodile swallows them. When their mother returns, she sings and sings, but her favorite 
children do not come out. The leprous child then tells her what has happened. She calls out for 
help, and the entire village start to look for the lost children—in vain. Then the leprous child asks 
for a donkey and a knife. He is mocked for his effrontery, but, because of his insistence, he is 
provided with the requested objects. The leprous child finally saves his brothers and brings them 
home, to the astonishment of his mother. That day, she cooks for him and serves him food in a 
clean dish, but the boy refuses to eat, telling her to continue to treat him the way she has always 
treated him. The boy finally agrees to be treated kindly after the intervention of the community 
leaders. Ever since, says the story, even if your child looks like excrement, he should never be 
rejected. But a brother or a sister can also reject a child. Stories such as “Les trois frères” and 
“Le paralytique et sa sœur” (Chevrier 132) are illustrations of this variant. In both cases, the 
rejected child triumphs over his/her privileged siblings.  
The figure of the mistreated or unloved child embodies the disadvantaged child, and the 
punishment of the misbehaving parent or sibling encapsulates traditional society’s response. 
Despite the variety in these types of folktales, the lessons are similar: injustices towards children 
are punished. Such lessons are rooted in the belief that children are God-given, reincarnations of 
ancestors, or the favor of some deities.  
 
 
4. Some Key Folk Notions of Traditional African Childhood 
Characters from oral tradition narratives can shed light on how traditional African society 
conceives of children and their lives. Rewards, punishments, prohibitions, and social 
expectations towards children are not arbitrary; they correspond to the images people have of 
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them. Therefore, it is possible to extract from such stories, not only the way the child’s reality is 
conceived, but also the way it is lived existentially. Yet, stories such as folktales are fictions and 
legends are fictionalized histories. Although they are representations of social realities, the lay 
observer can also misinterpret them. Proper interpretation thus requires ethnographic 
information. Such information is available through the work of cultural anthropologists. Since 
Margaret Mead, who revealed the difference between childhoods across the world in her Coming 
of Age in Samoa (1928), a tremendous amount of work has been done to restitute the reality of 
children worldwide. In Childhood and Cosmos: The Social Psychology of the Black African 
Child ([1968] 1973), Pierre Erny provides glimpses into the role and the place of the child in 
traditional African society. Studying how children are raised in different cultures in The 
Anthropology of Childhood: Cherubs, Chattel, Changelings (2008), David F. Lancy indicates 
that children’s perceptions in their own cultures profoundly affect all aspects of their lives. 
Folktales and legends contribute to such perceptions in the African context. Characters in these 
oral narratives are projections of social models and counter-models. In this regard, the child’s 
character is remarkable in the way it plays out these models and counter-models in the 
community.  
In the folktales and legends examined, child characters appear as crucial participants in 
the family. Both an ordinary child character such as in “A mother’s love” (Berry 31) and an 
extraordinary character such as “L’enfant lépreux” (Görög-Karady 29) exemplify the prominent 
role of the child in the family realm. In the first case, the loved child shows that children are the 
raison d’être of the traditional African marriage. Without a child, the stability of any family is 
jeopardized. In the second case, the unloved child character sends the message that children 
represent the future of the family, its hopes and chances. But, as the end of the two tales shows, 
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whether loved or unloved, justice and reasonable behavior are expected from adults towards their 
children. That is because childhood is the time during which, in African ontology, the child 
serves as the link between the living and the dead, the visible and the invisible. The child, Erny 
contends, “is endowed with will and intelligence right from the beginning, for he is not an 
absolute beginning. He has a past, a personality inherited from afar; he is already somebody, and 
often this somebody is stronger and more conscious than the average adult” (92). It follows that a 
key folk notion of childhood in the traditional African society is responsibility rather than 
carefreeness. It is not surprising that children are given key symbolic roles in rituals and begin 
from an early age to be responsible contributors to family life. 
The child’s contribution is also expected at the community level. Stories such as “La 
conquête du Baoulé” (Delafosse 159), “Soundiata Keita, héros historique et légendaire, empereur 
du Manding” (Sidibe 1960), and “The Voice of the Child” (Berry 54) are examples of the 
salvific capability of the child. Envisioned as the reincarnation of the ancestors, the child is born 
to solve problems facing the community. As Erny has shown, from the very moment a child is 
given a name, he is called by adults to a future role in society. The name may provide him with a 
role model, as in “Soundiata Keita.” Thus, the child’s very being is endowed with the 
expectation of success, and his ability to learn or to do those things appropriate to his age and life 
setting should never be questioned, as in “The Voice of the Child.”  It is fair to see in this 
practice a conception of childhood as a time for the initiation to the hard reality of adulthood. 
The subversiveness of these two folktales also reveals a discourse on the notion of 
childhood and obedience. Although most child characters (see “La cruche,” “La cuillère sale,” 
“Le conte des deux filles,” and “Les deux sœurs et le chien”) emphasize the virtue of obedience, 
the enfant terrible and the enfant malin characters show that exceptions to submission to adults 
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are recognized. Admittedly, as a rule, obedience is a key folk notion that characterizes childhood 
in traditional society. But the traditional African society has its imperfections. Then and now, 
this folk notion that children must submit to adults can be and has been abused by paternalistic 
institutions.  
This abuse also suggests children’s vulnerability. Deviations from the norms of bonus 
pater familias occur both within and outside the family. Children in this case may be victims of 
their own wicked parents or of evil adults. “The Cruel Mother” (Berry 26), “L’enfant pianique” 
(N’da 1984: 203), and “La cruche” (Le pagne noir 23) teach us that abusing the powerlessness of 
children is sanctioned by the gods and other protective spirits. The protection is particularly 
emphasized for disadvantaged children. In the African belief system, children may be 
empowered by the gods. But what if they are not? The stories seem to indicate that behind every 
powerless child is a hidden spiritual trap against abusers. Yet this religious myth can be 
deceivingly incapable of looking after the vulnerable child, thus giving rise to other forms of 
harm, including infanticide. The institution of some of these practices (abiku, obanje, nit-ku-bon) 
is ingrained in religious beliefs and does not appear markedly in folktales and legends. Such 
discretion might signify that these practices belong to the exception rather than the rule. 
In sum, the mystical origin of the child, in West African thinking, translates in folktales 
and legends. It foregrounds some distinctive concepts about childhood. Childhood can lead to 
dreaded mysterious behaviors, which some characters of the enfant terrible personify. It can also 
represent this time when the invisible world astonishes the living through children. The enfant 
malin fulfills this imagery by showing bravery and ingenuity. The extraordinary child specimens 
of enfant terrible and enfant malin thus appear as avatars of the traditional society’s fear and 
hopes about childhood. The ordinary child character, however, shows the place of children both 
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within the family and in kinship. Vis-à-vis parents and society, the child has responsibilities in 
return for society’s and parents’ responsibilities. Those societies, parents, or children who break 
the rules are certain to find the justice of the gods, the monsters, and the ancestors that populate 
the invisible world. Many of these lessons about the place of children in the traditional society 
are also taught with other forms of orature, including proverbs, songs, lullabies and riddles, that 
contain moral themes and describe virtuous acts for adults and children to emulate. Ojo and 
Dundes report that proverbs may serve as impersonal vehicles for parent-child interpersonal 
communication. A proverb may serve a parent as a tool to direct a child’s action or thought. In 
using the proverb, the parental imperative is externalized and removed somewhat from the 
individual parent. The guilt or responsibility for directing the child is projected onto the 
anonymous past or folk. In this instance, the child knows that the proverb used by the scolding 
parent was not made up by that parent. It is a proverb from the cultural past whose voice speaks 
truth in traditional terms.  
These orature genres, along with the stories examined here, simply underscore some of 
the differences social scientists have been documenting about childhood in the so-called 
Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD)23 societies and African 
societies. In contemporary modern society, largely based on this Western model, the ideas of 
childhood as described by historians (see Ariès) have moved from inclusion to isolation. Today, 
childhood is a place and time theoretically reserved for parents and guardians to secure for the 
child play, insouciance, and safety. This joyful time is limited only by schooling, and envisaged 
as a way to guide children’s intellectual and social development from as early on in the lifespan 
                                               
23Anthropologist Joe Henrich and psychologists Steven Heine and Ara Norenzayan coined the acronym Western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) following an observation that social science studies have 
constructed universal theories from this narrow and unusual slice of the world’s population. 
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as possible (Lancy 80). As folktales and legends have shown, this approach is in sharp contrast 
with the folk models found in traditional Africa. In the latter society, childhood is the time for 
the initiation to the hard reality of adulthood. An important expectation on the child’s shoulders 
is that of embodying the hopes and prospects of the family and the society. This expectation also 
normalizes a detail of a very contentious nature: labor. The various tasks performed by child 
characters are similar to actual tasks expected of children in traditional African society. Children 
are expected to do menial household chores. These tasks can be wide-ranging in the rural 
context: preparing meals, washing dishes, taking care of younger siblings, sweeping, fetching 
water and firewood, doing light farm work or monitoring livestock, and serving as messenger, to 
name a few. These tasks are not punishment; these are normal activities expected from children 
in the traditional context for their training as valuable members of the community. Child labor 
therefore appears to be understood differently in such a context. In “Être enfant en Afrique” 
(2002), Madeleine Borgomano compiles the personal testimonies of three West African scholars 
sharing their childhood experiences. These experiences—Amadou Koné’s “L’enfance: C’était le 
temps des rêves et de l’espoir,” Beatrice Nguessan Larroux’s “A l’ombre des jeunes filles en 
pleurs,” and Paul Nda’s “Etre enfant en Afrique, quelle aventure sur le dur chemin de la vie!” —
in many ways illustrate the context described above.  
This is not to say that a single concept of the child runs through the various cultures of 
Africa. Within the West African regions where these folktales and legends are drawn, a variation 
is noticed. Such variations are not just the exploitation by the storyteller of the margin of 
freedom in oral narrative. It also reflects above all the diversity of states and possible meanings 
of the same situations within adjacent cultures. Owing to a common belief system, however, the 
variations incurred in these stories hardly hamper the core folk notions about childhood. The 
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same is true even between these folk notions and the modern notion of childhood. Just because 
the differences are often emphasized does not mean that there are no similarities. In fact, the 
universal idea that children are precious, loved, and revered comes across in several stories, 
including “A Mother’s Love.” Similarly, unlike the oft-received idea, the story “The Voice of the 
Child” shows that the silencing of children’s voices is hardly the norm in traditional society. In 
fact, as the proverb in that folktale states, “it is the ring of a child that does not fit a man, but not 
his food and certainly not his words” (54). In this Akan proverb, the ring of the child speaks to 
the biological nature of children, which evidently contrasts with the typical adult. The food 
represents the child’s contribution. However small it might appear, this contribution is expected, 
because it adds up to the formation and the consolidation of the traditional society. Children’s 
words act in the same symbolic way as their food. But, in traditional society as in modern 
societies, paternalistic institutions and prejudices can hinder children’s privilege of voice. And 
the preeminence of the voice of the seniors is one such institution in traditional African society. 
The figure of the old storyteller in rural areas of Africa has been replaced in urban areas 
by today’s technologies. With regards to folk narratives, what Ngũgĩ terms cyberture manifests 
itself in various ways. Folktales are now broadcast on radio and television (Haring) as well as on 
the Internet (Adejunmobi). The digitally mediated technology ensures instantaneity and 
interactivity. Stories circulate on blogs in texts as well as in videos on channels such as 
YouTube. The reproduction and circulation of folktales and legends in animation films is 
particularly noteworthy. In 2013 the studio Afrikatoon in Cote d’Ivoire released an animated film 
on the legend of Queen Pokou, titled “Pokou, Princesse Ashanti.” The following year, it released 
another on Soundjata Keita, “Soundiata Keita, le réveil du lion.” Other animation films featuring 
folk narratives, lullabies, and other oral traditions from all parts of Africa abound. While some of 
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this material has been distorted grotesquely, there are several accurate treatments of folk 
narratives. I provide only a few examples. The YouTube channel Sénégal TV Enfant features 
several folk narratives, among them “Savez-vous pourquoi le coq chante?” The animation film is 
artfully done, and the narration made by Senegalese professional artist Lamine Mbengue 
provides an accurate rendering of the tale-telling style and tone of oral tradition. Other tales 
available on Sénégal TV Enfant include the legend of Malissadjo and “Le singe et le crocodile,” 
all made in the same style. In addition, this channel features lullabies, some of them in local 
languages such as Wolof. Animation film studios in France are also involved in the business of 
animated African folk narratives. For instance, Les Z’animés from Lagardère Studios features 
several folktales from all parts of Africa. Its video “Les contes de l’Afrique, dessins animés en 
français,” published in December 2017, features six folk narratives from different countries, and 
has more than a half-million views. Other France-based studios on YouTube such as Didier 
Jeunesse and Comptine du Monde-Africa, featuring essentially lullabies, have attracted a couple 
of millions of views.  
Alongside these professional studios, some local and less structured entities have 
published animated videos of folk narrative. In Mali, Ismaël Diallo’s channel Les contes de ma 
grand-mère published in 2013 “Princesse Sadjo,” which has now more than 1.2 million views. 
The video provides an accurate graphic rendition of the nocturnal storytelling performance where 
a grandmother narrates stories to children around the fire. However, not all local individuals and 
studios reproduce African folk narratives so faithfully. In Burkina Faso, Claver Comics, for 
instance, presents composite folktales made from different animal characters of West Africa. “Le 
Lièvre et le lion,” one of its videos, features a wicked lion (Gainde: Lion in Wolof) and a small 
and smart hare (Soamba: Hare in Moore) living with other animals in the African savanna. Such 
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innovations, although problematic from a folkloristic point of view, also signal the changes 
taking place in the virtual and global circulation of folk narratives. Whether the African folk 
narratives and lullabies ostensibly present online are faithful to the continent’s folk tradition is 
certainly a good question to debate. However, the question most relevant to this discussion is the 
extent to which these animation films capture and promote a folk idea of childhood. All of the 
videos, from “Pokou, princesse Ashanti” and “Soundiata, le reveil du lion” to “Malissadjo” and 
the lullabies, are concerned with an idea of traditional childhood. A logical question following 
the examination of the thirty folk narratives and the discussion of these videos would be: what 
has become of these folk notions of childhood? Do they remain in the fictional world of stories, 
or do they inform children’s actual lives throughout the continent? Recent studies (Ezémbé; 
Gottlieb) prove the continued significances of these narratives’ main ideas. In fact, these ideas 
are also encountered in written African literature, which often borrows strongly from oral 
tradition. The recuperation of folk ideas of childhood in the African novel in particular is the 











CHILDHOOD AND HYBRIDITY IN AFRICAN LITERATURE 
 
1. African Literature, Hybridity, and Childhood Discourse 
 
Contemporary African literature developed as a form of counter-discourse to colonial 
ones. In the 1970s, this literature became highly characterized by cultural and linguistic hybridity 
(see generally Dabla; see also Borgomano, “Linguistic and Cultural Heterogeneity”). In 
Francophone Africa, this latter characteristic was also incorporated into literary works on the 
theme of childhood,1 an approach that seems to have extended an earlier discourse on culture and 
identity initiated by the Négritude movement born in the 1930s. In order to counter the colonial 
ideology of mission civilisatrice, whose legitimacy was based on a presumed absence of culture 
and history of the colonized, Négritude writers, especially those from Africa, vowed to promote 
pre-colonial African civilizations through the reproduction of myths, legends, and folktales. As 
seen in the preceding chapter, this cultural heritage, whose revival is far from ending, has 
complex implications for the African child. The child is not only a character in these expressions 
of a folk worldview, s/he is also its recipient and its custodian. In this chapter, I examine the 
African child’s fate of being a battleground between the imposed colonial culture and the native 
                                               
1 In “L’enfance métisse ou l’enfance ‘entre les eaux,’ ” Alioune Sow examines Lopes’s novel as the beginning of a 
deep reflection and the exploration of new definitions of metissage, through Andre’s childhood tale. In “Writing 
Childhood,” Cheryl Toman concludes that “[b]y the end of the narrative, Matip realizes that she has become a 
hybrid of both the traditional and the modern” (87); see also Tierno Monénembo’s speech delivered at the annual 
conference of the African Literature Association, March 4-8, 2007, Morgantown, West Virginia, and published as 




cultural heritage. This fate is more vividly presented in African literature through various forms 
of hybridity.  
Hybridity as a concept is very diversely understood. Linguistic theorist Mikhail Bakhtin 
perceives it in the polyphony and the heteroglossia of the novel. He theorizes hybridization in the 
Dialogic Imagination as “a mixture of two social languages within the limits of a single 
utterance” (358). But he also adds that “only one language is actually present in the utterance, 
but it is rendered in the light of another language” (362). Postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabba 
defines hybridity in The Location of Culture in relation to the postcolonial condition. Bhabha 
views it as “the social articulation of difference, from the minority perspective,” which is “a 
complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in 
moments of historical transformation” (2). Anthropologist James Clifford reads hybridity in The 
Predicament of Culture as “the condition of collective identity” (10), yet he also views it in the 
activity of ethnography, which appears “as writing, as collecting, as modernist collage, as 
imperial power, as subversive critique” (13) These hermetic, confusing, and at times shifty 
delineations have been widely criticized for failing to provide a realistic framework. It is 
therefore important to adapt from them a working definition of hybridity that fits this study. In 
the colonial and postcolonial societies explored in this dissertation, hybridity refers to the 
mixture of various cultural consciousnesses as they are manifest in the child’s education, 
geographical movement, social choices, and desires. It is a factor of embracing a diverse way of 
being African that accounts for colonial heritage, beyond a fixed cultural identity. Additionally, 
the works of literature examined in this study also display, to varying degrees, hybrid traits in 
their languages, forms, and thematics. This working definition reflects the original horticultural 
meaning of cross-breeding or cross-pollination to form a third “hybrid specie.” Writers in the 
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Négritude movement have also used the more biological term metissage to refer to such 
hybridization, whereas Bhabba’s notion of Third Space provides a framework, albeit limited, to 
discuss its manifestation. Both metissage and Third Space will supply additional understanding 
of hybridization in this study. 
Through these various forms of hybridity, I examine the ways in which the theme of 
childhood was enlisted by Négritude writers as a catalyst for tackling the burning issues of 
colonial domination, and particularly the issues of identity and culture. The ideas generated 
within the Négritude movement are central to the social and cultural debates formulating the 
storylines of childhood narratives that span the second half of the twentieth century through the 
twenty-first century. Not only was Négritude’s earlier focus on African pride central to the first 
childhood narratives, but its later resonance with metissage, mixture, or better, hybridity, informs 
recent generations of African childhood narratives. This chapter therefore reads the way African 
novels delve into the theme of childhood and in some cases resort to the method of hybridity, 
thus attaining a veritable discourse on cultural synthesis.   
In the Francophone African context, the ideology driving colonial policy took on the 
main slogan of “assimilation.” This policy implied that the French colonizers must implant their 
culture among the colonized and, by the same token, curb the “backward” society in place. The 
“assimilation” policy was rooted in all aspects of life in the colonies: political, economic, social, 
and cultural. For my purpose, however, I shall focus on culture, for it connects with childhood in 
African literature at least in two ways. Childhood is a theme used in the literary discussion of 
colonial African people’s imperiled cultural identity. This theme is used precisely to reflect the 
idea that the child represents the people’s heritage, present and future, in short, their cultural 
identity. It is also used as a metaphor of the nascent literature, which is entrusted with defending 
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the imperiled cultural identity, just as the perpetuation of that cultural identity is bestowed upon 
children. The theme of childhood is a powerful metaphor in the sense that it is a temporary 
condition, destined to mature over time. It should not come as a surprise to see that the cultural 
identity depicted in literature matures, in the same ways that the literature that discusses it 
matures. Furthermore, an early specificity of African literature on childhood is the presence of 
the notion of mixture. The portrayal of the African child follows the schema initiated in 
Ousmane Socé’s Karim, in which the author locates African identity between two cultures. In the 
course of its development, literature on childhood in Africa took on more hybrid traits, becoming 
more linguistically, structurally, and stylistically imbricated. Such is the case, in particular, for 
what I characterize as the third-wave childhood narratives. For African literary critics such as 
Madelaine Hron, “the hybrid space of childhood enables writers to address themes that may, in 
fact, be too large for adult fiction, while also engaging culturally uninformed Western readers” 
(27). In other words, the combination of the mode of hybridity and the theme of childhood 
produces a particular semiotics directly related to intercultural exchange. In my view, the hybrid 
representation of the child figure in the African literary context is a showcase of the postcolonial 
subject’s negotiation of sociocultural identity. This manner of using childhood in literature points 
to “a quest that is inextricably linked to substantial global concerns of the twenty-first century” 
(Hron 27). Childhood narratives and their hybrid manifestations, in fact, raise concerns about 
dominated and dominant culture in the global world. I explore these global concerns more 
thoroughly in the next chapter. 
Négritude initiated the theme of cultural struggle in childhood narratives. When French-
speaking West African and Caribbean students living in the Quartier Latin of Paris launched the 
movement and published L’etudiant noir in the 1930s, they were angered by French colonial rule 
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and were mostly preoccupied with responding to the racial slur of nègre. They used this slur and 
added the suffix -tude, turning its negative connotation into a positivity, conveying the sense of 
being nègre and being proud of being so.2 The movement’s three foremost figures were the 
Martinican Aimé Césaire, the Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor, and the Guyanese Léon 
Gontran Damas. These pioneers published poetry in the 1940-50s that would define Négritude as 
a way of taking stock of and asserting the value of black or African culture, heritage, and 
identity. These works, however, encountered criticism both among African intellectuals and in 
the West. The theory was commonly viewed as essentialist, a view that French philosopher Jean-
Paul Sartre expresses in his essay “Black Orpheus”: “the Negro creates an anti-racist racism” 
(59). Sartre contends that the black, by vindicating his Négritude, “hopes to find the black 
Essence in the wells of his soul” (17). While the earlier works on which Sartre and the other 
commentators cast their observations share a common essentialist lexicon on race with colonial 
racism, Césaire and Senghor devoted their post-independence writings and speeches to 
rearticulate Négritude as a philosophy of universalism (see Diagne, “La Négritude comme 
mouvement,” and Mbom, “Et les chiens se taisaient”). Unlike its earlier expression of cultural 
outcry and its racial essentialism, which became obsolete after the independence of the colonies, 
its latter articulation is still resonant in recent literature, especially in narratives about African 
childhood.  
The Négritude of revolt was triggered by a specific colonial context. Senghor recalls in 
“Négritude and African Socialism” (first published in 1963) that at school, the French masters 
taught Africans pupils that they had no civilization. Colonized black people “were ‘tabula rasa,’ 
                                               
2According to Bachir Diagne (“Négritude,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2018), the choice of 
the suffix was thought through and was made after considering and dropping the suffix –ité for Négrité.  
 127 
or, better still, a lump of soft wax which the fingers of the white demiurge would mold into 
shape” (438). With this illustration, Senghor was sharing his experience about how black 
societies were compared to children, and the deployment of an imagery of childhood to capture 
their lack of maturity. But just as the Négritude movement reappropriated the slur nègre in an 
attempt to express what Senghor regards as “the sum total of the values of civilization of the 
Black World,” it reappropriated the imagery of childhood as an advantage. Childhood might be a 
stage of immaturity, but it also bears the hope of maturation and betterment, as opposed to the 
stage of maturity, which is the last stage before decay. By appropriating the theme of childhood, 
African writers seem to send the cultural and even the political message that a cultural better is to 
come. Culture indeed is crucial for African writers. For Senghor, in particular, culture comes 
first, for it is the “spirit of civilization” (“Spirit of Civilization” 52); it is inside and outside, 
above and beneath all human activities (Mutiso and Rohio 594). The struggle unleashed by the 
Négritude writers was thus primarily aimed at coming to terms with the cultural assimilation 
ideology that fuels the French colonial project of mission civilisatrice. Négritude writers of the 
time therefore unquestionably embraced the theme of childhood as a metaphor. This is a strong 
metaphor indeed, for not only does childhood evoke the culture which it aims to perpetuate, but 
it is also the mise en abime of an African literature in its beginnings,3 yet yearning to speak the 
truth. To offer an analogy with regards to the use of childhood imagery in literature, expert on 
British Romanticism Alan Richardson once argued that “[i]f the colonization of childhood in the 
late eighteenth century helps account for [William] Blake’s treatment of slavery in a children’s 
literary form [in reference to the poem “Little Black Boy”], the infantilization of the colonial 
subject helps elucidate the terms in which Blake poses his dual critique of children’s and colonial 
                                               
3The beginning of African literature as invoked here must be understood in reference to the literary works written in 
French, of which Force-Bonté (1926) by Bakary Diallo symbolizes the kick-off.   
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discourse” (237). While Blake’s thoughts on these important questions are certainly of great 
interest, my focus goes instead to Richardson’s observation, which has similarity with my 
present analysis. Indeed, Richardson underscores the conjoined effect of the two topics 
(childhood and slavery) to produce a distinct third theme that spells out a poignant social 
critique. It can similarly be alleged that the thematic of childhood in African literature first 
projected the signal that, even in its infancy, this literature could truthfully speak against the 
cultural contempt of colonialism. In the discourse of Négritude on culture and identity, writers 
thus used the theme of childhood to promote a different understanding of their indigenous black 
societies.  
Négritude writers were pioneers in using the theme of childhood to reflect on the 
challenges of affirming a different cultural identity in the face of a European modernity that 
sought to impose itself as the universal ideal. Aimé Césaire’s seminal long poem Cahier d’un 
retour au pays natal (1939) includes passages reflecting on childhood that are filled with 
political symbolism, notably the poignant tableau of the mute négrillon’s inability to answer at 
school. In Francophone West Africa, evocations of childhood were first seen in Léopold Sédar 
Senghor’s Chant d’ombre (1945). Many of his poems, including “Joal,” “Nuit de Sine,” and 
“Que m’accompagnent kôras et balafongs,” reflect the poet’s mythical Kingdom of Childhood. 
This kingdom is not only evocative of a memory of fulfilled childhood in a glorified society 
strongly rooted in traditions and history; it is also a longing and a grievance in the face of the 
cultural encroachment begotten by the process of colonization. Evidently, this childhood 
memory was also located in a vision of a disrupted, culturally divided African society in African 
literary works: A decade prior to Senghor’s poems, Ousmane Socé Diop had depicted, through 
Karim, roman sénégalais (1935), an African society entangled between colonial and traditional 
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heritages. Senghor’s use of childhood memory, however, made that same point more compelling, 
proving childhood to be a suitable framework for discussing the deepening African cultural 
dilemma.4 This explains why, beginning in the 1950s, novelists increasingly used this thematic, 
comparing traditional and modern African societies, thus sowing the seed of what I characterize 
as distinct historical waves of childhood narratives in African literature. In fact, the chronicling 
of African postcolonial society through the thematic of childhood has known three such waves, 
which are examined below. Each wave in this account of childhood not only describes a 
particular state of the social position of children, but also conveys a mise en abime of social and 
literary transformations in Africa and how they are reflected in different political and cultural 
discourses.  
In the following section, I examine primarily fifteen novels: L’enfant noir, Climbié, 
L’aventure ambiguë, Maimouna, Sous l’orage, Les danseuses d’Impé-Eya, De Tilene au Plateau, 
Une si longue lettre, Le baobab fou, Une vie hypothéquée, Rebelle, L’ainé des orphelins, Le 
ventre de l’Atlantique, Allah n’est pas obligé, and La petite fille des eaux. These novels represent 
the three waves of childhood narratives from 1950 to 2000. By waves, I mean the main 
developments that occurred in the West African Francophone childhood narratives, 
developments that are distinguishable by period, ideology, and style.  
The first wave began with the pioneering novel of Camara Laye, L’enfant noir (1953). It 
was soon emulated by many others, including Bernard Dadié’s Climbié (1956) and Cheikh 
                                               
4African scholars have also documented the literature on childhood’s aptitude to discuss identity and cultural issues. 
Madelaine Hron, studying the Nigerian context, contends that “the figure of youth is a particularly apt vehicle for 
the third-generation of Nigerian authors, themselves children of ‘the children of the postcolony’ (Waberi 8) to 
convey their perspective on Nigerian culture, in the context of multiculturalism, globalization, and even international 
human rights, to Western readers” (28). 
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Hamidou Kane’s L’aventure ambiguë (1961).5 These works dealing with childhood in the 
colonial French West Africa of the 1920s to 1940s were typically autobiographical novels6 and 
traced a tableau of the shift from the exaltation of the indigenous ancestral societies to the 
criticism of colonial encroachment. The three novels examined here synchronize the gradual 
movement from a romanticized traditional African boyhood (L’enfant noir) to a criticism of the 
colonial school (Climbié) to the questioning of Western rational thought in leading humanity’s 
future altogether (L’aventure ambiguë). It was a time when discordant voices such as the work of 
fiction of David Ananou, L’enfant du fétiche (1955), represented the exception to the pattern, 
which was not exactly the use of autobiography as a genre, but a certain discourse on African 
traditional values. Ananou’s work, on the other hand, painted an African world under the 
nefarious influence of fetishism and charlatans through the life of a young boy, but this work of 
fiction was also an apology of the Gospel and of the mission civilisatrice. In its introduction, the 
author expresses his gratefulness to the “civilizing powers” that had brought enlightenment to the 
“dark continent.” As a result, this novel fared less well than most childhood narratives of the first 
wave. 
Other notable first-wave novels, such as Abdoulaye Sadji’s Maimouna (1953) and 
Seydou Badian’s Sous l’orage (1954), display a variation in the pattern initiated by L’enfant 
noir. Indeed, they are not autobiographical and do not treat boyhood. Instead, they deal with 
girlhood and the contrast between the traditional, viewed as African, with the modern, viewed as 
                                               
5Both novels were written earlier than their publication dates.  According to Frederick Lemaire (2008), Climbié was 
completed on April 18, 1953, and according to Dorothy Blair, L’aventure ambigüe was completed ten years before 
its publication in 1961.  
6Recent studies oppose Lilian Kesteloot’s claim on the primacy of poetry in the birth of Francophone African 
literature. While Guy Ossito Midiohouan postulates that “novelistic prose” came first, Edgar Sankara finds it more 
accurate to assert that autobiography was at the birth of this literary tradition, citing Force-Bonté, Bakary Diallo’s 
pioneering autobiographical novel (1926). For more details, see Sankara. 
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European. They oppose the African village, repository of traditions, to the city, realm of the 
modern. While keeping with the undercurrent noticeable in most works of first-wave novels—
that childhood ought to embody the colonial subject’s struggle to heed both the African and the 
colonial heritage—Badian and Sadji, however, hint at possible criticism of traditional society. 
Their perspective seems like the opening call for the second wave.  
Narratives published in the 1970s and prior to the end of the Cold War began with 
autofictions, and gradually moved towards fiction as they become more and more openly critical 
of patriarchal African customs. Autobiographies such as Nafissatou Diallo’s De Tilène au 
Plateau, une enfance dakaroise (1975) and Simone Kaya’s Les danseuses d’Impé-Eya (1976) 
initiated this second wave. Diallo’s and Kaya’s works were answers to the missing perspective 
on girls and an update by women writers to the first wave childhood narratives. These two 
novels’ connection to the first-wave childhood narratives nonetheless appears evident, not only 
in the use of the autobiographical genre, but also in their setting in the time period from the 
1940s to 1960s. Although the female child voice was already rendered by Badian and Sadji, 
Kaya’s and Diallo’s works update the first-wave childhood narratives in two ways. On the one 
hand, African traditional girlhood in this colonial context was shown as exceptionally thrilling. 
On the other hand, it was thrilling for a completely opposite reason than that of boyhood. Unlike 
the reminiscence of happy boyhood in a shifting traditional dreamland unfolding in their male 
counterparts’ novels, the women writers introduce a joyful girlhood in the face of crumbling 
traditional values. This female voice, however, is hardly categorical in its criticism of traditional 
society. The female child’s most critical voice will appear around the 1980s with well-known 
works of fiction such as Mariama Bâ’s Une si longue lettre (1979) or Ken Bugul’s Le Baobab 
fou (1983). This criticism was also present in less-known works, including in Anne-Marie 
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Addiafi’s Une vie hypothéquée (1983). The shift in discourse apparent in these works is not only 
an awakening to gender imbalance and a call into question of the paternalistic traditional order. It 
is also an assertion of a youth’s fascination for the “modern” and trendy Euro-American culture. 
As the denouement of these narratives suggest, however, the accession to the European lifestyle 
does not always warrant happiness and success. This failure is indicative of a postmodern 
discourse on the drawbacks of modernity, of an argument that Western culture has led humanity 
to a dead-end. 
Works published after the end of Cold War and after, such as Fatou Keita’s Rebelle 
(1998), Tierno Monémembo’s L’aîné des orphelins (2000), and Ahmadou Kourouma’s Allah 
n’est pas obligé (2001) are representative of the third wave. These works reflect a clear state of 
revolt by members of a generation trapped between their status as both local and global children. 
The search for an equilibrium for the child protagonist in these narratives is constantly deceived, 
whether the choice is made between tradition and modernity. This scenario is also confirmed in 
other works that posit the place of the child in society as a challenge, such as Fatou Diome’s Le 
ventre de l’Atlantique (2003) and the collective novel directed by Florent Couao-Zotti, La petite 
fille des eaux (2006). The disenchantment in the search for an equilibrium in these novels 
resonates not only with the identity quest of the postcolonial subject in general, but also with the 
changing African child’s identity in particular. 
Of course, the selection of fifteen novels presented above is not exhaustive; these novels 
are simply a sample of the abundant literature about childhood in Africa. This selection can 
hardly exhaust the varieties of issues discussed in relation to children and youth in the African 
context. The merit of this selection resides, however, in its consideration of variety in cultures, 
religions and class within the Francophone West African region.      
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2. Changing Childhood in Francophone	West	African Literature from 1950 to 2000 
The changing roles and place of children and the perception of childhood in African 
societies is synonymous with the wider problems of the postcolonial African context. The 
identity quest is undoubtedly one of the most crucial such issues. In Francophone Africa, 
indigenous social models were targeted by the “assimilation” policy between the two world wars. 
The social structure and institutions which possessed the coded prescriptions for the interactions 
and development of people within these societies was tremendously transformed. Thus, the 
traditional sociocultural foundations on which African children’s role and place and the 
understanding of childhood were predicated was heavily shaken. This social model is apparent in 
the folk narratives examined in the preceding chapter. For example, traditional education, also 
called socialization, is generated in this context, through the participation of the child within the 
community. According to Onwauchi, this “direct participations in the general processes of life 
constitute the pedagogical tools in the indigenous African societies” (242). Folk narratives in 
which children are subjected to tests reflect this apprenticeship of the hard reality of life. 
Childhood narratives in the first wave borrow from these traditional frameworks in trying to 
depict an authentic and idyllic precolonial culture.  
 
A. The First-Wave Childhood Narrative or “The Return to The Sources” 
The chosen first-wave novels offer glimpses into this traditional socialization process of 
children across two West African major cultures: the Mandé and the Akan. These narratives also 
set the background and the outlook from which childhood narratives were to evolve in African 
literature since colonization. These narratives read as autoethnography, an ethnography of 
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oneself, which according to Julia Watson “is a hybrid autobiography” deployed by postcolonial 
writers to renegotiate their own subject position in writing (35). A key characteristic of 
postcolonial autoethnography, as another critic, Marie Louise Pratt, notes, is to engage with the 
colonizer’s own terms in representing oneself (7). In this sense, these childhood narratives send a 
message at once to two audiences with diverging views, the writers’ own social group and the 
metropolitan European reader. The postcolonial autoethnographer’s narrative therefore engages 
dialogically the worldviews of the two audiences involved in ways that produce a negotiated 
message. While these writers adopt the French language with its concepts, they also appear to 
bend them to fit the local context they depict. Hence, the first-wave male writers foreground the 
clash of culture within the colonial school (l’école des blancs), to serve as catalyst in the 
transition from the traditional world of the African village to the city influenced by European 
values, and ultimately to Paris.  
However, these narratives are admittedly not mere ethnographic data. The novels present 
instances where pseudo-facts shift into the realm of the imaginary, such as when Camara Laye’s 
parents are presented as performing some magic because animals appear to conform to what they 
said. Nonetheless, a merit of this inquiry is also to show that these narratives offer a 
representative snapshot of colonial as well as of the traditional African societies through 
insightful images of sociocultural realities. The sociocultural context of childhood socialization 
is one such area. 
L’enfant noir, for instance, unfolds in French colonial Guinea. At the beginning of the 
narrative, Camara Laye, the author and the protagonist, is a five- or six-year old boy growing up 
enthralled by his family’s Malinké7 tradition (a Mandé subgroup). In a world of magic, the 
                                               
7 The Malinké are one of the largest ethnic groups in West Africa, found in Guinea, and also in other countries such 
as Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Sénégal, and Sierra-Leone. 
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visible and the invisible coexist harmoniously. Camara Laye grows up learning the central place 
of the ancestors and other protective spirits, revered and called upon in all circumstance to bring 
assistance to the living. This social context does not differ much from the Akan8 society of 
French colonial Cote d’Ivoire from which hail Climbié and its author Bernard Dadié. In fact, 
veneration9 of the ancestors is characteristic of African animistic traditional religion (Oxford 
Encyclopedia of African Thought 72). Senegalese poet Birago Diop captures this African belief 
in his 1956 poem Souffles: “Those who are dead are never gone: they are in the thickening 
shadow / The dead are not under the earth: they are in the tree that rustles…” While in the case 
of L’enfant noir, animistic beliefs are syncretized with Islamic faith, it is in the Islamic society in 
which Samba Diallo, the fictive protagonist of Cheick Hamidou Kane’s L’aventure ambiguë, 
grows up that one can see the changes that have already been integrated into the traditional order. 
Indeed, as a little boy, Samba Diallo frequently finds refuge in the grave of Old Rella in times of 
troubles (40), introducing himself, for “he scarcely doubts that she hears him” (40), but his 
attitude seems to be a reminiscence of the ancestral tradition of believing in the afterlife which, 
in this case, was repressed by the Islamic faith. This reminiscence of a vanishing aspect of 
Samba Diallo’s traditions is evident in the passage where he finds himself united with the spirits 
of his ancestors during the Qur’an recitation in honor of his family (73).  
Despite the religious differences, the general outline of the socialization and education 
pattern are shared. Two of these patterns overlap and are particularly pervasive in the stories: 
within their respective families, the protagonists are expected to help according to their abilities 
and gender and to be exposed to the hard realities of life. The African family, as described by 
                                               
8	Akan people span from Ghana to Côte d’Ivoire to Togo.	
9 The ancestors are only venerated, not worshiped, the Supreme Being ranking first among all powers. 
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Mbiti (106), includes children, parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, brothers, and sisters who 
may have their own children and other immediate relatives. The initiation rites described in 
L’enfant noir are the most powerful symbol of the introduction to adult life; however, in the two 
other novels, such an initiation to the hard realities of adult life appears in one form or another in 
the protagonists’ lives. For instance, Climbié helps his uncle with each task in his plantation. He 
plays at imitating the old man, sometime hurting himself and crying, sometime enjoying the 
tasks. Dadié’s authorial voice adds that “[by] his uncle’s side, [Climbié] was learning a man’s 
work” (3). As for Samba Diallo, despite being a Diallobé prince, he is required to despise luxury 
and even beg to sustain himself. As Cheick Hamidou Kane’s authorial voice states: “car le 
disciple, tant qu’il cherche Dieu, ne saurait vivre que de mendicité, quelle que soit la richesse de 
ses parents” (“because the disciple, so long as he seeks God, can live only begging, [regardless 
of] the wealth of his parents”) (24).  
Initiation processes usually mold the physical, psychological, and spiritual self of the child 
through a strict discipline. In the case of Camara Laye, the konde diarra rite consisted in living 
in a bush camp, punctuated by the actual physical pain experienced through circumcision. The 
entire process is interspersed with various teachings in the bush camp, including learning to 
survive in nature—using plants for medicinal purposes, for instance. Adulthood is thus achieved 
through this traditional socialization system, but never attained by mere biological aging; thus, 
the African context complicates notions of childhood as they are typically received in the West. 
The sociocultural context discussed above sets the background in which the three novels 
provide glimpses into the very first imaginings of childhood by African writers. In the midst of a 
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still-dominant colonialist discourse,10 the adoption of the Bildungsroman form seems to bring 
these narratives under the purview of the decolonization discourse on African identity. These 
coming-of-age novels therefore appear to play a role in the emerging discourses opposing the 
stifling of indigenous cultures and calling for the return to the source, then viewed as a condition 
of “re-appropriation of values” (Césaire) or as a vindication of black civilizations.  
In these novels, among the many avenues that allow the cultural question to be raised, the 
school and the urban space appear prominently as the battleground against alienation. 
Conversely, traditions are often portrayed as sources of comfort and plenitude. Using this 
opposition, the first-wave childhood novels depict a dramatic image of colonial encroachment on 
the traditional lifestyle.  
L’enfant noir, Climbié, and L’aventure ambiguë, each in its own way, take the reader to the 
heart of one of the most severely affected traditional cultural institutions: the socialization or 
educational system. These three first-wave novels indeed draw a parallel between the ancestral 
educational system and the European schooling system. Indisputably, the novels’ protagonists’ 
preference goes to the ancestral ways. Even in the third novel, the Diallobé Arabic-influenced 
society of L’aventure ambiguë was considered traditional in the face of French colonial 
encroachment.  
In L’enfant noir, preference for the traditional order is particularly shown in the ways the 
indigenous socialization and educational model is associated with nostalgia, whereas the colonial 
school is associated with sorrow. Laye’s most thrilling formative memories are the time spent 
learning in the informal traditional system. He is thus excited to learn about the fundamentals of 
                                               
10 The publication dates of L’enfant noir and Climbié locate them easily in the colonial period. But several sources, 
including Blair (African Literature in French 261), concur that Kane wrote his novel in the 1950s, precisely ten 
years prior to its publication in 1961. 
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his family’s belief system. He learns about the black snake, guiding spirit of his father’s family, 
and of the crocodile, the protective spirit of his mother’s family. This religious belief exists in the 
Laye family’s Mande culture despite a monotheistic Islamic influence. Laye grows up learning 
the various processes by which his father runs his craft and how he turns gold into jewels. He 
shares his mother’s hut with his father’s apprentices, learns diner etiquettes, solidarity, justice, 
gratefulness, and respect for the elders. Although a town boy, Laye also learns the village life, 
goes hunting and works at the farm. The process culminates in the teaching of courage during the 
initiation rites and circumcision. As Camara Laye remembers fondly some details of this 
indigenous socialization experience (“Ah! Que nous étions heureux, ces jours-là!” [“Ah! How 
happy we were in those days!”] (67)), he also punctuates his reminiscences with a sadness 
caused by his relation to the colonial school. Although the author does not explicitly criticize this 
colonial institution, his evocation of school is associated with sorrow. When Laye receives his 
magistral lesson about the family totemic black snake from his father, the story ends when the 
father abruptly sighs: “J’ai peur, j’ai bien peur, petit, que tu ne me fréquente jamais assez. Tu vas 
à l’école et, un jour, tu quitteras cette école pour une plus grande. Tu me quitteras, petit” (“I’m 
afraid, really afraid little one, that you might not spend enough time with me. You go to school 
and one day you’ll leave this school for a bigger one. You’ll leave me, boy”) (20). Following this 
scene, Camara Laye describes his dismay in the next one-and-a-half pages. The evocation of the 
colonial school was such a negative image that he could not sleep. He was so concerned about 
being secluded from his home and roots that he sobbed as he tried to sleep, with the elusive 
image of his father in his mind (22). Later, at the farm, while his uncle reaped rice with the 
sickle, Laye wanted to imitate him. His uncle rejected his request: “Ce n’est pas ton travail de 
faucher. Je ne crois pas que ce soit jamais ton travail; plus tard” (“It’s not your job to mow, I do 
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not think it would ever be your job, later”) (60). L’enfant noir’s narrator complains about being 
dismissed in his attempt to become a member of his lineage and finds the experience puzzling:  
Ma vie n’était pas ici… et elle n’était pas à la forge paternelle. Mais où étais ma vie ? Et je 
tremblais devant cette vie inconnue… L’école, l’école…, est-ce que j’aime tant l’école? (61) 
My life was not here ... and it was not at my father’s forge. But where was my life? Then I shook 
at the idea of this unknown life... School, school ..., do I like school that much?” 
The representation of the colonial school in the African child’s life is powerfully used by the 
author. That is, the school’s relation to the African child is eponymous to French culture’s 
relation to Africa’s future. The school in particular was an integral part of the assimilation 
policy. Africans would be treated as equals to French citizens provided that they were educated 
in the French language and values. But the path toward school thwarts indigenous life. In the 
case of Camara Laye, it leads him away from home and from his ancestral way of life. Camara 
Laye’s subtle description of this experience sparked all kinds of criticisms, especially from his 
fellow African novelists. At a time when most African writers viewed their works as an anti-
colonial weapon, Camara Laye’s failure to insist on colonial injustice was read as a loyalty to the 
French colonizer.11 
                                               
11Mongo Beti, in a 1954 Presence Africaine article, under his real initials A. B (for Alexandre Biyidi), harshly 
criticized Camara Laye for publishing a childhood narrative in which he was deliberately uncritical of French 
colonialism. Recently, critics have revisited Beti’s own work and criticized his Les Deux mères de Guillaume 
Dzewatama as failing to distance itself from L’enfant noir. E. P. Abanime, for instance, criticizes Beti (who after all 
lived longer in France than in his native Cameroon) in Childhood in African Literature: A Literary Perspective 
(1998) for giving prominence to white motherhood over black motherhood and to prefering the mulatto baby over 
the black boy. Abanime sees this treatment as a betrayal of the novelist’s stark stance against the colonizer and his 
new intent to butter up “the white race with a view to making money from a large audience.” (89). Ultimately 
Abanime ended his analysis with a more conciliatory tone, acknowledging that the treatment of the theme of 
childhood by both Camara Laye and Mongo Beti is “written in advocacy of the brotherhood of man,” (89) in 
particular because Beti has turned to the union of the black and white race through the mulatto. Other works, 
including Adele King’s Rereading Camara Laye (2002) would go as far as presenting the novel as written by white 
men, and only published under Camara Laye’s name, in a conspiracy to bolster the colonizer’s image in Africa. This 
theory has since been rejected (see Irele Abiola’s “In Search of Camara Laye”).	
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While Camara Laye’s depiction of the colonial school’s encroachment on the traditional 
education in L’enfant noir is subtle, Bernard Dadié, in Climbié, offers a blunter depiction of this 
alienating phenomenon. In the famous passage now known as the episode of the “symbol,” 
Climbié, the protagonist, is forced to carry a ridiculous wooden cube given as punishment to any 
pupil who speaks his or her native language in the school space. This use of an instrument of 
shame has been devised by the white principal of the Grand Bassam’s colonial school to divide 
African schoolchildren as they speak their native languages. A punished student cannot get rid of 
the “symbol” until he or she catches another student speaking in local languages. Dadié describes 
Climbié’s traumatic state as a result of the stigma caused by the mockery of a horde of 
schoolmates, who themselves have often been victims of the same punishment:   
It was at the end of the morning lessons. Outside the school premises each one could speak his own 
dialect. But Climbié had to carry the symbol, because he had spoken N’zima inside the school 
building… Climbié went home alone, abandoned by his own friends, who were scared off by the 
presence of the symbol in his pocket, among the marbles and tops. Climbié could not eat his lunch, he 
was in a hurry to get rid of the little cube. If he didn’t manage to before the end of the school day, he 
would have to stay behind to clean the yard and sweep all the classrooms all by himself, with the 
symbol still weighting down his pocket. (106-107) 
Climbié’s inability to eat and his urge to get rid of the “symbol” are not due to the material 
weight of the wooden cube. The weight alluded to in this passage represents the burden that the 
alien object causes to his psychological well-being. The “symbol” is a metonymy for the French 
language. Just like this object imposed on him, the French language is not only a burden, but also 
an object of division for African children who denounce or calumniate each other to pass on the 
punishment to one another. Climbié’s unpleasant experiences with the colonial school are 
numerous. The novel opens on a scene where the hero is being chased down at the request of the 
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school headmaster for having written with charcoal on the school wall. On the run, Climbié 
wonders: “if you cannot write on the wall of a school, then what walls can you write on? Really 
now, grown-ups, usually so thoughtful, are no longer so when they have to deal with youngsters” 
(2). As Climbié keeps running to avoid being beaten to a pulp, it is not surprising that he finds 
solace in a figure of tradition: an old man walking in the street. He heads straight for him, grabs 
him with both arms, and asks for protection. This recourse to seniors—the very symbols of 
tradition—is also seen in L’enfant noir with Camara Laye going to his grandmother in times of 
trouble. Just as in his Mandé society, where the elderly are revered, in Climbié’s Akan culture, 
one does not offend an elderly person. As a little boy, the protagonist learns these rules, growing 
up in the compound of his uncle Ndabian. Unlike Camara Laye’s Mande patrilinear culture, 
however, the Akan are matrilinear and children are sent to their mother’s brothers for education. 
It is by helping his uncle on the farm, and emulating him, that Climbié eventually learns to 
become adult. Uncle Ndabian also tells stories to the boy, who enjoys these times over those 
spent at the colonial school.12  When Uncle Ndabian dies, Climbié’s informal education is 
bestowed upon his uncle Assouan Koffi. The core of his education nevertheless does not change. 
Uncle Assouan Koffi’s advice to Climbié translates the rigid regimen to which he submits the 
boy: “You are still young…I will say all this many times, so that you won’t forget it. The work! 
And after the work, independence, my child!... That should be the motto of your generation. And 
you must always shun the man who does not like to work” (69). Work, rigor, and harshness are 
components of the described traditional education, and this aspect is highlighted both in L’enfant 
noir and in Climbié, but it is also conspicuous in L’aventure ambiguë. 
                                               
12	Climbié remembers this time as being so memorable that he wants “to run down a path once more, to leap over 
the savanna, bursting with laughter, tumbling against the others, to play even more energetically” (34).	
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Cheikh Hamidou Kane, like the two previous authors, discusses the colonial school’s 
encroachment on the traditional school. The story begins when Diallo is a boy and a student at a 
Koranic school. Although Thierno, his devout teacher, admires him, he does not refrain from 
treating him quite roughly. The novel begins on a scene when the master severely punishes 
Samba Diallo for having incorrectly recited a verse of the Qur’an. The rigorous and austere 
discipline not only consists in reciting the Qur’an with accuracy, but also includes despising 
luxury and even begging to sustain oneself. L’aventure ambiguë, however, takes the debate of 
the colonial school’s impingement on the traditional school to a philosophical level by 
immersing the reader into the complex dilemma of Senegalese aristocrats of the leading Diallobé 
family, who must decide between their traditional education rooted in Islamic faith and the 
European education rooted in materialism. The dilemma facing them is whether or not to send 
their children to the colonizers’ schools. Samba Diallo’s aunt, La Grande Royale, a sort of family 
matriarch and a moderate conservative, urges the elite to send their children to the colonial 
school:  
L’école étrangère est la forme nouvelle de la guerre que nous font ceux qui nous sont venus, it il 
faut y envoyer notre élite, en attendant d’y pousser tout le monde… S’il y a un risque, elle est la 
mieux préparée pour la conjurer, parce que la plus fermement attachée à ce qu’elle est. (47) 
The foreign school is the new form of war which those who have come here are waging, and we 
must send our elite there, before pushing all the country to follow them.... If there is a risk, they 
are best prepared to ward it off, because they are most firmly attached to what they are. (My 
translation)  
This episode in which the Diallobé decide to send their children to school describes the context 
of the colonial school’s triumph over the local school, at least in the Diallobé society. But the 
terms of the acceptance of this school, and thus of European culture, adhere to a survival strategy 
rather than to mere acquiescence to the mission civilisatrice intended by the colonizer. As La 
Grande Royale puts it, there is a risk that children sent to the colonial school might undergo 
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transformation. “Quand ils nous reviendront de l’école, il en est qui ne nous reconnaitront pas” 
(“When they return from the school, there will be some who will not recognize us” (my 
translation) (57). Yet, still she persists, “Ce que je propose c’est que nous acceptions de mourir 
en nos enfants et que les étrangers qui nous ont défaits prennent en eux toute la place que nous 
aurons laisse libre” (“What I am proposing is that we should agree to die in our children’s hearts 
and that the foreigners who have defeated us, fill wholly the place, which we should have left 
free”) (my translation) (57). In making this last statement, La Grande Royale is addressing the 
worst scenario, since for her the Diallobé are prepared to cope successfully because they are 
firmly attached to what they are. Throughout Francophone Africa, it was this survival strategy of 
learning from the colonizer to add to one’s intrinsic values that drove African children such as 
Camara Laye, Climbié and Samba Diallo to the colonial school. However, as this process went 
on, the transformation alluded to by La Grande Royale became reality, for some, in the sense of a 
total rejection of the ancestors, and for others in a sense of hybridization. Samba Diallo belonged 
to the second category. Later in Paris, he observes: 
Tout au long de notre cheminement, nous n’avons pas cessé de nous métamorphoser…nous voilà 
devenus autres. Quelquefois, la métamorphose ne s’achève pas, elle nous installe dans l’hybride 
et nous y laisse. (125) 
All along our road, we have not ceased to metamorphose ourselves. And now we have become 
other. Sometimes, the metamorphosis is not completed, it installs us in hybridity and leaves us 
there. (My translation)  
This metamorphosis does not mean that he has become one of those who don’t recognize their 
elders and their heritage after learning from the French; instead, he finds himself torn between 
the two. For Samba Diallo, both his Diallobé background and his Western exposure have shaped 
his being. Speaking of which part of him belongs to Europe and which part remains to his native 
Diallobé country, Samba Diallo is unable to choose: “Je suis devenu les deux” (“I have become 
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both”) (my translation) (165). In L’enfant noir, the bewilderment is shown in the protagonist’s 
desire to go to Paris and his anguish at leaving his family and traditions behind. Dadié’s novel’s 
eponymous protagonist is also seen to have undergone the same phenomenon: “Every day, 
slowly but surely, Climbié forgot his origins” (11). The transformation has reached a critical 
level in today’s African countries where Western-style education is reduced simply to creating a 
pathway to future employment. The transmission of African cultures, which was foundational to 
the traditional socialization system, has critically faded away.  
A dynamic of shifting from African traditions towards the Western is present in the three 
childhood novels. In fact, while in L’enfant noir Camara Laye grips what was viewed as a 
passing ancestral tradition, in Climbié, the eponymous hero, after the aversion towards the 
colonial school in his early years, ends up becoming more curious about the new culture, 
especially during his sojourn in Dakar, as a colonial employee. The dynamic of change is 
confirmed in L’aventure ambiguë, where the choice of the European culture is clearly made and 
explained by La Grande Royale. This dynamic of change will become more apparent in later 
works. 
The reality of the change solemnly proclaimed by La Grande Royale would become more 
pervasive in the works of fiction written and published after the 1950s.13 Unlike the works 
examined earlier, childhood in these fictions concerns girlhood. Abdoulaye Sadji was the first to 
introduce the girl character in the West African Francophone novel. In Maimouna: Petite fille 
noire (1953), Sadji skillfully portrays the little girl Maimouna as she grows up in her traditional 
environment, the African village Louga. Her widowed mother Yaye Daro incarnates the 
traditional values that she tries to inculcate to her daughter. These values—which, as in all the 
                                               
13The earlier works such as L’enfant noir, Climbié, and L’aventure ambigüe belong to the period before the 1950s. 
Kane wrote his novel ten years prior to its publication in 1961.  
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previous works, romanticize African traditions—appear as a haven of concord, protective of the 
individual and guarantor of the social order. Thus, the dutiful girl lives happily until she becomes 
aware of the luxurious city life of her sister. Then she turns into a rebellious teenager seeking to 
join her sister in Dakar and take advantage of the modern European lifestyle. Maimouna’s 
journey from the village to the city is an opportunity for Sadji to contrast the two worlds. As 
opposed to the love, warmth, and protection in the village, in Dakar she experiences 
individualism and opportunism. Sadji opposes the inconsistent universe in Dakar of these 
Africans, called évolués by the colonizer, to the natural and virtuous world of the village. 
Dreaming only of assimilation, the évolués isolate themselves from their compatriots in the 
suburbs and the bushes whom they see as uneducated. However, their life is strewn with traps, 
deceptions, and illusions. Maimouna’s innocence falls victim to this perverted world. Dishonored 
by her pregnancy outside of wedlock, she returns to her village and bears a child who dies. 
However, Maimouna retrieves her life as she reconciles with her traditional roots. From her 
fleeing modern life to return to the village, along with her inability to convert her pregnancy 
contracted in the city into a child who symbolizes the future generation, Maimouna’s trajectory 
conveys the sense of a difficult transition awaiting Africans in their identity quest. Despite the 
clear attractiveness of the European culture to younger generations, Maimouna’s disillusionment 
and her later reconciliation with her roots seem to suggest the return to the source as the ultimate 
solution to African cultural alienation. This reading is even more plausible given the fact that the 
author, Abdoulaye Sadji, is one of the pioneering practitioners of the values associated with 
Négritude. In the midst of imperial domination and negation of African civilization, Sadji and his 
fellow writers were inclined to seek a reconnection with the point at which colonial domination 
 146 
ruptured the historical development of the African civilizations.14 Maimouna’s return to the 
source is thus Sadji’s criticism of the attractiveness of the European culture which causes a 
division among Africans. A class of African elites has emerged in the cities, fond of the culture 
imposed by the domination of foreign powers. In addition, a conflict of generations has emerged 
between the younger generations and the elders. This latter issue is further developed in another 
novel, Seydou Badian’s Sous l’orage (1954).  
Badian tells the story of an African urban family under colonial rule. The father and the 
eldest son revere the ancestral customs. The younger children, including Kany, the daughter, are 
strongly attracted to the European ways and ideas. The conflict is inevitable when the father tries 
to marry Kany to the old Famagan, a rich trader already married to two wives. Kany is already in 
love with her classmate Samou, known for his western lifestyle. This tension, which explains the 
title of the novel Sous l’orage, literally “beneath the storm,” will be resolved in a way that 
translates Badian’s forecast of the challenge to the African child’s identity quest. In fact, the 
author suggests that for the storm to dissipate, African children must acknowledge their cultural 
heritage and reconcile it with their westernization ambitions. Hence, the solution will come from 
the younger children’s sojourn in the village to learn their cultural traditions. Once aware of the 
traditional protocol, they will use it efficiently. By asking their father’s eldest brother to 
                                               
14The need to articulate this connection evolved, however, in two steps, corresponding to the two phases that would 
define the struggles of Négritude. These phases will be discussed thoroughly in the next section. As a theory, the 
return to the sources is undertaken by the colonized intellectual as a means of retrieving his/her cultural identity. As 
Barthelemy Kotchi suggests, this quest of identity by the African writers of the Négritude movement is driven by the 
sentiments of alienation and uprootedness that an adopted child living in the midst of legitimate children would feel. 
Later, in the 1970s, with Amilcar Cabral, the return to the source would be translated more pragmatically into 
cultural resistance and a process to reconquer a right to a place in history. As a provocative cultural theorist, 
Cabral’s theoretical works, among others National Liberation and Culture and Return to the Source, continue to 




intervene, the children have in fact made allegiance to the traditional order. As a result, it is the 
traditional order that obtains from the father the revision of his decision. This is not to say that 
the ancient order remains unshaken. From the confrontation of the two opposing camps, it 
appears that the traditional world requires cultural revision. The older generation becomes more 
aware of the changing times. One member of the old generation will tell the father: “Benfa, 
vouloir agir comme nous le faisions naguère, comme le faisaient nos pères, c’est montrer que tu 
ne vois pas tout le changement qu’il y a” (“Benfa, wanting to act as we used to do, as our fathers 
did, is to show that you do not see all the changes taking place”) (my translation) (180). 
Likewise, Badian shows that young people are also aware of the deeper issues at stake. Samou, 
the icon of cultural change, expresses this perplexity lucidly:  
Notre drame, c’est d’avoir été l’enjeu d’une bataille… On nous a éblouis et nous n’avons pas pu 
résister. Les Européens ont tout brisé en nous; oui toutes les valeurs qui auraient pu faire de nous 
les continuateurs de nos pères et les pionniers d’une Afrique qui sans se renier, s’assimilerait 
l’enseignement européen. L’école, avouons-le, nous a orientés vers le monde européen. Le 
résultat a été que nous avons voulu transporter l’Europe dans nos villages, dans nos familles. On 
ne nous a rien dit sur notre monde, sinon qu’il est arriéré. (156) 
Our tragedy is to have been the stake of a battle… We have been dazzled and we have not been 
able to resist. The Europeans broke everything in us; yes, all the values that could have made us 
the continuators of our fathers and the pioneers of an Africa which, without denying itself, would 
assimilate European education. The school, let’s face it, has directed us towards the European 
world. The result was that we wanted to transport Europe to our villages, to our families. We 
have not been told anything about our world except that it is backward. (My translation) 
Although both generations involved identify the issues at stake, Badian does not draw a 
definitive conclusion. Instead, he suggests that the traditional African society is a necessary 
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constituent of the resolution of the very problem it has produced. Sadji and Badian’s fiction 
indicates that in the debates about changes taking place prior to the independences, women and 
girls did not remain silent and inactive. However, the issue of gender inequality under African 
traditions was not seriously raised and would remain unraised until women writers emerged in 
the 1970s. 
 
B. The Second-Wave Childhood Narrative or “The Time of Questioning” 
In the 1970s, most African nations had been independent for a decade. Liberal ideas, especially 
the desire for free elections and individual freedom, were in the air. The United Nations 
proclaimed 1975 as the International Year of Women. That same year, Nafissatou Diallo 
published De Tilène au Plateau, une enfance dakaroise, and a year later, at the start of the United 
Nation Decade for Women, in 1976, Simone Kaya published Les danseuses d’Impé-Eya. These 
two autofictions are representative of the second wave of childhood novels, whose focus is 
African girlhood. The African girl’s voice was present in the first-wave childhood narratives 
through Maimouna and Sous l’orage. These female children’s voices, however, were fictions by 
male writers. Diallo’s and Kaya’s autofiction thus seems to represent an update to the first-wave 
narratives, which depicted mostly a happy boyhood in L’enfant noir, Climbié, and L’aventure 
ambiguë, as opposed to the less romanticized girlhood in Maimouna and Sous l’orage. In De 
Tilène au Plateau, as in Les danseuses d’Impé-Eya, the authors revisit their own girlhoods, 
bringing forward the missing testimony of the female voice by women. This is a testimony of 
happy girlhood. 
Nafissatou Diallo was born in 1941. She recounts her coming of age and mentions dates 
such as 1952, when her father accomplished his pilgrimage to Mecca, to locate her story in pre-
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independence Africa. The story ends when her father dies in 1967, after Senegal’s independence. 
In Simone Kaya’s Les danseuses d’Impé-Eya, events such as the abolition of forced labor15 by 
the French in Africa locate the story in the 1940s. The return of the Ivorian leader Houphouet-
Boigny to run the country took place in the last years of the 1950s. These events show that the 
women writers’ stories come in the years directly following the time frame described in their 
male counterparts’ first-wave stories. These first-wave narratives (L’enfant noir, Climbié, and 
L’aventure ambiguë) take place within the two preceding decades, from the 1920s to the 1940s. 
Camara Laye’s novel recounts his life from when he was five or six years old to the very day he 
boarded the plane for France, when he was in his twenties. Camara Laye was born on January 1, 
1928 in Kouroussa (Upper Guinea). Bernard Dadié was born earlier, on January 10, 1916. The 
fictional character whose life coincides with the author’s goes to school in Grand Bassam when 
he is seven, then leaves for the Ecole William Ponty of Dakar. After graduating from this 
colonial school, he also works for ten years in Dakar. When, in real life, Dadié returned from 
Dakar to Cote d’Ivoire and was jailed in 1949, he was in his thirties. A similar scenario avails 
with Cheikh Hamidou Kane’s fictional Samba Diallo. Kane was born in 1928. The fictional 
character Samba Diallo goes to Koranic school at age six, then begins European colonial school 
at age seven, before leaving for France. Samba Diallo was an adult when he returned to and died 
in the country of the Diallobé. In real life, Kane went to Koranic school, then to the colonial 
school before leaving Senegal for Paris to study law and philosophy at the Sorbonne. Kane did 
not return to his homeland until 1959, but the story of Samba Diallo’s childhood does not seem 
to exceed a timeframe beyond the 1940s. This brief roundup shows that the timeframe for these 
novels can fairly be set between the 1920s and 1940s. 
                                               
15Forced labor was abolished by the French parliament following the promulgation of the Houphouët-Boigny law on 
11 April 1946. 
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De Tilène au Plateau and Les danseuses d’Impé-Eya therefore come as an update to the 
earlier boyhood narratives in two ways. On the one hand, they continue the tradition of 
childhood narrative through autoethnography, and on the other hand, they break from the 
boyhood narrative by introducing a happy girlhood narrative that also initiates criticism of the 
patriarchal traditional society. Unlike the first-wave narratives, the second-wave women writers 
such as Nafissatou Diallo and Simone Kaya depicted the traditional world from which African 
girls were beginning to escape, at a time when feminism was starting to take hold in 
Francophone African literature.16 Happiness therefore appears as a central point in these girlhood 
narratives. In De Tilène au Plateau, Nafissatou Diallo’s story is set in colonial Dakar, where her 
fictional child self, named Safi, grows up in a bourgeois family with a literate father working for 
the administration. Like most African families, aunts, uncles, cousins, sisters and brothers live in 
the house. But Safi puts the accent on her life as a child and the social practices that keep girls on 
the margins of this society. While the fates of other girls she describes are gloomy, Safi finds her 
own girlhood particularly enjoyable: 
La jeunesse ne manquait pas de distractions. Une rivalité traditionnelle animait les équipes de 
football Réveil, Saint Louisienne et Espoir. Cette rivalité était à l’origine de bals, de tam-tams et 
de concours à qui désignerait la reine la plus gracieuse. Je me plaisais dans ce milieu où ma 
personnalité commença à s’épanouir. J’avais réussi à me parfaire en danse moderne et comptais 
bien surprendre mes cousins dakarois. (79) 
Young people did not lack distractions. A traditional rivalry opposed the football teams Réveil, 
Saint Louisienne and Espoir. This rivalry was at the origin of balls, tam-tams and contests to 
                                               
16Aoua Kéita published her autobiography, Femme d’Afrique, La vie d’Aoua Kéita racontée par elle-même in 1975, 
and Awa Thiam published La parole aux négresses in 1978. Since then, women have been engaged in the process of 
writing both autobiographical works and novels to challenge aspects of their society that contribute to oppressing 
them and, by doing so, placing the traditional patriarchal power structure under scrutiny. 
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designate the most graceful queen. I enjoyed myself in this environment where my personality 
began to flourish. I managed to perfect myself in modern dance and counted on surprising my 
male cousins in Dakar. (My translation) 
The girl child protagonist’s fondness for football teams, beauty contests, and modern dance 
attests to her ability to enjoy a type of freedom to which young women were not usually entitled 
in the traditional paternalistic society that confined them to the kitchen. Islam spread throughout 
Western Africa due to the expansive trade routes in the ninth century AD. A great majority of 
Senegalese society was Islamized but were not required to assimilate into Arabic culture. Islam 
and local cultures therefore mixed (Sow 70), and this in turn shaped ideas about gender roles, 
marriage, and a male-dominated patrilineal society. Nafissatou Diallo’s account of girlhood is 
about the disruption of that society with the assault of French colonization, which turns out to be 
an opportunity for her to go beyond what is permitted to girls. She acknowledges the difficulties 
that other girls are still facing at the same time. For instance, her cousin Ami is given away in 
marriage. Ami rejoices nonetheless, even though the marriage is arranged, because it is her only 
way of winning some level of freedom. In Safi’s large bourgeois family, all the domestic work of 
the house has rested on the shoulders of Ami, who is charged with doing laundry and the kitchen 
work morning to night, with the help of a servant. Marriage is therefore an escape from this 
miserable life (69). Ami’s condition is what the folk narratives examined in the preceding 
chapter typify as the “disadvantaged child,” for her biological parents are not alive. Unlike Ami, 
Safi is allowed reluctantly by her father to go to school (26), and she begins to like modern 
European dresses and lifestyles. She envies people dressed in European style (“j’admirais les 
personnes habillées à l’européenne” [35]) and is desperate over never getting the chance to dress 
like Europeans (“J’étais au désespoir de n’être jamais habillée à l’européenne” [74]).  
 152 
Nevertheless, Nafissatou Diallo continues to revere and live according to the customs of 
her parents. She enjoys traditional mores such as listening to folktales and legends, which her 
grandmother recounts at night (12). She enjoys her task as a girl to distribute food to friends and 
families around Dakar during the Muslim holiday (56-57). That is because, while she rebels 
against traditional methods of upbringing, especially the severe discipline that girls must 
observe, she also views the same as necessary and is therefore grateful to her parents:  
Bien que mon esprit rebelle et combatif me fît désapprouver parfois les méthodes d’éducation qui 
nous étaient appliquées, je n’en respectais pas moins mes parents et je leur vouais une grande 
reconnaissance. (48) 
Although my rebellious and combative spirit made me sometimes disapprove of the methods of 
education which were applied to us, I nonetheless respected my parents and I was deeply grateful 
to them. (My translation) 
Nafissatou Diallo appears to mitigate the harshness of her education and in so doing tries to 
rehabilitate some traditional figures of patriarchy. She is particularly lenient when it comes to the 
image of her father, which she often recounts with both fear and admiration. “Nous l’aimions. 
Nous le craignions” (“We loved him. We feared him”) (47), she writes of her father. Nafissatou 
Diallo also explains that he was strict about traditions in public, but flexible in private. The sort 
of ultra-traditionalist patriarchal figure that we saw in Badian’s Sous l’orage is quasi-inexistent 
in Nafissatou Diallo’s autobiography. One sees the same thing in Simone Kaya’s girlhood 
narrative. Kaya goes a length farther in describing her father as more prone to reverse the 
traditions. As for Nafissatou Diallo, for whom a very traditionalist grandmother embodies the 
maternal figure—her mother is dead—it is Kaya’s mother who is the perpetuator of traditions. 
Kaya’s father, like Nafissatou Diallo’s, is educated and aspires to a more modern life for his 
daughter.  
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Mon père se faisait volontiers plus distant et plus sévère à la maison. Étais-ce la coutume qui le 
voulait ? Je le crois, ma mère y veillait. Les filles devaient rester près de leur mère. Ce dont je 
suis sûre, c’était que dans son bureau, je retrouvais un papa merveilleux. (64) 
My father was inclined to be more distant and harsher at home. Was it a requirement of the 
customs? I believe so, and my mother was watchful. The girls had to stay close to their mother. 
What I’m sure of is that in his office, I found a wonderful dad again.  (My translation) 
Kaya exonerates her father, blaming the customs and the tradition-guardian mother for 
perpetuating the customs. Her father was one of the rare few who decided to send their girls to 
France for school. The story unfolds in Comikro, the part of Abidjan where the “locals” lived in 
the 1950s (Gnaoulé-Oupoh 314). Men in this indigenous neighborhood believed that sending a 
girl to school was to train her to rebel against customs and to ill-equip her to run a home. Just 
like these men, Kaya’s mother severely required her daughters to learn what she considered as 
their duty. “Elle disait qu’une fille devait connaitre les rudiments de la cuisine entre douze et 
quatorze ans” (“She said a girl should know the basics of cooking between twelve and fourteen”) 
(98). But the mother said she was only doing what she was required to do by the society in which 
she lived: “Je ne veux pas être accusée de vous avoir mal éduquées” (“I do not want to be 
accused of having poorly educated you”) (my translation) (99). Kaya’s narrative nevertheless 
concurs with Nafissatou Diallo’s that the time was one of happy girlhood for those who were 
sent to the colonial school. Like Nafissatou Diallo, Kaya was allowed to do what young women 
of her age were not permitted according to the traditional way. She wandered around the town, 
attending parties, and discovering other cultures, both European and African. While she 
denounces the prejudiced treatment of the female child based on traditions, she also found many 
benefits to some of the African ways. She loved Comikro, for instance, for being a town of 
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African solidarity. Although everyone came from different parts of West Africa, the indigenous 
neighborhood was a place where people formed a single family:  
Dès qu’une famille était en difficulté, les voisins accouraient. C’est ainsi que nous les enfants 
originaires du Nord, nous avons étés soignés bien des fois par une maman ou une grand-mère de 
nos voisins du Sud (….). Lorsqu’un enfant naissait à Comikro, la jeune mère et le bébé se 
voyaient entourés par des voisines pendant près de trois mois. Cette coutume, habituelle dans les 
villages, survivait en ville, comme beaucoup d’autres. (69) 
As soon as a family was in trouble, the neighbors would come running. This is how, we, children 
from the North, were often nursed by a mother or grandmother of our neighbors of the South.... 
When a child was born in Comikro, the young mother and the baby were surrounded by 
neighbors for almost three months. This custom, common in the villages, survived in the town, 
like many others. (My translation) 
This passage translates Kaya’s view that the replication of some African village traditions is 
constructive. Her view is similar to that of Nafissatou Diallo, who does not entirely reject her 
culture and religion. On the contrary, these women writers of second-wave childhood narratives 
found interest in the mixing of cultural space that the urban life enabled them to experience. In 
their stories, under colonial rule, both young female protagonists were exposed to the customs 
and religions of people of diverse cultural and religious origin, including Africans and 
Europeans. The displacement from the homogeneity of village life created an environment that 
produced for Safi and Kaya the sort of transcultural life which Bhabha termed the Third Space. 
For Bhabha, colonial discursive practices are heterogeneous and ambiguous. Hence, he proposes 
a theory of hybridity steeped in a Third Space, in which “all forms of culture are continually in a 
process of hybridity.” Bhabha contends that “it is in this space that we will find those words with 
which we can speak of Ourselves and Others. And by exploring this hybridity, this ‘Third 
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Space,’ we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the Others of Ourselves” (38). In 
Nafissatou Diallo’s and Kaya’s autobiographies, the young protagonists speak of the cultures of 
their parents and that of the colonizer, positioning themselves as belonging to this Third Space, 
in between these two original cultures. Bhabha foregrounds his Third Space as a threshold for a 
transnational culture subverting the binary opposition of identities and cultures between the 
colonizer and the colonized. The cornerstone of Bhabha’s theory is his much-repeated argument 
for intercultural transaction or translation occurring in a new space of negotiation of meaning and 
representation. Coming of age in this hybrid culture, both Nafissatou Diallo and Kaya 
appreciated and acquired an understanding of the various forms of cultures and religion around 
them. They took advantage of the Third Space emerging from the ambiguous environment of 
cultural mixture, as a comfort zone from which both girls escaped the patriarchy of their parents’ 
customs. This “in-between” space afforded the two protagonists the conditions of the possibility 
to enjoy the happy girlhood they depicted.  
It is not exactly clear if the comfort zone of the Third Space as depicted by Nafissatou 
Diallo and Kaya did produce for them a happy womanhood over time. However, we know from 
the works of subsequent women writers of the second wave of childhood narratives that it did 
not. The Third Space only provided consolation but did not solve women’s marginalization. 
Women protagonists as represented in Mariama Ba’s Une si longue lettre (1980) and Ken 
Bugul’s Le baobab fou indeed continued to live, after the independence of their country, under 
an utterly patriarchal society. Living under such conditions as educated women of the twentieth 
century, Ramatoulaye, the protagonist of Une si longue lettre, and Ken, the protagonist of Le 
baobab fou, view womanhood as hampered by the collusion of two oppressive legacies: 
colonialism and ancestral customs. Both protagonists explore various ways to escape these 
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obstructive barriers, only to end up trapped between traditions and modernism. For instance, 
Ramatoulaye’s attempt to gain agency by rejecting tradition and marrying the man of her choice 
in her youth is thwarted. In the course of her marriage, Ramatoulaye has to submit to customs 
and remain in the margins, a condition that culminates in her husband, Modou, taking a second 
wife in accordance with their traditions. After Modou’s death, Ramatoulaye describes in the 
various letters she sends to her friend Aissatou how the four-month and ten-day mourning period 
known as Iddah turned into frustration for her. She submits herself to various religious and 
traditional rituals. She never shuns these customary duties, although she is not at ease with many 
of them. Indeed, while she is dissatisfied with the social position of women, she also values some 
of her traditional principles. After catching her young daughter and other girls smoking 
cigarettes, Ramatoulaye feels that European values are not exempt from danger and that 
modernism must not wipe out African values altogether. Yet, it is by identification with 
European values that she prefers monogamy over polygamy. It is these same values that hold the 
promise of change for the generation of her daughters. The Third Space, in this sense, appears as 
an interstice through which Ramatoulaye finds consolation for herself and hope for subsequent 
generations of girls. 
Une si longue lettre is not deemed an autobiography, but Le baobab fou claims the genre 
in its subtitle. The narrator, a Senegalese young woman educated in the French colonial school 
system, tells a story of coming of age in which she is gradually feeling alienated from her family 
and Muslim upbringing. She admits growing up enamored with European culture, as was the 
case for most young people of her generation. Seizing all the opportunities of modern life, she 
travels to Belgium to further her education, as one way of escaping the restrictive values of her 
heritage. In Belgium, however, her skin color makes her an exotic creature in the eyes of those 
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white natives with whom she tries to identify. Overcome with the sense of being subjected to 
objectification, she eventually falls into alcohol and drug addiction, and becomes a prostitute. As 
the book ends, the protagonist takes the upward path of returning to her source, where she hopes 
to rebuild a life. Like Ramatoulaye, Ken is very outspoken about women’s conditions under 
African traditions, while also pointing to the pitfalls in European cultures. However, much like 
the female protagonists of the previous narratives, she criticizes her cultural heritage, but does 
not reject it entirely. Indeed, her return to the source attests to her reconnection with her 
traditions, which are symbolized by the baobab tree, which features prominently at the start and 
at the end of the novel.  
Among female authors dealing with the conditions of women and girls in late colonial 
and early post-independence Africa, Ivorian novelist Anne Marie Adiaffi seems to provide a 
much blunter criticism of the patriarchal customs of Africa. The novel’s title, Une vie 
hypothéquée (A Mortgaged Life), conveys the idea that girlhood is a doomed kind of life. The 
novel clearly continues the wave of feminist literature that took off in the 1970s.17 Yet it takes 
the criticism of women’s marginalization to the level of caricatural objectification. The story 
begins with a father striking a deal with an elderly married man, wherein he promises to give him 
his future child in marriage, should the newborn be a girl. The man is described as lazy, and even 
before his wife gives birth to a girl, he accepts a considerable amount of presents from the 
elderly suitor. The greedy father then goes so far as to give away his privilege as a father to this 
benefactor and allow him to name his newborn girl Ya, after the suitor’s mother. From her birth 
to adolescence, little Ya becomes familiar with the face of this elderly man, who is extremely 
generous to her family, including to herself. When she learns that the same man is in the process 
                                               
17In the 1970s women acquired unprecedented agency, as writers, novelistic character, and social actors (see Aoua 
Kéita, Femme d’Afrique, and Awa Thiam, La parole aux Négresses. 
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of taking her for his wife, she runs away, with the help of her brother and her maternal relatives, 
to the Europeanized city of Abidjan. There, she meets a young man and starts a relationship. 
Later she asks the young man to bring her back to her village and pay off her father’s debt vis-à-
vis the old man. Unfortunately for Ya, once she is back in the village, the old man takes his 
revenge. He plots the detention of Ya’s father and promises his freedom if she agrees to marry 
him. The story ends with Ya getting ready to marry him.  
The appalling imagery of a teenage girl’s commodification deployed by Adiaffi in the 
novel sends a powerful message about patriarchal institutions, including the dowry system and 
the father’s privilege in naming a daughter and consenting to her marriage. However, in this 
novel, there is another stipulation which connects patriarchal institutions to colonialism. Indeed, 
the fictional story is set in Eastern Cote d’Ivoire, where the customs of the Agni people (an Akan 
subgroup) are rooted in the matrilineal lineage system. Adiaffi, who originates from this region, 
clearly shows that both the father and the elderly man contravened the Akan traditional order 
where children belong to their mother’s lineage. The story seems to point to colonization as the 
source of the disruption of the ancient values, a disruption that allowed a father alone to take 
advantage of his daughter’s destiny under a matrilineal system. Both the elderly man and the 
father epitomize the legacy of colonization. On the one hand, the elderly man is a veteran who 
fought for France during World War II. By merely deploying his privileges as a veteran, he 
succeeds in putting the greedy father behind bars. On the other hand, the individualistic and lazy 
personality of the father suggests a failure of personhood under the Akan socialization system 
based on group solidarity. Adiaffi’s criticism therefore goes in both directions, against African 
traditions and colonial legacy. Though the story of Une vie hypothequée is set in an unspecified 
earlier time, its plot alludes to France’s involvement in its former colonies. This neocolonial 
 159 
intrusion was partly decried as responsible for the mounting dissatisfaction that occurred in the 
1980s-1990s, when the novel appeared. More generally, the collapse of the USSR in 1989 
reinforced Western influence in the world. But all over Francophone Africa, public protest 
brought to light the pernicious aspects of this influence. France, following the La Baule18 summit 
held in June 1990, decided to take stock of its role in the former colonies. Nevertheless, literature 
produced during the 1980s and1990s was very reflective of the violent wind of global capitalism 
blowing over Africa. In this context, as scholars have observed, African creative writing has 
sought to embody the struggles against the “global village,” whose brutal intrusion has had the 
consequence of disrupting the equilibrium of the traditional village in place. In a 2003 article, 
Francesca Sautman observed, for instance, that as a result of this context, “engaged African 
writers transform the art of writing as they testify against hunger, political repression, corruption, 
neocolonialism, genocide, poverty, the condition of women, AIDS, exile, and daily hardship” 
(107). This transformation of the art of writing found even more fertile soil in a cultural theme 
such as childhood, where the collusion of both colonial and ethnic legacies unmistakably pushed 
the younger generation to revolt.  
 
C. The Third-Wave Narratives or “The Synthesis of Cultural Identity”  
In the third wave of African childhood narratives, the revolt of the child characters in 
novels such as Rebelle, L’ainé des orphelins, Allah n’est pas obligé, Le ventre de l’Atlantique, 
and La petite fille des eaux is often branded as part of the textual violence that Odile Cazenave 
                                               
18At the Franco-African summit in La Baule (a coastal town in western France) held in 1990, Paris informed African 
nations that its aid would henceforth be tied to democratization. This announcement was materialized in a policy by 
which France ended its de facto assistance, which had been given to some of these countries throughout the Cold 
War. During that period, Paris’s assistance also included military assistance to friendly governments on the 
continent whose records on human rights and rule of law were deplorable.   
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has characterized as “a synecdoche for the dislocation of postcolonial societies, of families, of 
community structures” (60). In her article, Cazenave identifies two main ways in which violence 
works in childhood narratives: it serves as a pretext to look at the past and at traditional values, 
and it serves as an illustration of the current era and contextualizes its violence (61). The first 
type of violence is often used by women writers to stigmatize the inequity resulting from 
traditional practices; the second is used by male writers to depict injustices resulting from 
postcolonial political contexts.     
In Rebelle, Fatou Keita uses the first type of violence to revisit the childhood of 
Malimouna, the protagonist, who grows up in Boritouni, “un beau petit village, fier de ses 
valeurs et des traditions” (“a beautiful little village, proud of its values and traditions”). As in 
most African villages, “les règles y étaient établies et personne ne les remettait en cause, chacun 
connaissant son rôle et sa place dans la communauté” (“the rules were established, and no one 
questioned them, as everyone knew their role and place within the community”) (5). Yet 
Malimouna, as a teenager, questions and fights some of them. This young female character’s 
battle is directed mainly at the female child’s marginalization, the cultural practices of female 
circumcision and forced marriage. While these practices had been exposed by African women 
writers decades earlier, Keita raised the question in the context of the important development in 
discourses of childhood in the 1990s with the adoption of comprehensive international treaties 
setting out rights and defining universal principles and norms for the status of children. The 
United Nations General Assembly had adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 
November 1989. It became applicable as of September 1990. The same year, the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) adopted the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which 
entered into force in 1999. The treaties reflect two discourses on childhood that are not 
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necessarily opposed yet are strongly inscribed in two different cultural traditions. The African 
child, entrapped within these two cultural traditions, emerged in a literature markedly 
characterized by revolt. It is unlikely that the African charter informed Fatou Keita’s novel. It is 
clear, however, that the particular context of children’s rights discourses allowed writers to 
imagine, for the first time, the young female character’s triumph over traditions.19  
Keita depicts the unschooled young Malimouna escaping excision, forced marriage, 
illiteracy, racism, and finally polygamy and subservience to a master/husband through a series of 
rebellious acts. Indeed, as a young girl in her village, Malimouna is already inclined to global 
citizenship. She gains access to the “global village” through her contact and friendship with 
Sanita, a girl of her age whose educated family lives in the city and travels often to France. Both 
girls share their cultural backgrounds. After growing reticent to circumcision, Malimouna is able 
to lead the priestess to fake the operation on her genitals thanks to her knowledge of the 
priestess’s fornication in the bush with a young male hunter. Next, Malimouna mugs the elderly 
man to whom she has been given in marriage during their nuptial night and flees to the big town. 
In conferring this determinate agency on the female child in her rejection of her fate under 
tradition, Keita shows the changes in the idea of childhood that children themselves have 
incorporated in a changing society. Yet the change must not be misunderstood as one that is 
strictly directed against African traditions. Malimouna shows the same determination in rejecting 
Western discourses about race and African traditions. For instance, while in France, her friend 
Fanta’s daughter dies during a clandestine circumcision operation. Malimouna rebels against the 
media and also against her French husband Philippe, who accuses Africans of barbarism: 
                                               
19 Traditions have always prevailed in previous works (Maimouna, Sous l’orage, Une si longue lettre, Une vie 
hypothéquée). The new trend which presents the young girl protagonist as triumphant against tradition is also 
noticeable in Régina Yaou’s La révolte d’Affiba. 
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Malimouna était furieuse de l’entendre [Philipe] parler de la sorte. Ne comprenait-il pas que ce 
n’était pas aussi simple ? Que pour ces gens-là, il ne s’agissait absolument pas d’être barbare ou 
cruels ? Qu’ils aimaient leur enfant et étaient convaincus que c’était pour son bien qu’ils 
agissaient ainsi?... Cela n’avait rien à avoir avec la barbarie telle qu’elle était décrite par les 
journaux et la television. (126) 
Malimouna was furious to hear him [Philipe] speak so. Did he not understand that it was not so 
simple? That for these people, it was absolutely not about being barbaric or cruel? That they 
loved their child and were convinced that it was for her good that they were doing this?... It had 
nothing to do with barbarism as it was described by newspapers and television. (My translation)  
While Malimouna is herself a champion of the fight against female circumcision practices, she 
also feels it necessary to fight against the simplistic misrepresentation of a complex cultural 
issue. For Malimouna, the question is never to reject African tradition, or to embrace Western 
culture; it is one of finding the balance between the two. Keita seems to underscore the 
importance of balance, the quest for which traverses the narrative in Rebelle.  
The story starts with Malimouna and her friend Sanity finding balance between the 
Western and the traditional African worlds. While Malimouna learns about Western culture from 
Sanita, the latter learns her traditional culture to avoid being completely uprooted (16). This 
harmony is threatened when other members of the community pressure Sanita’s parents to excise 
their daughter, and the harmony is ultimately broken when Sanita’s family leaves and never 
returns to the village. Another instance of imbalance is depicted at the climax of the narrative, 
during her years in France, when Malimouna’s friend Fanta and her husband reject all forms of 
assimilation into French culture and resolve to live according to their African traditions. The 
couple eventually circumcise their daughter, causing her to die from hemorrhage. The violence 
of this event emphasizes the consequences of their imbalanced life. These two examples stand 
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for the many attempts at balance within the novel, where the author uses tragic and often violent 
events to underline the importance of reconciling African tradition and Western culture for the 
benefit of the African child. But, as Cazeneuve has noted, the type of violence used in Keita’s 
novel is paradigmatic for women writers. Male writers utilize another type of violence directly 
related “to a certain political context or situation of postcolonial society” (61). 
Thierno Monemembo’s L’ainé des orphelins and Ahmadou Kourouma’s Allah n’est pas 
obligé deploy this second type of violence to underscore the chaotic society generated for 
children in postcolonial nations of Africa. The two novels, published in 2000, shed light on the 
dramatic changes that have occurred in boyhood since Camara Laye’s L’enfant noir. The two 
boys in the new narratives are in a dire predicament. “J’ai quinze ans. Je suis dans une cellule de 
la prison centrale de Kigali. J’attends d’être execute” (“I am fifteen years old. I am in a cell in 
the Kigali central prison. I am waiting to be executed”) (my translation) (14). This is how Faustin, 
the protagonist of L’ainé des orphelins, introduces himself to the reader. Similarly, the 
protagonist of Allah n’est pas obligé introduces himself in a derogatory way: “Et d’abord… et 
un… M’appelle Birahima. Suis p’tit nègre…suis p’tit nègre parce que je parle mal le français… 
Suis dix ou douze ans…et je parle beaucoup. Un enfant poli écoute, ne garde pas la palabre” 
(“First...and number one... My name is Birahima. I'm a little negro...am a little negro because I 
speak poor French... Am ten or twelve years old...and I’m talkative. A polite child listens, does 
not keep the palaver”) (my translation) (9-11). As shall be clear, both boys are at once victims 
and culprits in a horrific society that does not recognize a place for childhood. In fact, childhood, 
whether understood in these boys’ traditional societies or in their modern global society, is no 
longer available to them. That society is one in which the boys themselves have given up on their 
past and future and have respect left neither for traditions nor for the modern world.  
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Faustin starts by calling the sorcerer Funga, guardian of the traditions, a liar. He eagerly 
listens instead to Father Manolo, who keeps alive in the village the culture brought by the 
Europeans a hundred years ago. But Father Manolo’s grip on the boy is ephemeral. He is 
introduced in the book in a sort of parenthetical anecdote, and he also dies within these 
parentheses. Funga’s influence, however, remains, and throughout the novel Faustin often refers 
to the sorcerer’s proverbs and powers as protective and guiding tools.   
Birahima provides a clearer picture of the child’s status in this global context, when he 
compares himself to “ce que les nègres noirs africains indigènes appellent une galette aux deux 
faces braise” (“what black native African Negroes call a pancake grilled on both sides”) (10). In 
this position Birahima describes himself as not being “villageois, sauvage comme les autres noirs 
nègres africains indigènes” (“a villager, savage like the other black African Negroes”) (my 
translation), yet he is not really like the “noirs civilisés et les toubabs” (“civilized black people 
and the white people”) (my translation) (10). While African writers have been describing actual 
and fictional childhood as located in between indigenous and foreign cultures for decades, what 
is different with Monemembo and Kourouma is the lack of balance between the two worlds. In 
fact, the foreign culture has superseded the local culture, which is the roots of both boys’ 
upbringing. On account of their inability to grasp foreign concepts, Faustin and Birahima define 
French words to fit their own local ideas. Thus, Faustin refers to the events of the 1994 genocide 
that killed one million Tutsis in Rwanda as “les avénements” (“the advents”). Birahima uses 
dictionaries to switch back and forth between “Black” and “Toubab” concepts. In L’ainé des 
orphelins, the protagonist’s struggle to convert his local knowledge into Western knowledge is 
not met halfway with Western or modern knowledge being converted into local concepts. Faustin 
complains, for instance, that the pédrophile (pedophile) M. Van der Poot, after several years in 
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the country, has not yet grasped anything about local customs and mores (82). In Allah n’est pas 
obligé, however, Birahima, who wants the world to understand what he describes as “ma vie de 
merde” (“my shit life”) (my translation) (11) fills in the gaps. The unsettled situation of trying to 
adjust to foreign culture while juggling their own cultural background worsens in these novels 
the unstable situations in which both Faustin and Birahima find themselves. To make their point 
more powerfully, the authors of the two novels place their narrative in the context of civil wars. 
In that context, the protagonists’ experiences amount to what scholars have termed the 
unspeakable. According to Sautman, the unspeakable “refers not merely to something that is 
impossible or extremely difficult to ‘say,’ but further, to utter; it is connected to voice, not 
merely to communication.” That is, it conveys “a subjective notion of that which cannot/should 
not be spoken because it is indecent, scandalous, morally repugnant” (110). L’ainé des orphelins 
and Allah n’est pas obligé are characteristic of such an unspeakable. While the repugnant 
language of denunciation as documented in African texts of the 1980s was aimed at 
neocolonialist controls of local cultures and economies (Sautman 107), the new language 
deployed by child characters in the 2000s was a repugnant textual violence featuring corporeal 
disintegration. Birahima uses that language to describe his mother’s illness and, more often, the 
violent deaths of his companions of war. The same is found in Faustin’s account of “les 
avénements,” in which he uses analepsis to switch back and forth between past and present, as he 
progressively relates the facts that led him to prison and to his awaiting of capital punishment. 
An example of this horror in its gruesome and repugnant form appears in the passage where he 
describes his cellmate Agide: 
Agide qui partage ma natte, a les couilles en compote. Quand la lumière du soleil arrive à percer 
les lézardes du mur, on peut voir ses boules qui flottent dans le pus et les vers blancs qui lui 
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grouillent entre les jambes. On ne peut plus dire qu’il pleure ou qu’il gémit. Un bruit de bête 
sauvage sort tout seul de sa bouche pour de bon entrouverte. (22) 
Agide who shares my mat, has his balls in decay. When the sunlight pierces the cracks in the 
wall, you can see the balls floating in the pus and the white worms that swarm between his legs. 
We can no longer say that he is crying or moaning. The sound of a wild animal just comes out of 
his mouth ajar for good. (My translation) 
The creeping rot of Agide’s genitals is the metaphor for the emasculated society in which no 
sense of humanity remains. Just like this suffering boy, around whom other adolescents are 
playing cards or fighting either to protect their own lives or to claim their leadership over the 
others, Rwandan society was abandoned to its own fate during the mass slaughter. In the midst of 
this inhumane atmosphere, Claudine, the woman who tries to save Faustin from the street, 
appears as one of the rare signs of humanity. The positive actions she undertakes are not 
fortuitous: she exemplifies the African who has succeeded in living in between two cultures 
(Uganda and Rwanda). On the contrary, Faustin’s inability to balance modern law versus 
traditions has led him to commit murder while looking after his own brother and sisters, as 
Claudine did for him. Faustin is convinced that, according to tradition, one has to wash the honor 
of a raped sister by shedding the culprit’s blood. While he is unwilling to compromise this belief, 
he appears to disregard other aspects of African traditions such as the reverence owed to elders. 
He is warned twice, first by his lawyer and later by the judges: “Faustin Nsenghimana, menaça le 
premier juge, tu es ici dans un tribunal! Nous sommes tes aînés et tes juges. Sois poli sinon nous 
allons te condamner pour outrage à magistrat” “Faustin Nsenghimana, threatened the first judge, 
you’re here in a court! We are your elders and your judges. Be polite, otherwise we will 
condemn you for contempt of court” (my translation) (135). When Faustin is sentenced to capital 
punishment, his lawyer’s plea that he is still a child is never taken into account, nor is there any 
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consideration of his psychological state after living for so long in the streets and in one of the 
most traumatizing prisons of the country. The tragic ending awaiting Faustin lays bare a troubled 
society that does not recognize a place for childhood. He is viewed only as a disrespectful 
criminal. In his plea, Faustin’s lawyer insists that he is a minor even if the law is not very clear 
on that. In fact, he contends, there is no more real law. There is nothing authentic left, since 
Rwanda is on the threshold of a new life. The whole thing is to be redone: history, geography, 
government, customs… He wonders, “pourquoi pas la façon dont nous comprenons les enfants?” 
(“so why not the way we understand children?”) (my translation) (81-82). Rwanda was, of 
course, a country to be reconstructed from scratch after the genocide, but this seems also to be 
the case of most postcolonial countries of Africa, where most people have lost their authenticity. 
Dubious behavior is indeed a common characteristic in Allah n’est pas obligé. From Yacouba-
alias-Tiecoura, the shaman, to Colonel-Papa-Le Bon, the warlord of Zorzor, to the various 
dictators of West Africa, phony behavior that does not uphold, but which abuses both African 
traditions and modernity has become the rule. An example is when the international community 
sends rations of rice to help during the Sierra Leonean civil war and local soldiers abuse this 
charity by invoking their traditions:  
Les militaires rouspétèrent et jurèrent sur tous leurs dieux qu’ils ne mangeaient pas trop. 
Seulement, lorsqu’ils commençaient à avaler leur maigre ration de riz, des membres de leur 
famille et des connaissances avaient la fâcheuse habitude de se trouver là, là où ils croutaient. Et à 
cause de la vieille solidarité africaine, la ration de riz était partagée entre un nombre infini de 
consommateurs. (206) 
The soldiers grumbled and swore by all their gods that they weren’t eating too much. It was just 
that whenever they tried to gulp down their meagre ration of rice there were always some family 
members and acquaintances with the annoying habit of hanging around, right where they were 
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trying to eat. So, on account of the ancestral African solidarity, the rice had to be shared between 
an infinite number of people. (My translation) 
When the international community tries to cut its misused aid, there seems to be a resistance 
from the entire army, playing on the same humanitarian drive of solidarity with those in need. In 
reality, it is the greedy army officers who invoke African traditions as a strategy to operate a 
hold-up of the international contribution destined to help an entire country embroiled in a civil 
war. When the humanitarian rice bags are delivered, officers help themselves first. According to 
Birahima: “Quand les officiers se furent servis, les trouffions, les bidassent n’eurent rien” 
(“When the officers have helped themselves, the low-rank soldiers, the squaddies are left with 
nothing”) (206). In turn, soldiers deploy the same strategy, in the novel, to take the NGOs’ 
assistance away from refugees. This egoistic approach is one that comes from the higher 
hierarchy of the postcolonial state, with actors such as Nigeran president Sani Abacha and 
Ivorian president Houphouet-Boigny playing for their own interests. Kourouma uses these petty 
calculations to underscore the disaggregation of social and cultural principles, at both the local 
and international levels.   
The disaggregation of human values is particularly illustrated through the cruelty of 
warmongers. Guerillas in Sierra Leone torture and amputate the hands of their enemies, while 
pro-government Kamajors, supposedly custodians of tradition, are seen committing rapes. The 
loss of values is at the point where children recruited in these armed groups are asked to violate 
the sacred rule of filial love by executing their own genitors (174). The contrast of these 
children’s stories with Camara Laye’s or Nafissatou Diallo’s attests to the dramatic way in which 
childhood has shifted on the African continent, a shift that underscores the chaotic postcolonial 
society. However, Birahima’s survival seems to indicate the way out. Birahima survives mostly 
thanks to his inclination to find a good balance in a society that he describes at the onset as 
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“république foutue et corrompue” (“crappy and corrupt republic”) (my translation) (10). His 
search for balance is noticeable in his use of four dictionaries—the Larousse, the Petit Robert, 
the Glossary of French Particularities in Black Africa, and the Harrap’s—to reach a global 
audience. This approach demonstrates his intention to go beyond his own community, and 
indeed he is not particularly attached to a race or tribe. He describes his own Malinké tribe as “la 
sorte de nègre noirs africains indigènes qui sont nombreux au nord de la Côte d’ivoire, en Guinée 
et dans les autres républiques bananières et foutues comme Gambie, Sierra Leone et Sénégal là-
bas, etc.” (“the kind of black African natives who are numerous in the North of Cote d’Ivoire, in 
Guinea and the other crappy banana republics such as Gambia, Sierra Leone and Senegal, etc.”) 
(my translation) (10). 
Admittedly, Birahima is not to be viewed as an ordinary child, after having been 
perturbed by the various civil wars of Liberia and Sierra Leone through which he fought. 
Nevertheless, as many other stories attest (e.g., Charly en guerre, Johnny chien méchant, L’ainé 
des orphelins), the number of African children suffering under these conditions is great, and 
Birahima’s language is to be understood within a similar context. It is therefore surprising to see 
how, unlike Faustin, Birahima remains on top of the traditions: “Je veux bien m’excuser de vous 
parler vis-à-vis comme ca. parce que je ne suis qu’un enfant” (“I’m sorry for talking right at you 
like this, on account of how I’m only a kid”) (my translation) (3), he apologizes to the reader. 
Birahima’s ability to balance his Malinké thoughts, proverbs, curses, and pidgin French, as well 
as his ability to switch from Muslim beliefs to traditional beliefs in gnamas (the shadow of a 
person remaining on earth after death) and gris-gris (the magic protections), appears as his 
strength in a world of heterogeneity. Kourouma’s emphasis on heterogeneity also explains why 
Birahima describes children’s agency in a very transnational way. Farah, the girl soldier killed in 
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Liberia, is from Cote d’Ivoire and Sekou-The-Terrible; another child soldier, slain in Sierra 
Leone, is from Burkina Faso. In this context of imbroglio, Kourouma’s use of hybrid language in 
Birahima’s narrative seems to underscore not only this heterogeneity, but also the fact that 
children’s issues have become international. 
 The two last novels to be discussed in this section, Fatou Diome’s Le ventre de 
l’Atlantique and the collective novel directed by Florent Couao-Zotti, La petite fille des eaux, 
illustrate children’s position of in-betweenness and some of the transnational ideas shaping 
childhood across Africa today. Unlike the two previous novels, these childhood narratives take 
place in countries troubled not by armed conflict, but by other forms of social challenges. An 
important theme in Le ventre de l’Atlantique is migration, whereas La petite fille des eaux deals 
with child trafficking. The two novels illustrate the dramatic position of the child in transitioning 
African societies. 
Viewed from the transnational perspective, Salie’s narrative in Le ventre de l’Atlantique 
is an account of the delusion of young Africans about the myth of a European Eldorado. 
Madické, Salie’s half-brother, is a talented soccer player living on the small island of Niodor in 
Senegal, with limited opportunities. Like many on the continent, he naturally dreams of going to 
France to make a name for himself in the French soccer league. Salie, who emigrated ten years 
ago to France, explains the challenges faced by immigrants who quickly become illegal, who live 
under racism and threats of expulsion. Invoking these reasons, Salie refuses to send Madické the 
plane ticket he requested.  
But viewed from the local perspective, both Salie and Madické are also aware of the 
deeper issues crippling the legitimate aspirations of the younger generation who remain on the 
island. Salie left Niodor because of a set of rigid beliefs and behaviors ingrained in the local 
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community. On the island, the community views “genealogy as an identity card” (90) and is 
therefore resistant to the integration of foreigners. As a child, Salie’s status as illegitimate and 
born from a stranger was a threat to her life. She owes her survival to the determination of her 
grandmother. Today, Madické seems to live under a similar pressure ingrained in the local 
community, namely the belief that children have responsibility towards their community. 
Successful children in this community have been those immigrants such as “The man from 
Barbès,” who returned, not only with wealth, but also with respectability. The example of “The 
man from Barbès,” along with his made-up fairy tales, encourages the local youth to aspire to his 
fate, and the elders to enforce the traditional expectation that children living abroad must send 
money back to their parents. In this context, the local teacher appears like the light in the dark. 
“For sure, you should be prepared to travel, to move forward toward a better existence, but do 
not do it with suitcases; do so with your brains,” he tells his students (166). For the teacher, 
what’s important is for the youth to be creative and avoid their parents’ mistakes regarding 
gender inequality, polygamy, and large numbers of children, and by doing so, they will eliminate 
the weight that constrains their society and prevents local development. 
In La petite fille des eaux, youth also owes its turmoil to a well-established custom: the 
vidomegon system. It consists in rural parents sending their children to live with and work for 
well-off relatives in urban areas. While the custom is believed to be a legacy of a colonial 
practice in which rural parents had no choice but to entrust their children to a relative in a town 
where they could attend school, today the practice has produced exploited and trafficked 
children. 
In La petite fille des eaux, Sité, a young rural girl, lives happily with her parents in a 
remote area of Benin. When her father gets sick and can no longer work as a fisherman, the 
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family finds itself in a desperate situation. A neighbor with contacts in the city suggests finding a 
good family who can take care of Sité, employ her as a maid, and pay a small amount of money 
to her parents to help them. Sité is not yet 10 years old, but leaves her village for the town, where 
she labors from dawn to dusk in the house of a ruthless and brutal mistress. Taking the pretext 
that Sité had stolen her money, this callous mistress molests and expels her. An unscrupulous 
relative lures Sité into believing that she will care of her, then takes advantage of the situation to 
sell the young girl to human traffickers. The Etinero, a yacht aboard which several children 
including Sité are being transported, is intercepted in Gabon and expelled. In this odyssey, Sité 
finds her older brother, who is believed to live and work with another relative. In reality, he has 
also been sold to human traffickers. Like other children, they will jump into the sea at a stopover 
and escape from the boat and finally reach their villages.  
In both Le ventre de l’Atlantique and La petite fille des eaux, local communities fail to 
adjust to a changing world. By continuing to live in the twentieth century as they lived in the past 
century, these communities create for children the sort of challenges to which Madické and Sité 
are confronted. Both young protagonists are expected to “succeed”—in the case of Madické, 
abroad, and in the case of Sité, in the town—so they can give back to their desperate family. This 
raises the question of the failure of the postcolonial state, which prolongs the colonial system of 
dichotomy of subjects versus masters, the indigenous versus the citizen, the rural versus the 
metropolis. Such a system, which prevents social mobility, hardly offers local communities any 
options, other than moving from the rural to the urban, and from the urban to Europe. In their 
letter to Europe, the two Guinean boys found dead in an aircraft in Brussels in 1998 made this 
point even more powerfully.  
“Excellencies, gentlemen, and responsible citizens of Europe: It is our great honor and privilege 
to write to you about our trip and the suffering of the children and youth in Africa,” the letter 
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reads. “We call upon your graciousness and solidarity to help us in Africa. Our problems are 
many: war, sickness, hunger, lack of education… And if you find that we have sacrificed our 
lives, it is because we suffer too much in Africa. We need your help in our struggle against 
poverty and war. Be mindful of us in Africa. There is no one else for us to turn to. (Quoted in 
Gikandi, “Globalization and the Claims of Postcoloniality” 630) 
Younger generations have grown skeptical of their governments, countries, and cultural values. 
With these youth seeking to escape more and more the lack of local opportunities, Gikandi reads 
the Guinean boys’ letter as illustrative of a new understanding of globalization running through 
the continent, one that is rooted in the European Enlightenment ideas of progress. Gikandi 
differentiates this understanding from its postcolonial theorization by advocates of hybridity such 
as Bhabha and Pieterse, who praise globalization’s potential to harmonize the universal and the 
particular and, in the process, open up to a multiplicity of cultural relationships. Obviously, the 
Guinean boys, as well as Madické and Sité, appear to be left behind in this latter process.  
The idea of modernity, as inherited from colonization and perpetuated by the African 
postcolonial state, therefore leaves local communities unable to reinvent themselves in a context 
of globalization. How to eliminate a social practice as ingrained as Vidomegon in the rural social 
fabric of Benin? What would be the replacement? In his foreword to La petite fille des eaux, 
Camille Amouro believes that the problem is not so much in the practice itself, but rather in its 
exploitation. Amouro contends that sending a child away is not problematic in an African 
context where it ensures family solidarity in the face of the failed state and the overwhelming 
capitalist system:  
Les enfants placés ne constituent pas une calamité dans l’entendement d’une solidarité entre la 
ville et la campagne, d’une possibilité offerte à ceux que la superstructure abandonne. Les enfants 
placés historiquement, constituent une forme d’adoption, une solution à l’indigence, en même 
temps que la manifestation première de la notion de discipline, entendue comme la formation de 
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disciples. Seuls peuvent constituer un problème la moralité et le caractère des personnes auprès 
de qui l’on place ces enfants. (7-8) 
Child placement does not constitute a calamity when understood as a solidarity between the city 
and the countryside, as a possibility offered to those whom the superstructure abandons. 
Historically, placed children constitute a form of adoption, a solution to indigence, at the same 
time as the first manifestation of the notion of discipline, understood as the formation of disciples. 
Only the morality and character of the persons with whom these children are placed constitutes 
an issue. (My translation)  
Amouro’s claim hinges on two ideas: the first, that Vidomegon was envisioned as a solution to 
structural issues, the second, that the resulting child abuse is to be blamed on the morality of the 
host of the child. These claims are not Amouro’s, they stem from the ideologies anchored in 
African traditions and for which folktales and legends serve as vehicles. While in folktales the 
ancestors and the spirits are eager to protect the child and punish the disgraceful adult, in La 
petite fille des eaux, these spirits seem, at first reading, absent from the narrative. Considering 
the urgency of the issue and its international scope, it appears laughable to invoke Amouro’s 
argument. Yet, his argument is common on the continent, and issues regarding children’s 
position in society remain very controversial. “Il y a la question du travail des enfants, vécues 
dans certaines sociétés, la mienne par exemple, comme un apprentissage à la vie” (“There is the 
issue of child labor, experienced in some societies, mine for example, as an apprenticeship to 
life”) (8), Amouro contends. Obviously, Amouro’s reference to child labor must be understood 
as children’s contribution to household chores and other menial activities, considered as 
educational in the African traditional context, and not to backbreaking labor in mines and 
plantations. He explains that as far as he is concerned, he would have been very unhappy if his 
parents had forbidden him to make brooms and other artisanal objects for sale when he was little. 
He attended school where these things were not only authorized but encouraged (9). According 
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to Amouro’s reasoning, forbidding children to work is more prejudicial than ensuring that this 
practice is not abused: 
La question est celle du respect de la personne humaine, intégralement, quels que soient son âge, 
ses origines, son sexe. C’est de savoir que les enfants, en particulier, ont plus besoin de protection 
sociale que d’autres dans la mesure de leur vulnérabilité. C’est de combattre de manière plus 
radicale que jamais, toute atteinte à la personne humaine, en commençant par les atteintes aux 
enfants. (9) 
The issue is one of intrinsic respect for human dignity, irrespective of age, origin or gender. It is 
to know that children, in particular, need more social protection than others because of their 
vulnerability. It means fighting harder than ever the assaults on the human person, and in the 
first place, assaults on children. (My translation) 
Local approaches and reasoning on children’s and youth issues seem to differ from the 
international approach, where international law is brandished as the guarantor of what is read as 
a disorderly and barbaric world. In her novel, which reads as an autobiography, Fatou Diome 
seems to reflect on the issue of the local community’s challenges to change its ways and adapt to 
new ideas and power structures. The novel’s narrator does not reject her roots: “with my feet 
shaped by the African soil, I am walking the European dirt: one step after another, like every 
human being in the world” (14). But, sadly, as she notices, living between two worlds is not yet 
well understood: “Africa and Europe wonder what part of me belongs to each of them” (294). 
But, as Salie seems to suggest, the dream world is one “where individuals are appreciated for 
what they are as a whole...where identity’s attributes are blurred...where things blend into a 
burning determination to embrace both pain and joie de vivre” (295). Similarly, La petite fille 
des eaux reframes the issue of child trafficking from a bottom-up perspective, emphasizing 
intentionally down-to-earth solutions rather than authoritarian and universal legal rules. Instead 
of the brutal condemnation of traditions and the call for respect for international law, what the 
ten authors of the novel seem to suggest is that the social and cultural environment of the child is 
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as important as the principles of rights of the child, as set out in the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and ratified by all countries except the United States. This does not mean, 
however, that the basic principles of the Convention are not necessary to the well-being of 
children. It means, as Jean Marie Volet has observed, that it is the people rather than the rules 
and regulations that decide the fate and fortune of a child. “More often, it is not the state 
apparatus that comes to the rescue of abused children when it matters. It is well-meaning 
individuals” and “like everybody else, officials and police in charge of ensuring the protection of 
children are responding to the situation according to their own temperament and sense of duty,” 
Volet wrote in his review of the novel in June 2002.  
As some scholars aptly observed, the search for solutions to the unique condition of the 
African child is one of pragmatism. Yet, others go as far as to suggest that it is one of 
existentialism. Taking the example of L’aventure ambiguë, Emily Carson explains, for instance, 
that “Samba’s transformation at the end of the novel can be seen…as [his] existential choice to 
redefine himself as ruler of his own earthly world” (47). While Samba seems highly aware that 
his existence depends on his relation to others, it is by a redefinition of his own identity that he 
finds the solution. For Carson, indeed, “Samba has found this hopeful solution to his despair 
alone, avoiding any alliance that would suggest his synthesis was any of the ready-made 
proposals offered up by the occidental or African communities he knew” (149) As Samba’s 
response to hybridity suggests, writers such as Kane have envisioned the movement towards 
synthesis as what reflects a contemporary multicultural perspective.  
 
3. The Significance of Hybridity in African Childhood Narratives 
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The depiction of childhood in West African Francophone literature, from the first-wave 
to the third-wave narratives, involves mixed themes, literary genres and forms, and in most 
instances, a mixed lexicon. These mixtures underline a descriptive hybridity. The three waves in 
which childhood narratives evolved can be linked generally to three phases in the evolution of an 
African (and African diasporic) rhetoric on cultural development. In the 1950s, when writers of 
the first wave such as Camara Laye, Bernard Dadié, and Cheikh Hamidou Kane emphasized the 
idea of the colonial school’s encroachment on traditional education, the key cultural rhetoric was 
the rejection of French assimilation policy. This rhetoric was supported by the ideological theory 
of Négritude. At this time, Négritude was preoccupied with responding to colonial racism 
towards the natives of the African colonies. Western intellectuals were largely convinced that 
black Africans had no high culture and had not contributed to world history and civilization. 
Debates on culture were influenced by racist ideas developed in writings such as Joseph-Arthur 
de Gobineau’s “Essai sur l’inégalité des races” (1853), Lucien Levy-Bruhl’s La mentalité 
primitive (1922), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich von Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History,20 in which these Europeans postulated that sub-Saharan Africans were primitives, had 
no culture and no history, and therefore had made no contribution to world history. This colonial 
mindset laid the groundwork for the colonial French policy of assimilation, a concept credited to 
French philosopher Chris Talbot (1837) with the idea of expanding French culture to the colonies 
outside of France in the early twentieth century. In response to this colonial mindset, Africans of 
the first half of the twentieth century set out to prove that Africa had a rich and complex 
civilization. In the face of the disparagement of the native cultures, childhood narratives such as 
L’enfant noir, Climbié, and L’aventure ambiguë were narratives of cultural resistance. In their 
                                               
20 These lectures were originally given at the University of Berlin in 1822, 1828, and 1830 
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respective works, Laye, Dadié, and Kane used autoethnography to speak to the westerner as well 
as to their own people, while also insisting on their so called “glorious authentic African 
civilizations.” The emergence of a new lexicon in their texts seems to underline the 
inimitableness of the African contexts and the lack of vocabulary in French to account for their 
particular realities.  
This battle, led by the Négritude movement to vindicate the “negro” culture, yielded 
tremendous results. Within a decade, a shift or at least a questioning of the western monopoly of 
civilization began, with Father Placide Tempels’s La philosophie bantoue (1945). In this book, 
Tempels attempted to prove that traditional African culture was not devoid of reason. Bantu 
understanding of being might not be the same as the understanding of the Europeans, but it does 
not follow that the Bantus’ construction of reality is less rational than the Europeans, Father 
Tempels argued. In the following years, a disruption of world opinion towards races took place, 
with scholarship such as George GM James’s Stolen Legacy (1954), in which the author posited 
that the Greeks were not the creators of Greek philosophy, but rather the Egyptians were. 
Tempels and James were hardly alone in shaking received ideas about Africans. William 
Abraham in his The Mind of Africa (1962) provided a similar opinion. The new debates also 
featured Cheikh Anta Diop’s Antériorité des civilisations nègres: mythe ou vérité historique? 
(1967) and John Mbiti’s African Religions and Philosophy (1969), to name a few.  
These new ideas reshaped the cultural debate during the first years of African 
independence. African intellectuals, now leaders of their countries, began to apply their cultural 
rhetoric to material social and economic policies. It was in this context that what is now known 
as the ideological or nationalist school thrived immediately after the independences. Leaders 
such as Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, and Julius Nyerere began to experiment with their 
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cultural rhetoric in economic and political policies. This step is of paramount importance, 
because it sets the precedent and explains why African cultural ideas are so often incorporated in 
national and international debates. Nkrumah, Senghor, and Nyerere felt that the Africans could 
never be truly decolonized unless they found their own system of living and social organization. 
Nkrumah advocated an “African socialism,” to be forged from the traditional, communal 
structure of African society. For him, a return to an African cultural system with its moral values, 
communal ownership of properties, and humanitarian social and political approach holds the key 
to Africa’s revival of her lost identity. African communitarianism and native culture are the basic 
teachings in his writings (see Consciencism, 1954; I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African 
Ideology, 1961; and Africa Must Unite, 1970). Similarly, Senghor also charted a policy known as 
“African socialism.” A prolongment of Senghorian Négritude, it shows the shift from the time of 
revolt against the intellectual tentacles of French assimilation to a vehicle of positive assertion of 
newly found identity. Senghor’s African socialism rejects foreign models. In a conference held 
in Dakar in December 1962, Senghor emphasized that “the problem is not to find ready-made 
solutions, but to search, objectively, for possible solutions...in the light of African realities” 
(“Développement et socialisme”). This idea would be better detailed in his work Négritude et 
Humanisme (1964), where Senghor traces his social policy to African culture, which he said is 
communal and laden with brotherly emotion. Senghor’s African socialism resembles Nkrumah’s 
in many points, and both socialisms are close to what Julius Nyerere calls “Ujamaa.” Ujamaa 
means familyhood. It is what Okoro (2004) calls a “being-with” philosophy or the “we” instead 
of the “I spirit” (96).  To overcome cultural imperialism, Nyerere suggests the development of a 
sociopolitical and economic ideology from the “petals” of African native culture, and traditional 
values of togetherness and brotherliness. In Nyerere’s publications (mainly Uhuru na Ujamaa: 
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Freedom and Socialism, 1964, and Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism, 1968), he postulates 
that Africans will not retrieve their identity unless they find Uhuru (freedom), which, he 
contends, transcends independence.  
These three forms of doctrine on the appropriation of cultural identity in African social 
policy are merely illustrative, but not exhaustive. Leaders such as Amilcar Cabral continued 
similar policies in the late 1970s. But the early examples show not only the desire of African 
leaders to base policy on cultural theories, but also their agreement on the orientation of such 
policies. Despite such widespread spirit in African governance, some Africans started to question 
the discourses on culture and demand innovative solutions. As early as the 1950s, fictions of the 
first-wave childhood narratives such as Maimouna and Sous l’orage anticipated this turn in the 
debates. Sadji and Badian became aware of the growing issues that African traditions might raise 
for younger generations. Yet, these Négritude writers believed these issues—in the case of these 
works of fiction, gender imbalance—could be solved by tradition itself. Badian’s stance is 
further clarified in Les dirigeants Africains face à leurs peuples (1965), in which he states that if 
the socialist way seems to him a necessity, it is on the condition of being adapted to the human 
framework and history of African society. The first-wave childhood narratives, thus, seem to 
have contributed cultural arguments and an intellectual foundation for the devising of ideological 
or nationalistic African policies. 
The second wave of childhood narratives emerged in the 1970s at a time of post-
independence disillusion. African traditions as well as the reliance on the ideological or 
nationalist methods came increasingly under scrutiny. The Négritude discourse became the 
object of renewed criticism. Stanislas Adotevi led the way with his Négritude et Négrologues 
(1972). In addition to recycling an old criticism—“Négritude is the black way of being white” 
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(207)—he also questioned Négritude’s reactionary approach, its backward-looking 
traditionalism, and its promotion of the retour aux sources, which hampers the movement of 
Africa towards the modern world. In short, Adotevi discarded Négritude as irrelevant for cultural 
and social discussion in African life. Following Adotevi’s criticism, Iyay Kimoni published 
Destin de la littérature négro-africaine ou problématique d’une culture (1975), mitigating 
Négritude’s role by stating that cultural and social debates cannot exist without an African 
cultural perspective. While Kimoni’s book is implicitly critical of Négritude poetry, it has more 
faith in Francophone African novels, because they “undertake, on the subject of Africa, not a 
metaphysical debate but rather a sociological one…their love of Négritude is selective.” Kimoni 
insists that “while combating colonialism, the [Négritude] literature poses the problem of the 
future of African culture, which it presages the transformation” (10).  
Indeed, the second wave of childhood narratives, which appeared with a striking feminine 
voice, was a portent of changing ideas. Women writers such as Nafissatou Diallo and Simone 
Kaya brought up the same gender issues already noticed and discarded by Sadji and Badian. In 
their treatment of that same issue, the feminine narratives criticized patriarchal customs. In their 
depiction of traditions and modernism, both writers demonstrated attachment to their cultures, 
less the patriarchal customs, while also showing tremendous interest in the European modern 
culture. As a result, Nafissatou Diallo and Kaya depicted a girlhood at the end of French colonial 
rule that rivaled the happy boyhood legible in Laye’s and Dadié’s novels. But subsequent women 
writers showed that happy womanhood did not result from modernity’s encroachment on local 
traditions. A balance was yet to be found, and Mariama Ba, Ken Bugul, and Anne-Marie Adiaffi, 
despite creating female characters with strong agency, ended their novels with a sense of 
traditions’ victory over women’s struggles. In these second-wave writings, mixed literary forms 
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and genres, as well as mixed local and French lexicons, pursued the hybridization observed in 
the previous wave. These literary works also reflect a self-questioning that was absent in the 
previous wave. Ideologically, the 1970s gave rise to what is now characterized as the “Great 
Debate,” when two rival schools of thought clashed on almost anything: the traditionalists versus 
the universalists. The traditionalists sought to construct an African identity based on excavated 
African cultural elements, while the universalists sought to demolish such an architectonic 
structure by associating it with cultural relativism. As if to comfort the critics of traditionalism, 
the African political arena began to produce a great number of dictators, who overtly rejected 
westernism and claimed traditionalism. In Malawi, Hastings Kamuzu Banda (1898-1997) was 
made president for life in 1971. In Uganda, Idi Amin Dada deposed then president Milton Obote 
and seized power in a military coup in 1971, the beginning of his dictatorship. In the Central 
Africa Republic, Jean Bedel Bokassa (1921-1996) declared himself president for life in 1972. 
These developments also had direct consequences for the growing human rights debates. Much 
like the rejection of Western-style liberal democracy, which these presidencies for life 
symbolize, modern Western conceptions of human rights were viewed by some African 
commentators as lacking adequate consideration for an African cultural uniqueness. Of course, 
the debate was not only African, it was also Asian. The relativists accused contemporary 
conceptions of international human rights, and further, their universality, of being a modern 
Western-secular concept rooted in Judeo-Christian values. However, the contention that a liberal 
“individualistic West” was a threat to a “communitarian” Asia or Africa was weakened by the 
many violations of human rights on these continents. By the 1990s, relativists and universalists 
started to acknowledge some pragmatic truth on each side, leading to an appeasement in the 
debate. A new era, that of cross-cultural approach, was born, helped by several historical and 
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political events: the end of the Cold War, the La Baule agreement. In the French context, support 
for African dictatorships decreased and multipartyism became a reality.  
In the new context, the Négritude stance had moved from narrow to broad. Indeed, as 
scholars21 increasingly observe, the Négritude movement of the colonial time, criticized in the 
1930s and 1940s for its racial essentialism, progressively gave way in the postcolonial era to 
what its fierce advocate, Senghor, terms a “twentieth-century humanism.” Négritude’s fathers, 
Senghor and Cesaire in particular, shifted and adapted their Négritude writings and discourses to 
what Cesaire terms the “rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir” and what Senghor calls the 
“civilization of the universal,” borrowing from French philosopher Teilhard de Chardin. 
Senghor’s civilization of the universal, however, is to be understood as the culmination of his 
métissage theory. Senghor’s philosophy of Négritude was gradually unveiled in his articles in 
Presence Africaine, his prefaces to books by other African writers, his speeches and conferences, 
most of which would be included in volumes published at the end of his career. But one of his 
speeches captures this trajectory. Speaking at India’s National Academy of Letters, where he was 
receiving an honorary fellowship in 1974, Senghor explains the mutation of Négritude as 
follows:   
In reality, our movement developed like a drama in three stages. We began by being violently 
opposed to the European reason, I might even say to Indo-European reason which is discursive 
but dichotomic. Then, the experience of nazism cured us and we parted from “Négritude-ghetto” 
or, as Jean-Paul Sartre puts it, from “antiracist racism.” We then discovered that the first great 
civilizations, which were born in the latitude of the Mediterranean—from the Egyptian to the 
Arabic civilization, through the Indian and Greek civilizations—had all been civilizations of 
                                               
21See Wallerstein, L’universalisme européen, and Diagne, “In Praise of the Post-racial.” In addition to their cultural discourses, 
Senghor and Césaire also pursued a political vision of a world order based on cooperation rather than competition. As Gary 
Wilder notes in Freedom Time, their vision challenged the very principles of territoriality, nationality, and state sovereignty 
advocated by European and North American powers within the United Nations. Indeed, they wanted to abolish colonialism and, 
at the same time, invent a new political form of world order, free of the traditional notion of sovereign and unified national states. 
 
 184 
cultural miscegenation and first of biological miscegenation. For us therefore Négritude, today, 
consists in grounding ourselves deeply in the values of the black peoples, but, at the same time, 
also in opening ourselves to other civilizations: to the European civilization for sure, which, 
though furthest away from us, marked us a lot, historically, but also to civilizations that are closer 
to us, like the Indian civilization and the Arabo-Berber civilization. (272) 
It is not surprising that the subsequent period, starting in the 1990s, witnessed the 
emergence of ideas of multiculturalism. The issues facing African children and youth in Africa 
are no longer the same as those described in the previous waves. These problems are posed in the 
global and multicultural world context. The writers of the third wave not only describe 
scrambled societies, but also use mixed narrative styles, lexicons, and a textual violence rarely 
seen before. Fatou Keita exposed the tragedy of female circumcision and forced marriage in 
postcolonial Africa. These postcolonial societies are also often ravaged by civil wars, in which 
all notion of childhood is negated: Tierno Monénembo and Ahmadou Kourouma depict 
children’s tragedy in these contexts. Fatou Diome and Florent Couao-Zotti et al. raise other 
issues facing postcolonial African countries: the lack of local opportunity and its consequences 
for emigrations and child trafficking. Children in these narratives are highly aware of their 
diversity and of the global world in which they live. The notion of heterogeneity is represented in 
these narratives in various ways: a mix of literary forms and genres, and the use of a mixed 
lexicon. In addition, the narratives of this last wave pose the question of identity with a renewed 
dynamic. In fact, the child protagonist in these narratives is neither traditionalist nor universalist. 
His or her identity is located between the two, a parody of African identity and its dynamism of 
adjustment to the changing world, as signaled in the multicultural trend in the later Négritude 
discourses.  
However, the Négritude movement is hardly alone in driving this trend in Africa. Other 
examples are worth mentioning: Patrick Chamoiseau’s, Jean Bernabé’s, and Raphaël Confiant’s 
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concept of “Créolité,” Edouard Glissant’s concepts of “Relation,” “Creolization,” and “Tout-
monde,” Ali Mazrui’s concept of “Triple Heritage,” and Mbembe’s concept of “Afropolitanism” 
speak, each in its own fashion, to the idea that African and African diasporic heritage is one of 
mixture and hybridity. These concepts often entertain antagonistic relations with one another, 
within the strict delineation prescribed by their theorists. This inevitably obstructs the perception 
of their connectedness. Shireen Lewis argues, for instance, in Francophone West African and 
Caribbean Literature and Theory, From Négritude to Créolité (2006) that “[a]lthough Créolité 
violently rejects Négritude, it paradoxically depends on it for its very existence” (xiv). Créolité 
as a literary movement was created in the 1980s, as the opposite of a Négritude hostile to 
métissage. Yet, the Négritude it sought to oppose was already shifting and focusing its discourse 
on the process of mixture, which Edourad Glissant more aptly captures in his concept of 
“creolization.” 
There is therefore an overlap and a continuity in the various theories created by African 
and Caribbean scholars. Senghor, Cesaire, Glissant, and Mazrui, to name a few, who are 
internationally revered and whose thinking affects scholarship, politics, and community practices 
worldwide, not have only divergences, but also promote common ideas, among them the idea 
that in the way forward, cooperation should replace confrontation. These ideas have been 
recaptured in the third-wave African childhood narratives through the various signs of 
heterogeneity and the child’s refusal of fixed identity. Multiculturalism has emerged as the most 
powerful characteristic of African cultural identity. The more than forty articles published in the 
2000 volume Multiculturalism and Hybridity in African Literatures, edited by Hal Wylie and 
Bernth Lindfors, speak to such multiculturalism. While the various forms of hybridity manifest 
in African writings constitute the totality of cultural diversity discourses so pervasive in African 
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and African diasporic cultural theories, we have also seen that African leaders tend to 
appropriate these theories in their social policies. A typical implication of the progressive 
intensification of cultural hybridity in childhood narratives of the continent is the reflection of 
such hybridity in children’s rights law. This point of convergence of literature and law is the 





CHANGING CHILDHOOD IN AFRICAN LAW 
 
1. Imagining African Childhood: Literary and Legal Convergence 
This chapter focuses on the convergence of the literary and the legal imaginations of a 
hybrid, heterogenous model of African childhood. The literary imagination of the African child, 
as seen in the preceding chapter, shifted from the portrayal of a traditional child posited as 
authentic to a more multicultural one. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child,1 adopted on July 11, 1989 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
Organization of the African Unity (OAU, now the Africa Union) makes provisions for the latter 
child model. Such a convergence is worth studying because it helps answer some of the 
questions that have puzzled scholars for years regarding the African Children’s Rights Charter. 
Some have questioned the need for adopting an African regional treaty on the rights of the child. 
Others have questioned the extent to which the African Children’s Rights Charter truly embodies 
African particularities. In showing some points of convergence between legal and literary 
discourses on childhood, which are necessarily linked to cultural identity, this chapter also 
emphasizes the notion that the perception of African identity through the old prism of indigenous 
versus Western is anachronistic. Scholars (Diagne et al.; Eze) have consistently claimed that 
present-day African identity is in continual mutation. Eze, for instance, observed in his 2014 
article “Rethinking African Culture and Identity: The Afropolitan Model” that scholars are now 
considering “concepts such as contamination, cultural hybridity, cultural mutt, conviviality, and 
most recently Afropolitanism, as means to understand the complex modern African identity” 
(234). 
The adoption of the African Children’s Rights Charter generated interest because it was 
predicated on the clear intention to devise a children’s rights document that would focus on the 
                                               
1 Hereafter the African Children’s Rights Charter. 
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particularities of the African child. The contextual background set by the preamble provides 
some hints with regards to this intention. The preamble clearly states that the charter will attend 
to “the unique factors of the [African child’s] socioeconomic, cultural, traditional and 
developmental circumstances, natural disasters, armed conflicts, exploitation and hunger.” It also 
intends to account for the virtues of the African “cultural heritage, historical background and the 
values of the African civilization.” South African legal scholar Frans Viljoen, who has 
extensively studied the Charter and its creation process, notes that “to some extent the African 
initiative was born out of frustration with the UN process” (205). According to him, African 
nations were underrepresented during the drafting of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). Furthermore, Viljoen adds, divisive and emotive issues were omitted 
in the search for consensus between states with diverse political and social structures during that 
process. However, African nations widely ratified the CRC,2 adopted on November 20, 1989, a 
year before the African Children’s Rights Charter. Viljoen found it quite remarkable that the 
African nations were able to reach an agreement on such a highly sensitive issue in such a short 
period of time, especially when the same process within the United Nations to draft the CRC 
lasted about 10 years.3  
Given the rationale for the enactment of the African Children’s Rights Charter, scholars have 
been very critical of what they perceive as a redundancy and an inconsistency in its provisions. 
Scholars view the African Children’s Rights Charter first as redundant because it replicates 
several dispositions of the CRC. Thus, as Amanda Lloyd (2002) notes, the “Children’s Charter 
prides itself on its African perspective of rights, yet it was inspired by the trends evident in the 
UN system” (183). A common criticism voiced against the UN system in children’s rights 
scholarship is that it favors a Western liberal model. Even before the convention’s adoption, 
                                               
2	At present the CRC has been ratified by all African nations, as well as all of the world’s nations but one: the 
United States of America. 
3 The 10-year period spans the period between the submission by the Polish government of a draft on the rights of 
the child in 1979 during the International Year of the Child to the adoption of the CRC by the UN General Assembly 
in 1989.  
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some scholars went as far as to label it “a case of Eurocentricism in standard-setting” (Barsh 24). 
Following its adoption, others have warned against achieving normative universality on 
children’s rights through the “universalization of the norms and institutions of dominant 
cultures” (An Na’im 62). Some of the scholars who raise the question of redundancy in the 
African Children’s Rights Charter claim that it perpetuates and reinforces a Western model, 
while critically missing the expected African fingerprint. Chirwa, for instance, argues that the 
African children’s rights instrument “can be criticized as having a Western bias, due to the fact 
that it prescribes rights for children, which historically is alien to African culture” (30).  
In addition to the criticism of its alleged redundancy, the African Children’s Rights Charter is 
also criticized for its inconsistency. Critics say it claims an African specificity while at the same 
time rejecting some African cultural traditions and conceptions. As Thompson argues, the 
Charter’s preamble claims the regional cultural context in an unambiguous “familiar African 
regional conventional language” (434). Yet, on many topics, it explicitly restates the 
“fundamental principle of Western law” in matters affecting children (435). Thompson 
concludes that “it may be contended that the Charter, though a progressive regional instrument, 
may be on a collision course with African cultural heritage and traditions in so far as they relate 
to the status of children” (440). Similarly, Wanitzek contends that, contrarily to the contrast often 
perceived between the emphasis on the individual in international human rights and the focus on 
the community in African cultures, the provisions of the CRC are strongly related to the 
community whereas the African Children’s Rights Charter focuses on individual rights of the 
child to a degree that in some cases goes well beyond the scope of the CRC (276).  
As these critiques show, there is a misapprehension of the nature of the African Children’s 
Rights Charter. This is partly because, as anthropologist Michael Cernea noted about the African 
context in international development literature, “a number of myths about African society 
continue to underlie many project designs: that there is a ‘traditional African family structure that 
has remained the same since precolonial times’ ” (xiii). Cernea was primarily discussing 
development project designs directed towards the African continent, but his remarks also hold 
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true with regard to the commentaries on the African Children’s Rights Charter. What appears as 
a discrepancy in that Charter, for instance, is actually a reflection of the changing discourses on 
cultural identity on the continent. The connection between two phenomena—the nature of the 
Children’s Rights Charter and the mode of expression of cultural identity in African literature—
might help answer the concerns that critics have raised. This connection also entails accounting 
for the often-argued interrelation between human rights law and literature. Children’s rights 
discourses are not dissociable from discourses on childhood, especially literary discourses on 
childhood. Contemporary discourses on childhood owe much of their rationale to the conditions 
of the imagined child in literature, be these in European or African literature. The liberal notion 
of childhood enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child can be 
linked to the “cult of childhood” in romantic literature, and the multicultural and hybrid African 
childhood notion in the African Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child can be linked to 
Négritude literature and to the legacy of other related cultural discourses.  
Before discussing the legacy of Négritude literature for African children’s rights discourses, 
it is necessary to recall further some of the scholarly discussions that linked the literary 
imagination in general with the production of legal discourses. In her Poetic Justice: The 
Literary Imagination and Public Life (1996), Martha Nussbaum argues that legal discourses rely 
upon the imaginative vision of human life produced in literature. She made the case for 
understanding “literary imagination as public imagination,” contending that it constitutes one 
that “will steer judges in their judging, legislators in their legislating, policy makers in measuring 
the quality of life of people near and far” (3). Nussbaum’s linkage of literary discourses to legal 
reasoning is not an isolated case. Four years earlier, Richard Weisberg had published Poethics, 
and Other Strategies of Law and Literature, in which he deplores the new trend in the practice of 
law to turn away from its roots as a literary form and, consequently, to alienate itself from its 
heritage and from the public. Weisberg takes some of his examples from Cardozo’s legal 
opinions, which he presents as the successful merger of form and substance in groundbreaking 
and potentially controversial legal opinions. For instance, in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 
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Cardozo, using literary narrative techniques, depersonalized the plaintiff until she disappeared 
from the opinion, whereas in another case, Hynes v. New York Central Railroad, he emphasized 
the personality and humanity of the young Harvey Hynes as a way to bring him forth as the 
central character and hero of a struggle against impersonal corporate forces. Both Nussbaum’s 
and Weisberg’s books make use of literary narrative strategies as well as of the imagination of 
human sensibilities in great books of European and American literature to support their 
arguments for law’s indebtedness to literature. It is not surprising, then, that the law in question 
in their work is contemporary American case law, with its tradition of reliance on precedents. 
Other scholars writing beyond the US and comparing both common law and positive law (which 
develops a set code to ensure the precise and unbiased application of the law) have come up with 
claims similar to those of Nussbaum and Weisberg. Both Fiction and the Law: Legal Discourse 
in Victorian and Modernist Literature (1999) by Kieran Dolin and Literature and Legal 
Discourse: Equity and Ethics from Sterne to Conrad by Dieter Paul Polloczek study Victorian 
novelists—Charles Dickens and Joseph Conrad, among others—and grant to literature the 
capacity to intervene in broader social and legal dialogues. Dolin particularly made the case that 
novels could provide a forum for solving legal dilemmas, often through extralegal avenues, the 
“settling out of court,” in her words (193). Taking up the French context, Lynn Hunt traced, in 
Inventing Human Rights (2007), the conceptual roots of human rights discourses in the 
Enlightenment by providing a progressive use of lexicon such as “natural rights,” “rights of 
man,” and “rights of humanity,” which, streaming through epistolary novels such as Rousseau’s 
Julie and Samuel Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa, would foster a sense of individuality and 
empathy, ultimately preparing ideologically for the French Revolution’s Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen, as well as for various anti-torture measures and twentieth-century 
campaigns against human rights violations. Lynn Hunt’s scholarship is concerned with 
globalization and strives to integrate insights from various disciplines (i.e. history and political 
theory). Yet, it does not go beyond the Euro-American space. Only in Joseph Slaughter’s 2007 
work Human Rights Inc. does one find some reference to world literature, including African, in 
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the discussion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Joseph Slaughter links the focus of 
the Bildungsroman on tracing the spiritual, moral, psychological, and social development and 
growth of the main character to the idea of full development of the human personality found in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The overarching idea running through these 
different studies is that literature provides an imaginary forum in which legal ideals and practices 
may be explored. Nonetheless, the literary imaginary forum explored in these studies remains 
squarely located in the West.  
This chapter therefore aims to emphasize the distinctive case of the connection between 
African literary discourses and legal discourses. The choice of the topic of childhood is not, 
however, innocent. In previous chapters, I discussed how contemporary notions of childhood 
resulted from a changing image of childhood first celebrated in literature before shifting to 
legal/political discourses. In chapter 1, for instance, I showed how the notion of childhood in the 
West as a “carefree, safe, secure and happy phase of human existence” (Sommerville, quoted 
in Prout et al., 168) emerged in Romantic literature as a way of breaking away from what were 
considered “barbaric” medieval practices towards children, before winding its way to legal and 
political pronouncements at the beginning of the twentieth century. As shown in that chapter, the 
ideal of childhood celebrated or grieved in Romantic poetry and novels was in fact only available 
to the European ruling class, the bourgeoisie and their progeny, while at the same time, such 
agreeable childhood was quasi-inexistent for the working class and their children. Indeed, one of 
the criticisms of Philip Aries’s seminal book Century of Childhood (1960) is that it ignored other 
forms of childhood in Europe. In another authoritative book in the field of childhood and 
children’s rights, The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood (1992), Philip 
Veerman contends that Aries’s book “professes to deal with the child in general, whereas in 
reality it deals only with children of higher classes” (5). Interestingly, despite the criticism, 
Aries’s book remains one the most influential and vastly cited in the studies of childhood and 
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children’s rights,4 including in Veerman’s book. The latter is a comprehensive study in which 
Veerman explores the changing image of childhood, examining more than 40 children’s rights 
documents, from the beginning of the twentieth century and culminating in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the World Summit for Children of 1990, and 
he concludes that “ideas concerning the rights of children are dependent on the prevailing image 
of childhood…[and] when that image changes, the ideas about the rights of the child also 
changes”(10). 
In chapters 2 and 3, I have examined how the image of childhood as represented in oral 
literature shifted to an image of childhood consistent with colonial and, later, with postcolonial 
societies of Africa in Francophone African literature. Taking only the West African Francophone 
context as example, the two chapters showed significant connections in the way some traditional 
conceptions of childhood have been appropriated in first-wave childhood narratives. The child’s 
identity in narratives published by Camara Laye, Bernard Dadié, and Cheikh Hamidou Kane, in 
the 1950-1960s, which I have termed the first-wave narratives, would shift from its reliance on 
cultural traditions to an identity of the child as a “global citizen” in later third-wave childhood 
narratives by Ahmadou Kourouma, Tierno Monénembo, and Fatou Diome. In between these two 
waves, a second wave of narratives appears as a time of questioning of the cultural traditions 
celebrated in the early hours and as a contemplation of what was viewed as the alien and 
imposed colonial culture. Protagonists in L’enfant noir, Climbié, and L’aventure ambiguë, for 
instance, were initiated to the hard realities of adult life during their childhood. The agency of 
these child characters exemplifies the Akan proverb in the folktale “The Voice of the Child,” 
according to which “it is the ring of a child that does not fit a man, but not his food and certainly 
not his words” (54). The characters’ involvement in labor, initiation rites, and gender-specific 
activities also echoes the majority of the folk expressions explored. Yet, this situation was 
mitigated and sometimes rejected in the subsequent second-wave narratives such as De Tilene au 
                                               
4The three versions (French, English and Spanish) of the book listed on Google Scholar have been cited more than 
hundred thousand times, as of February 2019.  
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Plateau, Les danseuses d’Impé Eya, Une si longue lettre, Le Baobab fou, and Une vie 
hypothéquée. The notion of childhood asserted in the first wave and that contested in the second 
wave were merged in the third-wave narratives, where the local characters of L’ainé des 
orphelins, Allah n’est pas obligé, Le ventre de l’Atlantique, and La petite fille des eaux appear 
also as rebelling local children with multicultural and global awareness. This change brings 
about the significant influence of a double cultural heritage in the imagination of African 
childhood. This double cultural heritage, however, was theorized in three phases in Francophone 
African literature. It started with the Négritude literary movement, which first inspired some 
writers to anchor their poetic and novelistic imagination of the African child in a romantic 
cultural past, then later prompted other writers to react to this first tendency and finally to 
reclaim cultural mixture. 
The utilization of the image of the African child in the negotiation between local and 
imposed culture appears as a metaphor for an African identity under construction. In the 
Francophone African context, this identity discourse in literature remained markedly under the 
influence of Négritude, from the movement’s earlier racialized discourses to its later universalist 
ones. The questions must now be posed: what relationship exists between the portrayal of 
childhood in African literature and African children’s rights law, and what is the significance of 
such a connection? 
I argue that the African child’s representations in literature since the 1950s provide insights 
into the nature of the African cultural heritage and historical background that the African 
Children’s Rights Charter drafters envisioned. Indeed, as the previous chapters have shown, the 
literary portrayal of the African child followed the development of the literary discourses on 
cultural identity. These discourses moved from the depiction of a romanticized African 
traditional heritage consistent with the early Négritude philosophy to the depiction of 
multicultural childhood in line with a later Négritude, concerned with metissage and the 
civilization of the universal. This shift also describes the development of the African cultural 
heritage as shaped by the continent’s historical background of colonization. The child’s changing 
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image in literature appears therefore as a metaphor of the continent’s changing cultural heritage. 
Today, Africa claims a cultural heritage and historical background quite different from the 
popular imagery of traditionalism. It is this cultural heritage that the drafters of the African 
Children’s Rights Charter embraced. Hybridity, specifically, is one of the most prominent forms 
of artistic representation of cultural pluralism. While the use of hybridity in the literary 
imagination to make sense of the developing African cultural heritage is well documented in 
postcolonial studies, its relation to the use of hybridity in law is hardly postulated. Yet, in 
literature as in law, hybridity is becoming a common form of expressing cultural pluralism and 
heterogeneity. Legal pluralism, for instance, is regarded as the legal pendant of literary hybridity. 
On the topic of childhood, African writers using hybrid forms of writing have sought for decades 
to reconcile the past with the future, and similarly, African lawmakers have struggled with 
reconciling the local with the global, collating different legal systems. Legal hybridity, or legal 
pluralism, is gaining momentum precisely for the same reasons that the literary imagination 
turned to hybridity. Indeed, hybridity serves to bridge a gap, to reconcile differences, and create 
an equilibrium out of what would have otherwise been a conflictual situation. An example given 
by Diagne et al. (“Identity and Beyond”), in which those authors anecdotally cite Senghor’s 
cultural posture, illustrates this point more powerfully. The anecdote states that Senghor set 
ablaze many of his earlier poems; he would not proclaim having finally found his poetic voice 
until he began creating new poems that sound Sereer (his language) in French (21). In other 
words, Senghor found the equilibrium in the reconciliation of his African heritage with his 
colonial heritage. As Diagne puts it, African identities or Africanity in literature is not a fixed 
reality, “but rather is continuously created through the very process of writing” (19). Likewise, 
new forms of laws on the continent seek to imitate this self-reinvention process. A resistance 
against the current global call for legal reform, emphasizing a unilateral legal order, seems to 
motivate legal pluralism. Local leaders in Africa, for instance, seem to be banding against the 
“westernization” of international law. The rich social experience of local legal practices is 
merged with international practices to produce a new legal pluralism. This model has been more 
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thoroughly presented in Boaventura Santos’s Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, 
Globalization, and Emancipation. It is in “The Heterogeneous State and Legal Pluralism in 
Mozambique,” however, that he addresses this question more closely in the African context. 
Santos presents legal hybridization as reflecting a porosity of boundaries between the different 
legal orders and cultures in Mozambique. He provides, as evidence of deep cross-fertilizations, 
the multicultural plurality resulting from the interaction between modern law and traditional law 
(39) (see also Griffiths 38-39).  
In what follows, I discuss the legal pluralistic nature of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child as an echo of the literary imagination of the multicultural identity of the 
child in African literature. First, I provide a contextual understanding of the concept of legal 
pluralism; secondly, I outline the legal pluralist characteristics of the African Children’s Rights 
Charter and compare it to some childhood narratives; and thirdly, I offer a reading of the 
implications of such connections. 
  
2. The Concept of Legal Pluralism 
Legal pluralism is a situation in which “more than one legal system operate(s) in a single 
political unit” (Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense 89). The notion has been a topic of 
scholarly discussion since the 1920s within legal anthropology and the sociology of law, through 
studies of law in colonial and post-colonial regions of the world.5 It was meant to designate the 
incorporation or recognition of norms of customary law or institutions within state law (see 
Tamanaha 390). Legal pluralism subsequently spread and became an interdisciplinary field 
explored in a variety of disciplines. According to Brian Tamanaha, despite its apparent success, 
the notion was marked by deep conceptual confusion and controversy. These were motivated by 
the fact that legal pluralist scholars originate from various disciplines and bring different 
                                               
5 See Malinowsky, Crime and Custom in Savage Society. For the sociology of law, see Jackson, “Legal Pluralism 
between Islam and the Nation-State.” Jackson cites Erlich’s Fundamentals of the Sociology of Law (1936) as the 
beginning of the notion.   
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concepts and orientations to the subject. Tamanaha explains that in a context in which “the 
literature invoking the notion of legal pluralism covers a broad spectrum,” miscommunications 
and confusions over the notion are inevitable (391). The major controversy that emerged 
regarding the concept, however, is the definition of law. Social scientists who spearheaded the 
concept of legal pluralism emphatically reject the notion that law is limited to official state legal 
institutions, an ideology known as “legal centralism.” They insist that it encompasses the 
normative system of social groups of all kinds. But the controversy about “what is law?” 
remains, since the legal definition does not admit that there can be any other forms of law than 
those hailing from the state. 
In his 1986 article “What is Legal Pluralism?,” the seminal piece in the field and the most 
frequently cited article in legal pluralist literature, anthropologist John Griffiths introduced a 
binary distinction between what he termed “strong” and “weak” legal pluralism (5), now 
recognized as the basic point of reference. For Griffiths, “strong” legal pluralism is the fact that 
not all law is state law. On the contrary, there are multiple forms of normative ordering that do 
not necessarily rely on the state for their authority. What Griffiths terms “weak” legal pluralism 
is the case in which the state sponsors other systems of law (religious, customary). Other 
commentators such as Sherman A. Jackson contend that the distinction made by Griffiths was 
not value-neutral. It was “the inner workings of an ideological campaign to break the hegemonic 
influence” (2) of legal professionals and scholars for whom the notion of law refers to state law 
and to alternative systems of law recognized by the state. The binary dichotomy in legal 
pluralism came to be also known as “social science view” for “strong” and “juristic” for “weak” 
(see Merry, “Legal Pluralism” 871). 
However, as Tamanaha puts it, “it is not necessary to construct a social scientific conception 
of law in order to frame and study legal pluralism” (396). For him, the legitimacy of legal 
pluralism comes from “the fact that diverse, competing and overlapping legal orders in different 
types and forms appear to be everywhere and multiplying” (396). In his 1986 seminal piece, 
John Griffiths already recognized, for instance, that “legal pluralism is the fact” (4). It is also 
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“the name of a social state of affairs and it is a characteristic which can be predicated of a social 
group. It is not the name of a doctrine or a theory or an ideology” (12). Since legal pluralism is 
neither a theory nor an ideology, scholars continue to view it in light of social realities. David 
Pimentel, for instance, observes that legal pluralism as a contemporary reality reflects the idea 
that “in any society, and any state, the legal system will reflect a mélange of doctrines, 
institutions, and practices reflective of that country’s history, culture, and politics” (61). As this 
chapter hopes to show, Pimentel’s characterization of legal pluralism is not only accurate in 
contemporary society, it also reflects a colonial and postcolonial reality.  
The Enlightenment developed the view that positive law removed man from the state of 
nature and that it represents the yardstick for a civilized society, in contradistinction to primitive 
laws. European imperial conquest brought this view to other parts of the world. As Sally Engle 
Merry has rightfully observed, “for the proponents of empire in the nineteenth century, this 
imposition of European law was a great gift, substituting civilized law for the anarchy and fear 
that they believed gripped the colonized peoples, freeing them from the scourges of witchcraft, 
and tyranny” (870). Thus, on the African continent, the English and French overlaid their law 
onto indigenous law. The European legal system, modeled after capitalist interests, served the 
new extractive industries or the production of cash crops. Early in the twentieth century, social 
scientists became curious about the way in which precolonial societies maintained social order 
without European law (e.g., Malinowski’s Crime and Custom in Savage Society, originally 
published in 1926). Such studies yielded a wide variety of social control measures: custom, 
customary laws, and procedures. To the surprise of scholars, legal pluralism, which was a term 
not yet invented, was already taking place since colonized peoples had both indigenous and 
European law. Clifford Geertz, for instance, observed that indigenous law had been shaped by 
conquests and migrations for centuries. Geertz takes as example the legal complexity of Java, 
which resulted from the encounter of an original group of settlers from South China and North 
Vietnam with Indian states. These communities mingled with Chinese trading communities, 
Islamic missionaries, Dutch and British colonizers. Ever since, legal pluralism has been 
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reinforced in this area thanks to Japanese occupation forces and, more recently, the Indonesian 
state (226). However, in most colonized areas, the complexity of the legal landscape described 
above is one in which the colonial state defines the parameters for marking the jurisdictions of 
legal systems within its control and, in so doing, divides colonial and customary law into 
separate spheres. Thus, while plurality of normative orders existed, it was supposedly embodied 
within the state, which would either recognize customary law as lived in the communities and 
administered by state-recognized colonial officials or seek to specifically capture and define 
customary law in state codes. 
In this study, I am interested in a different form of legal pluralism, one that has been 
observed within international legal discourses. Speaking of the “emergence of international legal 
pluralism,” William White-Burke shared some of the metaphors deployed at the opening plenary 
of a symposium organized by the Michigan Journal of International Law in 2004 to “examine 
one of the defining problems for the future of international law.” White-Burke cites, for instance, 
Gerhard Hafner,6 describing international law as consisting “mostly of erratic blocks and 
elements as well as different partial systems.” Likewise, he quotes Joost Pauwelyn7 as saying 
that international law is “a universe of inter-connected islands.” These metaphors, he notes, 
concur with what Charles H. Koch, Jr.8 has called “judicial dialogue” with prospects for “legal 
multiculturalism.” These observations led White-Burke to conclude that “while most observers 
agree that there is not a unified international legal system, many still witness a significant degree 
of interconnection within the system” (963-964). 
The African Children’s Rights Charter is an international treaty which follows this trend on 
“legal multiculturalism.” What is remarkable about this charter, however, is the way in which its 
legal pluralistic features connect with cultural identity discourses, legible in literary creations. By 
                                               
6White-Burke quoted from Gerhard Hafner’s presentation, also published in 2004 as “Pros and Cons Ensuing from 
Fragmentation of International Law.” 
7Joost Pauwelyn is another presenter at the symposium from whom White-Burke quoted. Pauwelyn’s paper was 
published as “Bridging Fragmentation and Unity.” 
8Charles H. Koch, Jr. also presented at the symposium, and his paper was published as “Judicial Dialogue for Legal 
Multiculturalism.” 
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that, I mean the connection noticeable between the African Children’s Rights Charter’s form and 
content and African literary creative work on African childhood. In the present study, I therefore 
consider legal pluralism to encompass form and content and the way they both concur in the 
expression of cultural heterogeneity.  
 
3. The African Children’s Rights Charter: A Legal Pluralist Treaty 
The African Children’s Rights Charter is legal pluralist, because it is hybrid and 
heterogeneous. The charter shares with childhood literature a fascination for mixture, both at the 
formal (aesthetic) and content (ethical) level. I consider these two elements as complementary in 
my discussion of the charter’s pluralistic characteristics. While classical legal theory is obsessed 
with ethics, postmodern legal theory is increasingly taking an interest in aesthetics.9 In his book 
Songs without Music, the historian, legal theorist, and musician Desmond Manderson argues that 
“by treating a text, legal or otherwise, as if it were merely a sequence of logical propositions, 
readers miss its formal and symbolic meanings” (x). In the same vein, Sophia McClennen and 
Joseph Slaughter suggest that in the humanistic study of human rights, there is something 
missing “when such texts are taught with little or no attention to the forms of their expression” 
(7). Furthermore, narrative theorists have long argued that content and form converge in the 
whole meaning of any text. In Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film 
(1978), Seymour Chatman, a structuralist and film theorist, posits that there are at least two 
levels in a narrative text: what is told and how it is told. He describes the what as the story, 
whereas he identifies the how as the discourse (19). Story and discourse are obvious references to 
content and form. This characterization is taken further in Hayden White’s The Content of the 
Form (1990), where he stresses that a narrative is “not merely a neutral discursive form,” but 
rather one that “entails ontological and epistemic choices with distinct ideological and even 
                                               
9 The large and still growing literature on postmodern legal theory and aesthetics includes Manderson. Songs without 
Music; Minda, Postmodern Legal Movements; Douzinas et al., Politics, Modernity, and Critical Legal Studies; 
Douzinas et al., Postmodern Jurisprudence; Cook, “Reflections on Postmodernism” and “Postmodernism and Law”; 
and Hunt, “The Big Fear.” 
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specifically political implications” (ix). Thus, the formal choices made in the writing of 
narratives are not always devoid of meaning, and these choices have the potential to powerfully 
contribute to the construction of meaning. A legal document such as the African Children’s 
Rights Charter is not a narrative per se, but scholars—legal and humanists (see Slaughter; 
Dworkin; Weisberg)—often encourage the reading of legal document as a narrative, for they are 
both the result of emplotment. In examining a text that strives to make sense of the social reality 
of the African child, it is also important to look at the signs and symbols by which legal meaning 
is generated. These formal features are best understood when considered as an aesthetic of 
representation.  
Thus, I begin with the assumption that the form of something is part of its meaning. Legal 
documents demand a particular form, which is rigidly controlled as a way to convey the sense of 
authority. Even the packaging, the size and the displaying of legal documents, is symbolic 
(Manderson 38). For a productive discussion of how the form of the African Children’s Rights 
Charter contributes to the creation of its legal meaning, I borrow from Manderson’s tri-
dimensional approach to reading aesthetics in law, outlined in Songs without Music: the 
Methodological Dimension, the Epistemological Dimension, and the Normative Dimension.  
According to Manderson, the Methodological Dimension is an approach that deals with 
aesthetics as a methodology. The purpose of such an approach is to be able to “discern meaning 
in the form and language of the law and to read it with subtlety and imagination” (43). The 
approach is convenient for examining the African Children’s Rights Charter because it enables 
us to identify what else is being said—sotto voce—in the margins and metaphors of the law. 
Furthermore, in African epistemology, the aesthetic is produced through “significant forms,” in 
the sense used by Clive Bell, which command that African art be read as signs that manifest a 
metaphysics (see Diagne’s “African Art as Philosophy”).10 
                                               
10 “Significant form” is Bell’s theory of art criticism, according to which purely formal qualities, such as the 
relationships and combinations of lines and colors, constitute the most important elements in works of art. Bell 
described this theory in his books Art (1914) and Since Cézanne (1922).  
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The title of the African Children’s Rights document as a point of entry provides important 
clues to its form. The title reads “African Charter of the Rights and Welfare of the Child.” This 
wording is indicative of the scope to which the charter aspires. Not only is it a “charter,” but its 
scope also covers the “rights” and “welfare” of the child. The sense of plurality suggested in this 
title is reinforced by the legal definition of “charter,” which is twofold. According to the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary of Legal Terms, it is either “a grant or guarantee of rights, powers, 
or privileges from an authority or agency of a state or country” or “a written instrument that 
creates and defines the powers and privileges of a city, educational institution, or corporation.” 
The African Children’s Rights Charter is obviously of both types. It is both a guarantee of rights 
from an authority and a founding document for children’s rights on the continent. The term 
“charter” not only gives this document a double significance; it also puts it in dialogue with its 
counterpart, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. While the term “charter” designates 
particularly formal and solemn instruments, such as the foundational treaty of an international 
organization (i.e. the Charter of the United Nations), a “convention” is a formal agreement 
between states, that is, it is synonymous with the generic term “treaty” (see Meganck and 
Saunier). The difference in terminology might make one wonder whether a hierarchy of authority 
is implied between the two documents. Yet, there are many reasons to believe that the use of the 
term “charter” only serves an aesthetic and performative function. Indeed, following a period of 
international non-hierarchical legal order, in 1945, the United Nations propounded its Charter as 
the head of international law, with the explicit statement in its article 103 that obligations to the 
United Nations prevail over all other treaty obligations. Later, the 1969 Vienna Convention set 
up a new hierarchy of norms, according to which there should be no treaties in conflict with a 
peremptory norm of general international law—jus cogens (article 53). The article specifies that 
“for the purposes of this Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a standard to 
which no derogation is permitted and which can only be modified by a new norm of general 
international law having the same character.” It follows that the African Children’s Rights 
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Charter, a regional document, does not have the same global authority, “the same character,” as 
the CRC, to which its preamble even refers, and cannot therefore supersede it. Yet, the term 
“charter” commands respect and is used in the title of the African Children’s Rights document 
for that very purpose. The term “charter” has been used in previous African documents, such as 
the founding treaty of the OAU (1963), whose goal was to fight against colonialism and 
apartheid,11 and in the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). The distinctive 
features of these documents have been described as reflecting “traditional African cultural 
values” and “being a welcome step, however small, in the direction of greater involvement and 
commitment by the OAU in the field of human rights.” The use of the term “charter” in all these 
documents appears to be purely symbolic and of performative value, which might be better 
understood as an aesthetics of the quest for esteem. The continent’s legal system did not develop 
out of a vacuum. The history of colonialism has put the continent in a position of constant 
struggle to assert itself, sometimes in a pedantic way. It must be noted that the pedantic approach 
did not only manifest itself in law. Scholars have extensively documented the various ways in 
which postcolonial African rulers sought to exhibit a sense of grandiloquence by building 
landmarks to compete with industrialized western countries. An example is the work of Lagae 
and De Raedt (178-179, see also Elleh), who documented the case of President Mobutu of Zaire. 
Mobutu resorted to his political doctrine of recours à l’authenticité to try to topple the legacies 
of Belgian colonial architecture. Working with Eugène Palumbo, an Italian architect, the Zairian 
leader designed several iconic public buildings whose architectural language evoked both 
“authentic” Congolese culture and notions of progress and modernity. In other aspects of 
political life, rulers also sought to adopt the highest title of authority as was the case, for 
instance, for “Marechal Mobutu” in Zaire or “Emperor Bokassa” in the Central African 
Republic. With these titles, these rulers sought to appear as more powerful than their 
counterparts in western countries, who have titles like “president.” The idea of appropriating the 
                                               
11Article II (d) states, the Charter’s purpose is among others: “To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.” 
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colonizer’s language, art, and philosophy and improving it with one’s own culture influenced 
every aspect of African life, including law. This state of affairs is another phenomenon, like the 
literary discourses on cultural identity, that contributed to legal pluralism at the state level (as 
documented by Santos) but also, at the regional level, in the African Children’s Rights Charter.   
Another indication of legal pluralism resides in the capitalized heading for each article in the 
African Children’s Rights Charter. This feature is the continuation of a tradition initiated since 
the OAU’s charter and has been replicated in the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
While these headings do not add to the substantive provisions, they are meant to summarize the 
content of the articles, a duplication that echoes the aesthetics of repetition often found in oral 
tradition. This is not to imply that African legal instruments invented the use of headings in 
treaty writing. Other instruments such as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duty of 
Man have used them as far back as 1948. However, the use of this style in African documents 
seems to follow the trend of departing from anything considered to be purely Western aesthetics. 
In using Manderson’s Methodological Dimension approach to reading aesthetics in law, I 
have attempted to read beyond what the African Children’s Rights Charter explicitly states. Of 
major importance are the aesthetic and performative value of a bombastic title such as “charter” 
and the attempts at repetition and a neater and cleaner presentation of these documents by the 
adjunction of headings for each article. These features are marks of struggle to make sense of the 
colonialist past. The term “charter” does not mean that the document is hierarchically higher, nor 
do the headings mean that it is more elaborate or has a wider scope than the CRC, as the word 
“welfare” in the title suggests. These features are simply meant to bear witness to the fact that 
regional African legal realities emerged out of a context of colonial struggle, which necessitates 
a mixture of this legacy with the native heritages.   
The second of the three dimensions devised by Manderson is the Epistemological 
Dimension. This dimension speaks to two aspects of aesthetics in relation to law. The first, the 
expository power of aesthetics, helps enrich legal texts by considering their use of figurative 
language. The second uses aesthetics to explore the genesis of legal texts. According to 
 205 
Manderson, the usefulness of this second approach is to show that aesthetics offer insights into 
why a particular legal principle was developed or why it has developed as it has (44). 
An illustration of the first kind of aesthetics (expository) is the notion of the child’s education 
in the African children’s charter. The provision referring to education, article 11, is the longest of 
the charter. Indeed, this article is a metaphor of the elasticity of the notion of education. The 
CRC assumes education to be equal to schooling and deals with this question in two articles—28 
and 29—of about equal length. Article 28 deals with the rights to education, and article 29 is 
about the aim of the child’s education. Article 28 has three paragraphs, of which the first reads as 
follows: 
 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right 
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and 
vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate 
measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of 
need; 
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means; 
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all 
children; 
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out rates. 
 
Read between the lines, paragraph 1 of article 28 of the CRC is clearly an emphasis on formal 
education and its schooling approach. By using specific terminology—“primary education” (a), 
“secondary education” (d), “higher education” (c), “vocational” (d)—article 28 is listing what 
counts as education. The two other paragraphs in this article are about measures to be taken by 
the state to ensure that school discipline does not undermine the child’s human dignity, and about 
cooperation among states to help developing countries in the “elimination of ignorance and 
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illiteracy” and access to “modern teaching methods.” Article 29 of the CRC merely enumerates 
the goals of such education.  
A different approach is noticeable in article 11 of the African Children’s Rights Charter. 
A negotiation of meaning takes place between the assertion of the European schooling system 
and the intertextuality of the African informal socialization system. Article 11 has four 
paragraphs, of which the two first—most relevant to the discussion—are presented below:  
 
1. Every child shall have the right to education. 
2. The education of the child shall be directed to: 
a. the promotion and development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and 
physical abilities to their fullest potential; 
b. fostering respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms with particular reference to 
those set out in the provisions of various African instruments on human and peoples’ 
rights and international human rights declarations and conventions; 
c. the preservation and strengthening of positive African morals, traditional values and 
cultures; 
d. the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding, tolerance, dialogue, mutual respect and friendship among all peoples, 
ethnic, tribal and religious groups; 
e. the preservation of national independence and territorial integrity; 
f. the promotion and achievement of African Unity and Solidarity; 
g. the development of respect for the environment and natural resources; 
h. the promotion of the child’s understanding of primary health care. 
 
The first paragraph of the article simply states the right of the child to education. Then, 
the second paragraph proceeds to enumerate the various aims of the child’s education. This 
article, through its multiple paragraphs, shifts the focus from naming what counts as education to 
enumerating the various means by which education can be achieved. Weisberg’s example above 
about Benjamin Cardozo is edifying on how law writers can use literary techniques to bring a 
topic into focus or deemphasize it. By enumerating the various aims of the child’s education, 
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article 11 seems to emphasize the importance of the goal rather than the means to achieve it. 
Indeed, there are various ways to achieve education, and some scholars have argued that pre-
colonial Africa possessed formal centers (see Cleaveland; Diagne, “Toward an Intellectual 
History”)12 of learning and scholarship, alongside the informal education system. The 
socialization system, more common, has often been the focus of scholars discussing African 
traditional education. It is obvious that many of the goals enumerated in article 11 cannot be 
fulfilled within the formal schooling framework. In Article 11, paragraph 2, lines (c) to (h) are 
clearly references to the African traditional socialization method of education. As Felix Boateng 
observed, “[t]raditional African education was not only there to be acquired, but it was actually 
there to be lived. Children acquired education through the maintenance of and participation in 
sociopolitical and religious institutions that ensured effective means of communication between 
the different generations” (322).  Schooling does not seem indispensable to achieve for instance, 
the “preservation of national independence and territorial integrity” (line (e)). Only by 
participating in sociopolitical life can the African child contribute to this goal. Similarly, the 
notions of “preservation and strengthening of positive African morals, traditional values and 
cultures” (line (c)), “the promotion and achievement of African Unity and Solidarity” (line (f)), 
“respect for the environment and natural resources” (line g)), and the “understanding of primary 
health care” (line h)) are reminiscent of the teachings of initiation rites wherein the ideas of 
“solidarity,” respect for  “nature,” and lessons on the use of plants constitute the basics of 
building community and survival techniques (Boateng; Adeyemi and Adeyinka). Augustus 
Adeyinka, defining education from an African perspective, states that it is “the process of 
transmitting the culture of a society from one generation to the other, the process by which the 
adult members of a society bring up the younger ones” (19). For Adeyinka, education is a three-
way process: there is first the generation that inherits the culture of the society from the elders; 
then they transform the culture they inherited and adapt it to their own situation; finally, they 
                                               
12 The centers discussed by Cleaveland and Diagne refer to centers of scholarship as opposed to the more informal 
socialization system.  
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pass on the modified culture to the generation following them. In contemporary highly urbanized 
and technological society, the notion of education is a more complex one. The African 
Children’s Rights Charter accounts for this aspect in the remaining paragraphs of article 11. 
Paragraph 3 lists obligations placed on state parties to take measures to achieve the full 
realization of the child’s educational right in the modern sense of “basic education,” “secondary 
education,” and “higher education” and to encourage regular attendance. Having acknowledged 
formal education in the previous paragraph, paragraph 4 demands that state parties respect the 
rights and duties of parents to choose for their children “schools other than those established by 
public authorities.” Paragraph 5 protects the child against inhuman parental discipline, and 
paragraph 6 provides for children who become pregnant to be given an opportunity to continue 
their education. Finally, paragraph 7 tries to reconcile “the liberty of individuals and bodies to 
establish and direct educational institutions” with the “minimum standards as may be laid down 
by the States.” The language of reconciliation of two systems is additional evidence of the 
heterogeneity of the African Children’s Rights Charter, and the complexity of the issues it seeks 
to address is also manifest, at least in part, in the length of article 11.  
The expository effect of aesthetics as outlined in Manderson’s Epistemological Dimension 
has been helpful in reading the legal text through its figurative language. Claims by critics that 
the African Children’s Rights Charter is not African enough are unfounded. Reading beyond the 
text helps understand the language of the form and how it contributes to postulate an African 
perspective. But what is an African perspective today? While myths about African society have 
“remained the same since precolonial times” (Cernea xiii), the literature on childhood examined 
in the previous chapter has shown a progressive change. As Adeyinka outlined, the African 
culture bequeathed from generation to generation does not remain static. The generation that 
inherits the culture from the elders leaves its imprint on the culture being legated. The changes 
imparted on the culture explain why the new generation inherits a much different cultural 
heritage than the elders. In the case of the African child, such heritage is incontestably charged 
with a history of colonization.  
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Contemporary African cultural heritage, as envisioned in the African Children’s Rights 
Charter, can be further explained under the second aspect of Manderson’s Epistemological 
Dimension. This aspect of aesthetics serves to explore the genesis of legal texts. It helps 
understand why a given legal principle was developed or why it has developed as it has. Using 
this second aspect, I shall attempt to explain what Thompson has misread as provisions in a 
“collision course with African traditions.” In his criticism, Thompson notes that the African 
Children’s Rights Charter takes a distance from child marriage, which he implies to be an 
African tradition. Thompson notes more prescriptively: 
 
In Africa the main purpose of heterosexual relationship is procreation. Marriage is deemed to be 
the only appropriate framework for accomplishing this aim. The age of marriage is set by 
reaching puberty. In most tribal communities, parents often give away their daughters in marriage 
to suitable men, who are able and willing to pay the dowry, at an age as early as nine or ten. Girls 
in those communities are, therefore, viewed as ready and suitable partners for sexual relations at 
an early age. This is critical. (439-440) 
In Thompson’s description, parents do not seem to have any moral or emotional 
considerations when it comes to “give away” their own female children “at an age as early as 
nine or ten” to suitable men, inasmuch as they are able and willing to pay the dowry. He then 
rejoices that the African Children’s Rights Charter prohibits these practices. Indeed, article 21 of 
the Charter makes provisions for the protection against “harmful social and cultural practices.” 
This provision reads as follows:  
 
1. State Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate harmful social 
and cultural practices affecting the welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child 
and in particular: 
a. those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or life of the child; and 
b. those customs and practices discriminatory to the child on the grounds of sex or other status. 
2. Child marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys shall be prohibited and effective action, 
including legislation, shall be taken to specify the minimum age of marriage to be 18 years and 
make registration of all marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
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The first paragraph seeks to curtail those practices ingrained in previous African social and 
cultural practices, which have become obsolete and harmful, following the emergence of new 
realities and knowledge. The second paragraph of article 21 speaks to child marriage. The 
provision prohibits the practice, without claiming it as an African “custom.” In Thompson’s 
criticism, however, child marriage is synonymous with African tradition. As evidence for this 
rationalization, Thompson cites one of his own articles (written with Edna Erez) titled “Rape in 
Sierra Leone: Conflict between the Sexes and Conflict of Laws,” a paper with no reference to 
children being suitable partners for sexual relations.  
Thompson seems to misinterpret the inclusion of the child marriage prohibition provision in 
the African Children’s Rights Charter as the recognition by Africans that child marriage is one of 
their ancestral customs. It must be noted that the scourge of the betrothal of children and of child 
marriage as a whole is deplored worldwide and is not the exclusivity of a continent. The same is 
true for the plague of children’s sexual abuse, which is still a global issue. In Anne-Marie 
Addiaffi’s Une vie hypothéquée (Mortgaged Life, 1983), we learn of the misconduct of a father 
whose greed leads him to promise his daughter to a rich elderly man. The conduct of the father in 
every aspect is in contradiction with the Akan matrilineal system, which serves as framework for 
the fictional story. This is not to say that child marriage is not a reality and cannot exist in the 
Akan society. However, between what is considered an unquestionable cultural tradition and the 
abuse of the authority of patriarchs, there is a nuance to be considered. Even when a minority of 
the myriads of tribal communities existing in Africa consider the practices described by 
Thompson to be customary, stories such as Une vie hypothéquée remind us that the issue is more 
complex and does not warrant the essentialization of criminal behavior as if it represented 
practices unquestioned at the African family and community level. Thompson’s criticism of 
parents giving away their daughters at 9 or 10 years of age in marriage to suitable men in 
exchange for dowry on the assumption that they are suitable sexual partners is reminiscent of the 
theory of children’s mistreatment by their medieval European parents. Scholars such as historian 
Linda Pollock have demonstrated that parents did love and pamper their children in medieval 
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Europe, as they still do today. Such universal ideas that children are precious, loved, and revered 
come across in several African folk stories, including “A Mother’s Love,” reviewed in chapter 2. 
One can understand that African parents may love their children, and a dowry, which in some 
cases is symbolic, cannot justify the parental actions described by Thompson.13 In chapter 2, I 
also examined “Taweloro,” a folktale about parents who did not want to give their daughter in 
marriage even to the richest and highest-status suitor. Exploiting children is never a positive 
cultural norm. When it happens, it represents an abuse, even if tolerated by a corrupt patriarchal 
system. Some examples are provided in chapter 3, where we see in De Tilene au Plateau that 
Nafissatou Diallo’s cousin Ami was given in marriage, and in Sous l’orage where the younger 
generation opposed the decision of Kany’s father to give her in marriage to Famangan, the 
wealthy old merchant. In these two instances, the decision to marry these young women/girls is 
motivated by various levels of interests, including the personal gain of the patriarchs involved. In 
Ami’s case, she consents and is happy to be married. As a “gifted and disadvantaged” child 
whose biological parents are no longer alive, she finds marriage to be a getaway from the huge 
load of housework she has been subjected to. The mistreatment of “gifted and disadvantaged” 
children in the ancient context was supposed to be punished by the deities. In the modern 
context, the African Children’s Rights Charter plays this role. In Kany’s case, there is the pursuit 
of personal gain by the father. The search for personal interest is in fact contradictory to the 
tenets of the communitarian way of life pervasive in African societies. Yet, these practices are 
possible since people who hold authority can always interpret cultural norms to fit their own 
interests. Kany’s father may invoke norms such as the respect owed to parents by children. 
While one might assume that this norm is therefore a weakness of the African customs, the 
African Children’s Rights Charter drafters paradoxically considered it to be one of the values of 
African civilization and enshrined it in article 31, which is discussed below.  
                                               
13 The point of view of Beninese playwright Camille Amouro presented on p. 174 also answers Thompson’s 
concern. Amouro contends in the preface of La petite fille des eaux that the issue of child abuse is one of individual 
failure to safeguard the intrinsic respect for human dignity, irrespective of age, origin, or gender, rather than the 
norms of a given society.    
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I discuss article 31 with an approach described in Manderson’s scheme as the Normative 
Dimension of aesthetics. Manderson argues that “legal theories themselves are marked by 
conflicting aesthetic values, which helps us to understand the nature of their disagreements” (45). 
Manderson believes that diverging legal norms can be understood by developing a vision of the 
role of law in society as being “both critical and pluralist” (45). Article 31 of the African 
Children’s Rights Charter, titled “The Responsibility of the Child,” displays an aesthetics which 
bears the mark of this criticism and pluralism. As a criticism, this article formulates a divorce 
from mainstream approaches to children’s rights, according to which children have no 
responsibility. Article 31 states:  
 
Every child shall have responsibilities towards his family and society, the State and other legally 
recognized communities and the international community. The child, subject to his age and 
ability, and such limitations as may be contained in the present Charter, shall have the duty: 
a. to work for the cohesion of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at 
all times and to assist them in case of need; 
b. to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its 
service; 
c. to preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity; 
d. to preserve and strengthen African cultural values in his relations with other members 
of the society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and to contribute to 
the moral well-being of society; 
e. to preserve and strengthen the independence and the integrity of his country; 
f. to contribute to the best of his abilities at all times, and at all levels, to the promotion 
and achievement of African Unity. 
 
The notion that children may have responsibility is controversial. Although the language of duty 
exists in other human rights documents (see Sloth-Nielsen and Mezumur), it did not raise 
questions until it was introduced in the African Children’s Rights Charter.14 Critics have raised 
concerns about the intentions of this provision. Gose, for instance, raises concerns with regard to 
the obligation of the child to “respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times,” as it can be 
                                               
14The American Declaration of the Rights and Duty of Man (1948), which the USA, Cuba, and Canada did not 
ratify, stipulates in its article 30: “the duty of children to honor their parents always and to aid, support and protect 
them when they need it.”  
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understood as “constituting a duty of obedience” (40). Prior to Gose, Van Bueren (1998) had 
expressed concerns that this responsibility is the “risk that the child will be exploited by family 
members and that it may be regarded as a debt for which children are obliged to compensate 
their parents.” She adds that “the responsibility to respect parents and their elders at all times is 
qualitatively different and too unquestioning and general” (76). Other commentators such as 
Chirwa have also regretted that it “may undermine the child’s right to participate in decision 
making in matters affecting the child in particular and in other matters in general” (169). These 
concerns reflect the questions raised in the intergenerational conflict depicted in the African 
creative literature on childhood examined in chapter 3. The role of a novel such as Sous l’orage, 
in which Kany’s father might invoke the respect due to a parent as a justification for his 
unilateral decision to marry the young girl to the rich merchant, was precisely to warn against the 
“storm” (l’orage) that some conceptions and practices may create for the future generations. The 
author, Seydou Badian, suggested the way out, recommending African wisdom. Forty years 
later, the drafters of the African Children’s Rights Charter seemed to suggest a different 
approach for the same result: safeguarding the spirit of the African cultural heritage. By 
enshrining article 31 in the African Children’s Rights Charter, they aimed to achieve various 
normative goals.   
One such Normative Dimension is the fact that it provides a modern and contextual 
framework in which this norm is to be applied. Legal and customary rules are made for social 
regulation. Yet, these rules can lose their relevance as the context in which they make sense 
changes. When such a situation happens, our modernist reading is to say that the ancient rule is 
not good. In reality, the rule may still be good and needs to be adapted to the context. Article 31 
is an attempt to provide a modern context for norms that are ingrained in African societies and 
which might continue to be applied according to the old context. Both Viljoen (1998) and Sloth-
Nielsen (2008) display a good understanding of this aesthetics of article 31 when they retort to 
critics such as Gose, Van Bueren, and Chirwa that their arguments are hardly a fair interpretation 
of the African Children’s Rights Charter drafters’ intent. According to Viljoen, “if a holistic 
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approach is adopted, the duty of obedience may be reconciled with, for example, the prohibition 
of harmful cultural practices,” set out in the same charter (211). As for Sloth-Nielsen, the 
criticisms “somewhat misconstrue the positive values that the provision seeks to promote” (176). 
Indeed, article 31 seeks to promote a positive value that takes stock of the ways in which ancient 
rules are continuing to be applied. By making it a rule of the African Children’s Rights Charter, 
there is no likelihood that a scenario such as the father of Kany pressing her to marry the old 
Famagan could succeed. In fact, this article cannot be claimed independently of article 1, which 
is about the “Obligation of State Parties.” This article stipulates among other things that:  
 
1. Member States of the Organization of African Unity, Parties to the present Charter shall 
recognize the rights, freedoms and duties enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake the 
necessary steps, in accordance with their Constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Charter, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to 
the provisions of this Charter. 
2. Nothing in this Charter shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the realization of 
the rights and welfare of the child contained in the law of a State Party or in any other 
international Convention or agreement in force in that State. 
3. Any custom, tradition, cultural or religious practice that is inconsistent with the rights, duties 
and obligations contained in the present Charter shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be 
discouraged. 
A holistic reading of the African Children’s Rights Charter will prove that Kany’s father would 
face the restrictions imposed by article 1 of the Charter, which account for the modern context. 
The father’s intent would also fall short before other conflicting articles, including article 4: Best 
Interests of the Child; article 7: Freedom of Expression; article 10: Protection of Privacy; and 
article 27: Sexual Exploitation. In other words, whoever seeks to apply article 31 needs to 
actualize the interpretation of the child’s responsibility. 
The foregoing has been an examination of the role of law in society as being “critical.” 
What follows is about its “pluralist” dimension as theorized by Manderson (45). Indeed, article 
31 provides a pluralistic framework to better appreciate the “holistic approach” that would 
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valorize the “positive value” of article 31. A better understanding of the provision would be to 
place it in the pluralistic cultural framework of postcolonial Africa. The aesthetic of the 
reasoning behind the formulation of article 31 is to be grasped beyond the scripted words. It 
reflects the vision of metissage, which commands to reconcile two distinct entities or systems. 
The legal pluralistic approach of the African Children’s Rights Charter as a whole has led critics 
to see it as having a “Western bias” (Chirwa 30) or as focusing “on individual rights of the child 
in a degree that in some cases goes well beyond the scope of the CRC” (Wanitzek 276). The 
aesthetics involved in article 31 is to prove the ability to have both “European bias” and “African 
bias.” 
If article 31 can be viewed as the African cultural fingerprint (Ncube 21), other 
provisions of the Charter, such as article 2, are also viewed as radical Western biases. Indeed, the 
definition of the child in article 2 is not viewed as African. As Ncube notes, the movement from 
childhood to adulthood in the traditional approach “contrasts sharply with the philosophy 
underlying the approach of international human rights instruments on children’s rights which are 
based on the idea that upon the attainment of a certain predetermined age, in this case 18 years, a 
person transforms into an autonomous, independent and fully capable adult” (20). The CRC has 
been discouraged from following this definition. Yet, the African charter embraced it more 
powerfully in article 2 to mark its ability to relinquish some of the ancient African conceptions. 
This propensity of the Charter to compromise must also be distinguished from inaccurate 
assumptions that notions such as individual rights are “European bias” incorporated in the 
African Charter (Wanitzek 276). The widespread scholarly assumption that, in African 
traditional society, the rights of the individual are conceived as being always tied to those of the 
group, in the sense that such individual rights and entitlements are always submerged into those 
of the group, the family, or even the community as a collective (Ncube 20-21) is specious. As 
Diagne (“Individual, Community, and Human Rights”) has shown, based on the Kurukan Fugan, 
the medieval charter of the Malian empire, rights in traditional Africa are also understood as 
being individual. The African Children’s Rights Charter’s aesthetics is not just meant to look 
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pluralist by bringing traditional notions (such as the child’s responsibility) under the purview of 
modern notions of children’s rights ingrained in the Enlightened notions of “freedom” and 
“equality,” it also claims views that are regarded to be Western (such as “individual rights”) as 
African. 
Furthermore, article 31 does represent the unseen African communitarian perspective. 
Ideas such as “to work for the cohesion of the family,” “to serve his national community,” “to 
preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity,” and “to contribute to the … achievement 
of African Unity” are undoubtedly rooted in community building and development. It is also 
about having a role in the chain of this solidary community. In fact, in this communitarian 
perspective, the person is not defined by metaphysical characteristics; he or she is a subject to 
whom communal values are imparted. Individuals therefore need to see beyond their own 
individuality, which clearly does not deprive them of their individuality or their individual 
entitlements in private and public matters. Discussing the West African Akan people as an 
example, Gyekye (1995) explains for instance that “the concern for human welfare constitutes 
the hub of the Akan axiological wheel” (143). The axiological wheel is to be understood as a tool 
to serve the collectivity, while also serving individuals within the collectivity. Reciprocally, a 
disservice to the individual affects the community. In other words, there is a reciprocal idea of 
caring in human welfare which is supposed to enhance harmony among individuals in the 
community. Article 31, in this sense, represents an additional step towards the reconciliation of 
the multiple with the singular. 
Manderson’s Normative Dimension was helpful in understanding the significance of the 
conflicting values of article 31. The Normative Dimension has made it possible to see that this 
article not only epitomizes a politics of contestation, but it also departs from mainstream 
children’s rights law to express its legal pluralistic characteristics, as well as its ability to perform 
self-criticism.  
Overall, the review of these few articles has shown that they also relate to one another in 
producing the aesthetics of contestation which motivated the creation of the African Children’s 
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Rights Charter. An important formal characteristic not to be missed is the rhythm and rhyme that 
clearly connects articles 1, 21, and 31. Article 1 claims two cultural systems and proclaims that 
whenever an “inconsistency” arises between the two systems, “custom, tradition, cultural or 
religious practices” should be discouraged. This approach is reinforced in article 21, which 
rejects some African cultural traditions. Yet the focus of article 31 is to consecrate some other 
African cultural traditions. This process of pick and mix is an attempt to construct a vision of the 
postcolonial African identity steeped in multiculturalism.  
Both the claiming and the rejection of norms participate in the pick and mix that 
strengthens the pluralistic characteristics of the African Children’s Rights Charter. More broadly, 
notions borrowed from the CRC feature alongside those disregarded in this global treaty, such as 
the notion of “protection against apartheid,” which appears in article 28, and the notion of “gifted 
and disadvantaged children,” in article 11. While the term apartheid recalls a history of 
colonization, the notion of “gifted and disadvantaged children” makes reference to a category of 
the most vulnerable children present in the African folklore, and repeated in African novels (e.g., 
Amy in De Tilene au Plateau).  
As this analysis shows, beyond the subject matter with which it deals and the principles it 
states—separate from the functional aspects of legal writing—the aesthetics and the ethics of the 
African Children’s Charter tell us about the context in which it was developed and the 
understanding of social relations and the legal order which operated to produce it. Manderson’s 
three dimensions were useful in this analysis. This scholar developed the tri-dimensional scheme 
by creatively using music as a model to demonstrate that law is not a sterile, rational structure, 
but a cultural form to be valued and enhanced through rhetoric and metaphors, form, images, and 
symbols.  
 
4. Convergence of Literature and Law, Hybridity and Childhood:  
Possible Implications 
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The convergence of law and literature, hybridity and childhood as examined throughout the 
preceding chapters suggests a possible discourse on cultural identity. Cultural identity discourses 
transpire in African literary creative works, through the use of what Abiola Irele identifies as 
“both a convergence of theme and a common preoccupation with modes of address of a new self-
formulation” (4). In her 2001 book The African Imagination: Literature in Africa and the Black 
Diaspora, Irele refers to African imagination as “a conjunction of impulses that have given a 
unified expression in a body of literary texts” (4). Irele acknowledges that Africa is not a 
homogenous nation in the ordinary sense, with a literature being the mode of the collective 
expression of its people and its heritage. What makes the African imagination possible and 
recognizable, however, according to her is this literature with a distinctive corpus of works by 
Africans, situated in relation to a global experience that embraces both the precolonial and the 
modern frames of reference. Irele adds that “the most fruitful way of characterizing modern 
African literature in European languages in order to understand what appears to be its double 
formal relation…is to see it as an effort to reintegrate a discontinuity of experience in a new 
consciousness and imagination…in terms of both themes and formal procedures” (16). Irele’s 
notion of conjunction of both themes and formal procedures in the African imagination is indeed 
germane to my argument that hybridity and childhood may serve a discursive strategy in African 
literature and law.  
The postcolonial notion that hybridity beckons mixture of cultures and the notion that 
children represent a society’s future merge in what I perceive as a possible discourse on cultural 
identity, which is an identity of cultural metissage. In the Francophone West African context, 
explored in this dissertation, childhood narratives are almost always narratives on the mixture of 
culture. These discourses developed in the footprints of the cultural discourses of the initial 
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Négritude movement. The movement’s initial self-glorifying cultural discourses are noticeable in 
the early childhood narratives of romanticized boyhood within a pristine African cultural 
civilization in the 1950s. Yet, the early childhood novels, the first-wave narratives such as 
L’enfant noir, Climbié, and L'aventure ambiguë, sowed the grain of mixture, which developed 
more concretely after the independences, by depicting children attempting to resist the 
movement towards mixture. In these novels, the assimilation of the protagonists into the 
colonizer’s culture suggests the failure of the resistance and the movement towards 
hybridization. The puzzlement caused by this movement towards mixture, of which narratives 
such as Maimouna and Sous l’orage are further illustrations, would gain stronger ground in the 
1970s, when African writers moved on to questioning some aspects of what was presented in the 
1950s as a glorious ancestral heritage. Women writers who rose in fame during this period 
focused on issues such as the gender imbalance and the biased phallocratic cultural tradition. As 
seen in this second wave of childhood narratives through the example of De Tilène au Plateau, 
Les danseuses d’Impé-Eya, Une si longue lettre, Le baobab fou, and Une vie hypothequée, this 
literature was also pregnant with African youth’s yearning for a more modernized society. But 
for African writers, modernization of African society, when understood as importation of 
Western cultures to Africa, is doomed to failure. They suggest this idea more clearly in the way 
various characters travel to the town or to the metropolis but need to return to their sources after 
disillusion. From the 1990s on, a disabused African youth appears in literature as “grilled on 
both sides,” to use the expression of Birahima, the protagonist of Allah n’est pas obligé. This 
disillusioned youth, sandwiched between the violence of two cultural worlds, will not survive 
unless s/he adapts to his/her hybrid identity. This quest for balance has been presented in novels 
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such as Rebelle, L’ainé des orphelins, Allah n’est pas obligé, Le ventre de l’Atlantique, and La 
petite fille des eaux. 
This trajectory of African childhood narratives describes clearly the shift in cultural 
discourses in the literature of the continent. The novels examined need not quote Senghor or 
Négritude to illustrate their interest in the early discourses on the “return to the source” and in 
the later discourse on metissage that Négritude promoted. Similarly, it can be said that the 
mounting criticism of Négritude as seen in Adotevi’s work in the 1970s may also have 
contributed to the questioning of cultural discourses observed in that period. The link of these 
works to Négritude has not always been obvious to literary commentators. For instance, the work 
of Camara Laye, L’enfant noir, which was accused of not following the Négritude attitude of 
resisting the colonizer, was proved to be promoting precisely such a philosophy. Senghor, in this 
instance, defended Camara Laye’s L’enfant noir for promoting the authentic African cultural 
heritage which the Négritude movement sought to restore (Liberté 1 155). The later novels from 
the 1990s, which are highly hybrid linguistically and thematically, reflect the new cultural 
discourses that Senghor and Cesaire sought to promote through ideas such as the “rendez-vous 
du donner et du recevoir,” cultural métissage, and the civilization of the universal. Debates about 
African identity have shifted since the end of the Cold War, which reinforced globalization. This 
shift is more clearly reflected in African writers’ focus on cultural pluralism, manifest in notions 
such as cultural hybridity or metissage. The later cultural discourse of Négritude paved the way 
for this new trend, which is now influential in the postcolonial Francophone African literary 
arena. I shall contend that childhood narratives, particularly, convey the continuity and 
discontinuity in Négritude’s cultural discourse, because they have served as one of its privileged 
channels of expression.  
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The hybrid and pluralistic mode of expression observed in childhood narratives seems to 
resurface in a different forum: legal discourses. The African Children’s Rights Charter, in fact, 
makes provision for an African childhood steeped in hybridity, at the intersection of African 
traditions and Western models, a characteristic which clearly echoes the development in literary 
discourses and their mode of expression. As a hybrid and legal pluralistic document, the African 
Children’s Rights Charter connects with the forms and content of the African childhood 
narratives. This connection, in my view, suggests that they may speak a common language: the 
language of metissage and multiculturalism. In fact, as a document of international law, the 
African Children’s Rights Charter inserts itself within the postcolonial discourses on the 
dynamics of power relation within the contemporary global order. In Critical International Law: 
Postrealism, Postcolonialism, and Transnationalism, editors Prabhakar Singh and Benoit Mayer 
complain that, while “one of the challenges for international lawyers is to go beyond national 
prejudices to evaluate problems from a global perspective,” the tendency has long been “to 
implement the rule, not to criticize it” (2). This situation has nurtured an unequal world order, 
because as scholars have noted, there is a lineage between international law and imperialism. 
Anthony Anghie remarked, for instance:   
It is clear that many of the world regions, Africa, South East Asia and East Asia have developed 
complex principles that governed relations among entities belonging to such groupings. By the 
19th century, however, all these regional systems were replaced by a European system of 
international law that all societies had to abide by if they were to acquire membership in the 
“Family of nations.” (27)  
Anghie, a pioneer in the postcolonial criticism of international law, tries to dispel in this passage 
the tendency of studying international law as if it were not entrenched in a historical process. By 
clearly bringing colonialism to the center of international law, he suggests the need to accurately 
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map the concerns of postcolonial societies so that their integration into the global order, if any, is 
equitable. Within the framework of these postcolonial examinations of international legal 
discourses, the African Children’s Rights Charter contributes its “fifty cents” by clearly sending 
the message that it represents a regional perspective, as opposed to the often-global perspective 
dominated by western interests. It is not a surprise that this regional treaty was created in the 
aftermath of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and was presented as a response to 
the frustrations of Africans with the UN process (Viljoen 205). The African Children’s Rights 
Charter in its own terms claims to be an instrument attuned to “the unique factors” of the 
continent. But the document as a whole can also be read as a response to the notion of global 
childhood, flowing from the UN convention. Scholars including Jo Boyden, Abdullahi Ahmed 
Na’im, Olga Nieuwenhuis, Judith Ennew, and Karen Wells have consistently identified such a 
global notion of childhood as one with its roots in Euro-American history and culture. This is not 
to say that the origin of such a notion should be construed as its inability to achieve global 
recognition. In fact, the African Children’s Rights Charter’s approach has been to Africanize this 
notion. This is perhaps why other commentators of the African Children’s Rights Charter, such 
as Amanda Lloyd (2002), read its innovative features as “reflecting the modernization of 
Africa,” as opposed to its “westernization” (187). The use of a hybrid mode of expression and of 
the theme of childhood seems to reflect an innovative approach and channel, and more 
importantly an aesthetics of reconciling an African past with its colonial realities in African 






At the end of this study of the convergence of literature and law, I would like to connect the 
possible significances of the hybrid and pluralistic mode of expression that characterizes 
contemporary African literary and legal discourses on childhood with a more general 
postcolonial discourse on cultural identity: multiculturalism. Today, the focus of African writers 
is indeniably oriented towards cultural pluralism. This focus also reflects African critical 
scholarship on cultural identity, which has shifted towards pluralistic concepts, including 
contamination, cultural hybridity, conviviality, and recently, Afropolitanism (see Eze). The later 
cultural discourse of the fathers of Négritude on cultural mixture fits well in this new trend. The 
notions of “rendez-vous du donner et du recevoir” and the “civilization of the universal” remain 
influential among postcolonial Francophone African writers. The endorsement of these notions 
in literary works ensures the continuation of the cultural discourses started during colonization. 
As Boniface Mongo-Mboussa notes in Désir d’Afrique, there is a tendency to read the 
development of African literature in terms of rupture, whereas the reality has been one of 
continuity. While Mongo-Mboussa sees this continuation in the way that the tone set by the 
pioneers is still recurrent, which keeps these pioneers as modern as possible, there is also 
continuation in the ways new writers try to take stock of the pioneers’ work to bring variation in 
the previous articulations. This pattern is more visible in the African childhood narratives, which 
are recognized as conducive to political discourses (see Alioune Sow, “Political Intuition”).  
The symbolism of the child as an avatar of culture and of a society’s future might certainly 
have played a role in enhancing the political value of such cultural discourses. In precolonial 
narratives, the child’s position in legendary narratives has been one of sacrifice for the society’s 
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perpetuation. The sacrifice of Queen Pokou’s son to the river Comoe, for instance, allowed the 
community to escape, survive, and thrive in the new world. But, since colonization, the discourse 
has shifted. And the metaphor of the child has changed as well. Now it is the community that 
must “die” for children to survive and perpetuate society. La Grande Royale suggested the idea 
to the Diallobés in L'aventure ambiguë. In exorting the local community and its culture to “die” 
through their children’s adoption of the invaders’ culture, La Grande Royale, as the African 
writer, imagines the hybridized African child who would exorcise the alienation that the local 
community was subjected to. Hybridization was embraced in African literature as a mode of 
expression to convey more powerfully the sense of transistioning from one single identity to a 
double identity following from the adoption of the invader’s culture. If the culturally hybrid child 
was portrayed in a hybrid literature, the rights of the same child needed a hybrid channel of 
expression in legal documents. Understandably, the African Children’s Rights Charter came to 
be such a hybrid and pluralistic legal document.  
As the congruence in the forms and content of the African childhood narratives and the 
African Children’s Rights Charter suggest, both the literature and the law speak a common 
language on metissage and multiculturalism. What such a language on metissage signifies, 
however, can be interpreted in various ways. Yet, the postcolonial context makes one of these 
interpretations more potent. Indeed, the combining of the hybrid mode of expression and the 
theme of childhood remind us of Irele’s notion of African imagination. The language on 
metissage could signify this self-reinvention, a discourse on African cultural identity as it stands 
in the contemporary global world. The African Children’s Rights Charter in this global context 
stands simply as a metaphor of what African identity has become. The same metaphor was used 
in literature, in Camara Laye’s L’enfant noir, which in the colonial context served as a response 
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to the colonizers’ discourses about Africans lacking a sense of civilization. L’enfant noir became 
a classic, not just because of its masterly use of the French language, but mostly because the 
author deployed an image of childhood which, while speaking to a particular cultural tradition, 
conveys the universal values of human society, its future and hopes. The African Children’s 
Rights Charter seems to deliver the same response to the dominant discourses conveyed through 
international law. It serves as a response to the notion of global childhood. In fact, the notion of 
African childhood developed alongside and in supplement to that of global childhood, which it 
seeks to Africanize. Like its global counterpart, the notion has never been formally defined. Yet, 
it is encountered in literature—e.g., in Camara Laye’s L’enfant noir, translated in English as 
“The African Child”—or in international discourses, as for instance in the International Day of 
the African Child,1 celebrated every June 16. The African child is also a notion in the African 
Children’s Rights Charter’s preamble. The relevance of a notion of African childhood may be 
questioned if one understands the qualifier “African” in its colonial connotation as “backward.” 
The contemporary meaning of African childhood as enshrined in the African Children’s Rights 
Charter is nowhere more legible than in the portrayal of the progressive shift in childhood 
discourses in the African literature discussed above. It is a childhood that stands for the 
multicultural, hybridized, postcolonial Africa. 
Yet, to claim this identity when one has been so long associated with a different identity can 
be even more difficult. Postcolonial societies have great difficulty in detaching themselves from 
their early perception. In fact, Bhabha notes in “The Other Question…” that colonial discourse 
“produces the colonized as a fixed reality which is at once an ‘other’ and yet entirely knowable 
                                               
1The International Day of the African Child was instituted by the Organization of African Unity and celebrated on 
June 16, in honor of students slain in the Soweto uprising the same day in 1991. The commemoration is now often 
utilized by the humanitarian community to make the case for the burdens of children on the continent.   
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and visible” (18). In other words, the ‘other’ is known and remains visible through changing 
stereotypes. The struggle against the demeaned African identity has long been portrayed in 
literature. But international law appears as one of the powerful instruments shaping 
contemporary society. It is not surprising that it appeals to African intellectuals as a forum to 
advocate the new African multicultural discourses. This is not a cynical idea, since international 
law is viewed as a perpetuator of colonial inequality. Anghie argues that: “colonialism, rather 
than being a peripheral concern of the discipline, is central to the formation of international law 
and, in particular, its founding concept, sovereignty.” Anghie is particularly vocal against the 
ways in which international law has always been animated by the civilizing mission, the project 
of governing and transforming non-European peoples (739). In fact, history is purposely poorly 
articulated in international law (Morss), and the early murky motives of international law are 
hardly acknowledged. According to Singh and Mayers, international law was “essentially born of 
the need to find new markets, raw materials, and to defend captured ships full of spices,” yet it 
“came clothed in the vocabulary of freedom and liberty…only to unleash colonization in the 
process” (13). No wonder that anticolonial leaders, including Senghor and Cesaire, viewed 
territoriality and sovereignty—the key foundations of international law—as other scourges, 
extending the fanonian criticism in The Wretched of the Earth to the “pitfalls of national 
consciousness” through which national elites would exploit their own people and set out a new 
form of domination.  
Indications that the African Children’s Rights Charter might serve as a discourse on African 
cultural identity in the global world come from the context surrounding the creation of this 
regional treaty. It follows from the development of the African quest to have its voice accepted 
in world forums such as the United Nations (see Adekeye and Scanlon). Viljoen provides a 
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typical example of the tendency to overlook African voices with the composition of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child. The committee consists of ten members, recognized for 
their competence in the field of children’s rights, elected by state parties. The “diplomatic 
language” of the CRC states that, in electing members to the committee, state parties’ 
consideration should be given to “equitable geographical distribution, as well as to the principal 
legal systems” (article 43). Yet, in January 1997, at the first election, only three of the ten 
members of the committee were from African states: Burkina Faso, Egypt, and Zimbabwe. 
According to Viljoen, this means that 30 percent of the membership of the committee was 
African, a figure that deviates slightly from the African percentage of the total number of state 
parties (which stood at 37 percent). At the same time, according to Viljoen, “the west European 
region was overrepresented” (200). He quotes LeBlanc as justifying this overriding of strict 
geographical considerations by reference to “the fact that ‘states in that region were the most 
active and constructive’ ” in drafting the UN convention on the rights of the child. Most 
importantly, “they also carry ‘the heaviest financial burdens’ in supporting the UN” (quoted in 
Viljoen 200-201). While being marginalized in decision-making, the welfarist approach to 
international law, scholars have noted, also exposes African nations to the system of carrot and 
stick. As parties to international treaties, African nations are likely to be subjected to reprisals for 
not conforming to “Eurocentric standards” (see Deplano 78). 
The articulations in the regional law of a changing notion of childhood in Africa, a notion 
that is at the crossroads of the traditional and the modern, do not merely represent the assertion 
of a hybrid identity; they also signal a social and political discourse and an aspiration to 
contribute the African voice to an already fully designed global order. This effort to contribute 
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the African voice to global discourses began in the literary and cultural discourses of the poets, 
playwrights, and novelists of the Négritude. 
Furthermore, the African Children’s Rights Charter, like its mother document, the 
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, represents a rejection of the division of labor 
between the West and Africa that was instilled during colonization. In this division of labor, the 
West is the thinker, the theorizer, in short, the creator of universal concepts and values. African 
and other societies in the world are mere consumers, when they are not simply providers of raw 
material. The frustration with this situation started, again in literary discourses, before its recent 
extension to legal discourses in Africa. In the preface to Myth, Literature and the African World 
(1976), Nigerian Literature Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka grumbled:  
We black Africans have been blandly invited to submit ourselves to a second epoch of 
colonization—this time by a universal humanoid-abstraction defined and conducted by 
individuals whose theories and prescriptions are derived from the apprehensions of their world 
and their history, their social neuroses and their values systems. (Emphasis in original) (x)  
 
Soyinka refers, here, to the ways in which African literary productions are judged by western 
academics according to their own realities. In opposing the constraints exerted on moral and 
artistic life in Africa from the West, African intellectuals devised theories to be applied locally. It 
seems that this process has reached the legal arena. One way to understand the hybrid nature of 
the African Children’s Rights Charter, therefore, could be that after trying to decolonize literary 
thoughts, it is also time to decolonize other disicplines, including legal thoughts. By Africanizing 
these thoughts, they would provide a more accurate representation of the distorted African 
identity, which is never fixed as a colonial reality, but in movement as a postcolonial one. In 
recent years, African lawmakers seek increasingly to “Africanize human rights.” The concept 
itself is fraught with insufficiencies, since ideas of human rights are universal and have existed in 
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one form or another in all civilizations. But a different and positive way to interpret this concept 
is to understand it as an expression of regional contextualization of international law in order to 
address specific regional human rights challenges. Although reading the “Africanization of 
human rights” in this light helps avoid the cultural relativism that for some time prevailed in the 
local human rights discourses, it does not eclipse the more contingent issue that Soyinka’s banter 
unveils. The “universal humanoid-abstraction” defined by the West according to its history and 
heritage governs the world, and the mere idea of intending to attend to regional issues with a 
regional approach is an assault on the “normal” order of global affairs. This approach, in fact, 
could detract from the international legal machine, which Anghie claims is like “a universal 
system of order among entities characterised as belonging to different cultural systems.” Anghie 
adds that the problem gives rise to what might be termed the “dynamic of difference.” In this 
dynamic, “international law posits a gap, a difference between European and non-European 
cultures and peoples, the former being characterised, broadly, as civilised and the latter as 
uncivilized” (742). If the earlier cultural identity discourses, such as seen in Négritude 
discourses, consisted of saying something like “we are more civilized than you think,” the new 
approach seems to be one of saying something like “we are part of the same diverse civilization.” 
And this particular discourse on sameness in diversity is traceable to the human rights advocacy 
endeavor of pioneers such as Julius Nyerere and, more clearly, Leopold Sedar Senghor, who 
indirectly spearheaded the creation of the mother document of the African human rights system.2 
In this regard, I must revisit here the opening address that Senghor delivered on November 28, 
1979, as president of the Republic of Senegal at the Meeting of African Experts tasked with 
                                               
2See Diagne, Ink of the Scholars (81), where he refers to Nyerere’s opposition to the hosting of an African human 
rights summit by dictator Idi Amin Dada and to Senghor’s direction to Juge Keba Mbaye to prepare a resolution 
which led to the drafting of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights.   
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preparing a preliminary draft of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. President 
Senghor more clearly urged the experts to be careful “so that [the] Charter may not be a Charter 
of the rights of ‘the African Man.’ Mankind is one and indivisible and the basic needs of man are 
similar everywhere.”3 But, he added, “that does not mean that we have to give up thinking by 
ourselves and for ourselves.” He then encouraged the drafters to show imagination by drawing 
inspiration from African traditions, keeping in mind the real needs of Africa and the values of its 
civilization (quoted in Heyns et al. 51). To be clear on what he really meant, President Senghor 
concluded his remarks stating that “if we want to build the Homo Africanus of tomorrow, we 
should, once again assimilate without being assimilated” (quoted in Heyns et al. 53). In plain 
words, Senghor was philosophizing about his notion borrowed from Teillard de Chardin, the 
“civilization of the universal.” He was clearly calling for a legal instrument cognizant of the 
metis, hybrid identity that the Homo Africanus has acquired by virtue of history. Drafting a 
regional law that borrows from modernism, that which does not misrepresent African civilization 
and deep nature is for Senghor the sine qua non condition to the harmonious development of 
African civilization in the context of the worldwide civilization, and such development requires, 
Senghor added, a scrupulous respect of freedoms and rights. The African human rights system is 
therefore clearly rooted in Senghorian humanism. To identify this characteristic does not mean 
such system is perfect, or that it is efficient. Senghor admitted in his 1979 address that 
“unfortunately, independent Africa can hardly teach a thing or two on human rights” (51). In this 
twenty-first century, the imagined African human rights system has yet to overcome this 
weakness. As I conclude, it is thus crucial to deplore the reality of the condition of human rights 
                                               
3Senghor was clearly trying to right the wrong in the European Convention on Human Rights adopted in 1950, 
wherein European included what is known as the “colonial clause,” excluding through article 63 the protective rules 
designed for Europeans to the people of Africa. As a member of the French Parlement, Senghor was a fierce 
opponent of article 63 (see Miltner 716-717).  
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on the African continent. I cannot end without condemning these continuous gross violations of 
human rights, although the primary focus of this study was never an examination of the human 
rights situation in Africa. Rather, it has been to connect the simultaneous processes within 
literature and law, which inventively use hybridity and childhood as both means and amplifier of 





FULL LIST AND SUMMARY OF FOLKATLES IN THIS STUDY 
 
EXTRAORDINARY CHILD 
1. “The Wise Child” (Berry 46) 
The chief in a village is infuriated by a child who gives himself the name “I-am-wiser-
than-a-chief” The chief commands the child to serve as his coiffeur in a sign of 
submission. The child in turn asks the chief to provide him with a kernel of corn for each 
hair he cuts. The chief falls into the trap, and no sooner has the child cut a few hairs, than 
the chief is out of his corn supply. The child then stops fashioning his hair. The chief now 
requests that his hair be reinstated, but the child then requests that the corn kernels also 
be reinstated on their cobs. “Alright! Debt cancels debt!” concludes the chief, who also 
orders the boy out of his territory. The following day, the boy is found to be destroying 
the property next to the chief’s compound. He is then captured and given to the soldiers 
for execution by drowning. On their way the soldiers, in order to fetch a canoe, 
temporarily leave the sack in which the child has been bound. The child, clever as he is, 
lures an old man and makes him believe that he is being taken forcibly to marry the 
chief’s daughter. The old man agrees to take his place and is drowned. In the meantime, 
the chief believes that the child who symbolizes rebellion to his authority had died. He is 
celebrating when the child appears again, declaring: “Listen, that place where you sent 
me under the sea, there is nothing but money!” Amazed by the news, the chief sends his 
wife. “Be careful, she might not return, because of all that money,” warns the child. 
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Indeed, the wife does not return, and the chief decides to get himself tied up and thrown 
into the sea. Thereafter, the child replaces the chief on his throne.  
2. “Les enfants terribles” (Chevrier, L’arbre à palabre 40) 
In a village, two twins, a girl and a boy, mock moral institutions and social norms for no 
cogent reason, but to create anarchy. The boy initiates the troubles and convinces his 
reluctant sister to follow through. They start off by killing their own parents. The king of 
their nation condemns them never to be fed, with the penalty that whoever feeds them 
will be executed. But the queen, seized with pity, provides them with food. The 
ungrateful children denounce her to the king, who executes the queen. Taking advantage 
of the confusion, the two twins find refuge on the biggest tree in the king’s courtyard. 
The king sits under the tree to rest from the recent events. The boy then defecates on his 
head just as a matter of play. Order is given to cut the big tree to capture the offenders 
and kill them. But as the tree bends under the bite of the hatchets, a small lizard sneezes 
and reinstates the tree. The boy kills the lizard. The tree finally falls. But, just in time, an 
eagle takes the twins on his wings to save them from certain death. The boy stings the 
bird’s anus with a sharp object. The bird drops these ungrateful children and, as they fall 
on the ground, they are saved by a turtle. The boy decides to eat the turtle and goes on to 
the next village in search of fire. The sister releases the turtle, but the boy finds it on his 
way back. The turtle is grilled and eaten. Thereafter, the two children are welcomed at a 
nearby farm and served food. Then, they are asked to care for the host’s child. They must 
grill a frog and feed the host’s child. Instead, they grill the child and give it to the frog. 
Moreover, the ungrateful children decide to make fun of their benefactors. They call their 
hosts and tell them: “Hey my friends, we grilled the child and gave it to the frog. But the 
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frog does not seem interested.” Then they run away, leaving the hosts grieving for their 
loss.  
3. “Adele and the Pineapple Child” (Berry 52) 
One of the two wives of a man is desperately barren and childless. One day, while going 
to the farm with her husband, the woman meets an old man in the forest who decides to 
fulfil her deepest desire. The unknown old man makes a child out of a pineapple and 
gives it to the woman. The condition imposed is to never call this child a pineapple child. 
Back in the village with the baby, the woman is ecstatic. Yet while singing as she cares 
for the baby, she inadvertently reveals what must never be said to the baby herself. Her 
co-wife, who is jealous and is spying on her, learns the secret. Several years pass and the 
child is now a young girl. One day, the mother leaves the child in the care of the co-wife 
and goes to the farm with her husband. Instead of attending to the child’s request for 
food, the co-wife grows angry and shouts: “Why are you so spoiled? Be quiet and give 
me some peace. After all, you are nothing but a pineapple child.” As soon as the child 
hears what must never be said, she begins to cry, leaves the house, and heads towards the 
forest. At the return of the couple they learn what has happened and the man runs after 
the girl, but too late. The little girl has taken up the spot where the old man uprooted the 
pineapple to make her. She begins to sing and as she sings, she also sinks into the ground. 
The man tries to pull her out but is only able to grasp her hair and hold it tightly to his 
breast. That is why man has hair on his chest.  
4.  “Soundiata Keita, héros historique et légendaire…” (Sidibé) 
Soundiata Keita, the son of a Manding king, is born in spectacular conditions to a 
hunchbacked mother, Sogolon Konté. Soundiata is crippled, but when a co-wife makes 
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an affront to his mother, he requests an iron stick, which he uses to gain usage of his legs. 
Despite the prediction of oracles that Soundiata is the legitimate successor, his half-
brother is installed on the throne at the death of the king. So Soundiata exiles him and 
prepares to conquer back the throne. During his journey, he becomes a mighty warrior, 
turns down the highest military rank in a rich kingdom, performs miracles, and defies and 
ridicules kings. Meanwhile, Soumangourou Kanté, a wicked king, continues to terrorize 
the entire Manding region. A delegation looking for Soundiata convinces him to return to 
the Manding. On his way back, Soundiata conquers all the small kingdoms and manages 
to form a powerful coalition to defeat Soumangourou. However, the defeat of the latter 
will occur when Soundiata learns his secret thanks to his sister, whom Soumangourou 
Kanté has married by force. Thereafter, Soundiata restores justice and set rules for a 
peaceful society. Soundiata became the most powerful emperor in the history of the 
Manding. 
ORDINARY CHILD 
5. “Taweloro” (Dadié, Légendes Africaines 81) 
A mighty king and his queen have been desperately hoping for a child. The queen 
remains barren, despite the science deployed by medicine men from all other world, but 
one day she miraculously falls pregnant. The kingdom celebrates for months. The queen 
gives birth to a girl of incomparable beauty. The two parents love their daughter so much 
that they refuse to marry her to any of the numerous suitors. Angry, the girl leaves the 
parental house and goes to the ocean. The queen searches for her everywhere in the 
world. She finally finds her near the ocean. However, by the time she is found, the girl 
has almost become a mermaid and refuses to return to the human world. Since then, the 
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queen has been living on the beach, crying and supplicating her beloved daughter. The 
tale says that she is the fog sometimes seen on the beach.  
6. “A Mother’s Love” (Berry 31) 
A mother is so negligent that she leaves her only daughter in the care of her co-wife. The 
co-wife, barren and jealous, decides to mistreat the child. Under the co-wife’s 
persecution, the child weeps and sings, telling travellers through her song to let her 
mother know her sufferings. As she sings, she sinks into the ground. Her mother finally 
hears the story but, by the time she arrives several days later, she finds the daughter neck-
deep into the ground. The mother then weeps and begs the child not to leave her. 
Following her promises for better attention, the gods take pity and crack the ground, thus 
freeing the girl. 
7. “Araignée et son fils” (Le pagne noir 143) 
A cruel but very courageous father throws his son several miles away because he is lazy. 
The boy falls in a place where a big snake takes cares of him. When he becomes mature, 
the snake gives him the power to become king. His kingdom is the most prosperous in the 
region. Soon the village of his father is under famine. The father later hears about the 
story of his son and goes in search of his banned son’s kingdom.  
8. “The Cruel Mother” (Berry 43) 
A beautiful and gentle girl has a very callous mother who treats her harshly. When the 
time comes for the gentle girl to get married, the nasty mother provides her with a basket, 
pretending that it is full of clothes and jewelry. In reality the basket is full of leaves and 
rope made to look like beads and trinkets. The mother tells the daughter, “when we were 
living together, you were nasty and headstrong….here is your reward.” When the 
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daughter finds out about the contents of the basket, she cries until her tears turn into a 
torrent. Then she sinks into the ground, bit by bit. Her mother then starts to plead and beg 
her not to leave her. It is too late and the daughter disappeared. The moral is that one 
should never be cruel to children.   
9. “La conquête du Baoulé” (Delafosse 159) 
Queen Pokou, whose dissident army has been defeated by her ruling brother’s, runs away 
with her people to escape the Ashanti warriors. When a sacrifice is requested at the river 
Comoe, Pokou asks her people to throw their babies in the water. All of them refuse. 
Then, Pokou takes her only son, adorns him with gold, and throws him into the water. 
Instantly, a big tree bends to bridge the two banks of the river. Pokou and her people 
cross the river and escape the enemy. Queen Pokou then leads her people into the new 
lands where she rules until she dies. 
10. “La légende Baoule” (Dadié, Légendes Africaines 5) 
Queen Pokou and her people, fleeing from a fratricidal war with the Ashanti, arrive at an 
agitated river. The diviner advises that to appease the river and cross its stream, the 
fleeing crowd must sacrifice their most valuable belongings. All the gold and ivory is 
given. But the diviner pushes away all the jewelry, pointing at the baby prince as the most 
valuable belonging. The Queen, at first reluctant, gives up her only child and, when it is 
thrown to the river, a barrage of hippopotamuses comes out of the water, allowing the 
crowd to cross. Once safe, the people bow down before the Queen, who has only one 
word to say: “Ba-ou-le,” that is, the child is dead. That word becomes the name of the 
Baoulé tribe.  
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11. “The Voice of the Child” (Berry 54) 
Elders considered as wise men in a village try desperately to save a dying woman. Then 
“a dirty-looking little child all covered over with yaw” asks them if he may say a word. 
“Get out of our way,” the men shout. But at the request of an old woman (the symbolic 
figure of the wise), the child is heard. His recommendations lead to the diagnosis of the 
illness, and three remedies are prescribed. One of the remedies is to provide the sick 
woman with a black cobra’s tongue, which the husband cannot get without risking his 
own life. The little child then kills the snake and provides the remedy, saving the man and 
his wife.  
12.  “L’enfant et la flute” (Nda 203)  
A disobedient child decides to go back to the farm at night to fetch his flute against his 
parents’ advice. The monsters of the forest capture him. He struggles to escape, while his 
parents are looking for him. In the hands of his captors, the child feels remorse and 
conveys this sentiment in a song. His captors, impressed by the song, agree to lead him at 
the entrance of his village where his song will lure his twin brother, so that the captors 
can have both of them. Through this strategy, the boy is able to escape and join his 
family.  
13.  “Le canari merveilleux”  (Equilibecq 116) 
Baffo, a bad-mannered girl, stubbornly refuses to work. But she has the annoying habit of 
touching anything she sees. Despite frequent punishments, she does not change. One day, 
at the market, Baffo sees some nice pieces of white pottery. She takes one and asks the 
next merchant: “What is the price of this canary?” “I do not know,” replies the man, and 
“anyway, it is not for sale,” he adds. Baffo disregards these words, throws down some 
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coins, and walks away with the pottery. However, the little white pottery is nothing but 
an egret which, at each market day, transforms to live a little in the midst of men. Baffo 
has not reached her hut when the pottery turns back into its bird form. The bird then grabs 
the little girl and flies with her to the top of a big tree, before flying away. Baffo screams, 
begging passers-by to warn her parents. They come running, bringing with them their 
black dog, who climbs the tree and comes back down with Baffo. The lesson benefits the 
girl, who corrects herself. And, by way of gratitude, she never forgets, each time she eats 
her couscous, to give the first and the last handle to the big black dog. 
 
DISADVANTAGED CHILD 
14. “Les deux sœurs et le chien” (Tersis 62) 
Two stepsisters live happily together, but when the mother of the first dies, the mother of 
the second sends her to do the most difficult tasks. One stormy night, the stepmother 
sends the orphan to go fetch the leaves needed to cook dinner. The girl goes in the forest 
and finds a dog watching over a thigh. The thigh commands the dog and the dog obeys. 
Both the dog and the thigh submit the girl to a series of tasks, which she performs 
jauntily. At the end, the thigh braids the orphan girl’s hair with gold and gave her clothes 
and other riches. When she returns home, the stepmother is furious and sends her own 
daughter to get the same. The second girl goes but refuses to obey the dog and the thigh. 
At the end she returns leprous.  
15. “Les deux sœurs et la vieille femme” (Tersis 72) 
A cruel stepmother sends an orphan girl to the farm to bring her brothers their lunch. On 
her way back, she finds a dead mouse and adds it to her basket. The blood of the mouse 
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stains the basket and the stepmother grows very angry, commanding the orphan to go 
wash it at a dangerous pond. The girl goes to the pond and finds an old woman who is a 
spirit. The spirit subjects the girl to several trials and at the end gave her a gourde. The 
girl follows the instructions and returns to the village with a herd of animals. The 
stepmother becomes jealous at the sight of this success. She sends her own daughter to 
bring the lunch to her brothers. The stepmother’s daughter finds the dead mouse and 
stains the basket. She is now sent to wash it at the pond. But she is so disrespectful that 
even though she is given a gourde, she does not follow the instructions and, ends up 
being eaten up by wild animals. 
16. “La cuiller sale ” (Diop 177) 
Binta, whose mother has died, grows up under the persecution of her stepmother, while 
Penda, her half-sister, is pampered. One night, the wicked stepmother chastises Binta for 
having forgotten to wash a dirty wooden spoon, then sends her to wash it at the 
dangerous sea of Danyane. In search of the sea of Danyane, Binta meets mysterious 
creatures to whom she addresses herself politely. These creatures, in return, grant her 
material aids and blessings. At the end of her journey, she meets the mother of all the 
wild animals, who submits her to trials. After passing all these tests, Binta returns to her 
village with the cleaned spoon, as well as a huge fortune that makes her stepmother 
jealous. The stepmother sends her daughter Penda to the Danyane sea to collect the same 
fortune. But Penda is so impertinent that she irritates all the mysterious creatures she 
meets on her way. At the end of her journey, she returns with curses and is devoured by 
ferocious animals at the entrance of her village. 
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17. “La cruche ” (Dadié, Le pagne noir 23) 
Koffi, an orphan boy, breaks his stepmother’s pitcher. Angry, the stepmother sends the 
boy to find one that is exactly the same. On his way to the difficult assignment, the boy 
encounters various types of frightening creatures—a crocodile, a foul-smelling monster, a 
devil—before reaching a village of old women. In this village, he must tell his story to 
each of the many old women, each of whom asks him to comb her hair, clean her 
fingernails and toenails, wash her and fetch water for her. The orphan submits to these 
various tasks willingly and with a smile. The old women, satisfied, give him two gourds, 
with specific recommendations on what to do with them. Koffi does as he is told and 
magically finds himself in the company of his mother, who in turn gives him a pitcher in 
replacement of the one he broke, and three more gourds. When the boy breaks the 
gourdes following his mother’s instructions scrupulously, he returns to the village with 
riches, and as a king with castles and people to inhabit his kingdom. The stepmother, 
envious of the orphan’s fortune, sends her own son, a spoiled child, to do as the orphan 
did and become rich. So, the stepmother’s son sets out for the same journey as the 
orphan. But, as he meets various creatures, the same ones the orphan encountered, he 
refuses to submit to the tasks given to him. Nevertheless, he is given the gourds at the end 
of his journey with the same recommendations the orphan was given. But the 
stepmother’s son not only disrespects all the creatures, he also ignores their instructions 
on what to do with the gourds. As a result, when he breaks the last gourds, the earth 




18. L’enfant pianique (N’da 82) 
A sick child goes from village to village to seek help. The child arrives at a village where 
no one pays attention to his demands, except a poor man. When the night comes, he tells 
the man to leave the village with his family. The man obeys and the unkind inhabitants of 
the village turn into rock the following day.  
19. “L’enfant lépreux” (Görög-Karady, L'enfant dans les contes Africains 29) 
One of the four children of a woman is leprous. Every time she returns home from a farm 
with a basket of fruit, she sings a song in which she calls every child by name and asks 
him to come help her discharge the load and eat the fruit. Only the leprous child is not 
invited to do so. The sick child is only left with the seed kernel of the fruits to lick, after 
his brothers have eaten all the good parts. This life goes on for a while. One day when the 
mother is out, a crocodile who has been spying on this family comes and sings the song. 
The spoiled children try to open the door, but the leprous child warns them that the voice 
is not their mother’s. They do not open the door but report to their mother that the leprous 
child forbade them to open the door when altruistic people came to offer them some food. 
The mother flogs the leprous child and tells him never to interfere when strangers try to 
help. The following day, the crocodile comes back and the spoiled children open the 
door. The crocodile swallows them. When their mother returns, she sings and sings, but 
her favorite children do not come out. The leprous child then tells her what has happened. 
She calls out for help and the entire village starts to look for the lost children. In vain. 
Then the leprous child asks for a donkey and a knife. He is mocked for his effrontery, 
but, because of his insistence, he is provided with the requested objects. The leprous child 
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finally saves his brothers and brings them home to the astonishment of his mother. Ever 
since, says the story, even if your child looks like excrement, he should never be rejected.  
20. “Les trois frères” (Chevrier L’arbre à palabre 127) 
Three half-brothers promise a proper funeral to their dying father. At the death of the 
father, each of them undertakes initiatives to gather the fortune necessary for the funeral. 
The two elders fail. The youngest of them returns home after having managed to acquire 
the power to metamorphose into all kinds of animals. He decides to metamorphose into a 
horse to be sold by his brothers to kings. After the sale he flees, becomes human again 
and returns home. The brothers repeat the scenario with several kings until they have 
become rich. But the two elders decide to get rid of the younger brother. They know that 
if they sell the horse to a ‘marabout’ the younger brother will not come back. So they sell 
it to a ‘marabout’. But the brother manages to escape and punishes his elders by turning 
them into a cock and a donkey, before celebrating a impressive funeral for his father. 
21. “Le paralytique et sa sœur” (Chevrier L’arbre à palabre 132) 
At the death of their parents, a sister decides to marry and abandon her paralytic brother. 
The paralytic brother begs the sister in vain. She leaves with her new husband, leaving 
the paralytic little brother trailing behind them. But a spirit takes pity of the paralytic 
brother and transforms him into a mighty king. After years, the sister's husband marries 
another and the sister is left to beg to survive. She arrives at the village where her 
paralytic brother is king. Her brother tries to help her, but she becomes ashamed, turns 
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